Liberation of Goa: Why there is little to be proud of the landmark event

While it is true that the liberation of Goa from centuries of colonial rule by the Portuguese is a landmark event in contemporary Indian history, there is much to learn about Indian statecraft of the time when one considers that it took fourteen years for a large and resurgent democracy that claimed leadership of a large bloc of nations to evict a fading colonial power. Defeated by the Dutch and the British in most of their colonial battles in Asia, Goa in India and the two African colonies of Angola and Mozambique remained the only Portuguese colonial possessions in the 20th century. Several factors resulted in the inability of one of the most inspired and effective independence movements to evict an insignificant and militarily weak colonial power for almost fifteen years after having forced the world’s mightiest colonial power to leave India’s shores. While the initial impetus to the freedom struggle in Goa came in 1946 from Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, a Congressman turned Socialist; the movement fizzled out once he left the Congress in 1948. The reason for this neglect was geopolitics in the literal sense. With Kashmir and Hyderabad holding centre-stage in the whole process of the unification of India along with the amalgamation of all the princely states into the Union, it is likely that smaller provinces like Pondicherry and Goa, which were still under colonial rule by France and Portugal respectively, were considered expendable for some time by the ruling Congress government for a few reasons. Three reasons for the lethargic response of the Government of India towards local aspirations for Goan freedom from Portuguese rule seem plausible. First was that the Indian government expected that seeing India’s willingness to use force to defend its sovereignty and coerce several recalcitrant Maharajahs to join the Indian Union, it would only be a matter of time before the Portuguese left Goa. Once the guns fell silent in Kashmir and Hyderabad in 1948, Nehru went on a diplomatic offensive for the next decade, championing peaceful resolution of conflicts and was highly critical of the unfolding ‘Cold War’, even playing ‘peacemaker’ in Korea by having Maj Gen KS Thimayya lead the UN Repatriation Force there. In the bargain, he effectively put paid to any immediate chances of using force to evict the Portuguese from Goa.

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A third reason for the ‘go slow’ on Goa could be attributed to the political reality of the Opposition parties like the Communist Party of India and other parties like the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) attempting to take up cudgels on behalf of the nationalist movement in Goa and pressurising the GoI to initiate military action to liberate Goa. In the bargain, politics scored over nationalistic aspirations and resulted in more than a decade of procrastination on Goa by the Government of India. Had the ruling Congress party been at the forefront of the Goan nationalist movement, military intervention may have come about earlier. From a Portuguese perspective, the reluctance to leave Goa was due to a misplaced sense of territorial propriety on the part of the Portuguese government under the Fascist dictator, Salazar, and a delusion that NATO and the US would come to its rescue should India use military force to evict them from Goa. Though much is attributed to Soviet influence that finally legitimised India’s use of force, the former had little to benefit from any overt support to India over Goa, preferring instead to support the anti-colonial struggle against the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique. Thus, it was clear that any pressure to liberate Goa had to come from within India. Nehru made several peaceful overtures to the Portuguese government, urging it to pay heed to the nationalistic aspirations of the Goan people, but to no avail. On 15 August 1955, a large group of over 3,000 Goan freedom fighters or Satyagrahis led by the communists attempted to march on the capital Panjim in a show of solidarity with the Goan freedom movement. The march was brutally opposed by the Portuguese security forces, which killed and injured many peaceful marchers; the number of casualties suffered by the peaceful protesters was put at 22 killed and 225 wounded, as stated by Dr Gaitonde, the renowned Goan historian and reported by American political scientist Arthur Rubinoff in an authoritatively researched monograph. Surprisingly, Nehru’s Congress government did not endorse or support the Opposition-led movement stating that the violence it had perpetrated was against the principles of conflict resolution eschewed by India. It was clear that narrow and opportunistic politics and a premature need for global importance was scoring over nationalism and integration. At this juncture, had the ruling government ignored international opinion and mobilised its armed forces as it had done when Kashmir was threatened, or when the Razakars in Hyderabad had stepped-up genocide against the majority Hindu population, Portugal may have been sufficiently coerced to leave Goa without a fight. Unfortunately, this did not happen and Goa kept simmering with discontent for another six years. As the political opposition to the Congress became stronger, so did the pitch for the liberation of Goa. The late 1950s saw significant international criticism of India’s policy of non-alignment and lack of support for militant liberation movements in Africa, particularly from within the developing world. Making matters worse for India’s international stature was the failure of the Panchsheel Agreement with China and the increasing prospects of conflict with its powerful northern neighbour. Facing domestic flak over numerous developmental and security concerns, and faced for the first time with serious electoral challenges, Nehru had no choice but to silence his critics and order military action to evict the Portuguese in the winter of 1961. The author is a military historian and the President’s Chair of Excellence at National Defence College, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal. Read all the Latest News , Trending News ,  Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.