For non-specialists in Washington DC, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the SCO Summit may appear like a reaction to US President Donald Trump’s anti-India campaign and an attempt to seek China as an alternative to the United States to make up for the downturn in the India-US relationship. But that would be far from the truth.
For more than a year, India and China have been engaged in consistent diplomacy to bring stability into the bilateral relationship and minimise conflict.
In October 2024, India and China reached an understanding to partially resolve the military standoff in Ladakh that began with Chinese incursions in 2020 — well before Trump began his anti-India campaign. The deal made way for a meeting between Modi and Xi on the sidelines of the Brics Summit in Russia, which was their first meeting since the military skirmishes of 2020 plunged the bilateral relationship to the worst point since the India-China War of 1962.
Sharing my remarks during meeting with President Xi Jinping. https://t.co/pw1OAMBWdc
— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) August 31, 2025
The decisions announced earlier this month during Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi , such as the resumption of direct flights, visas, and border trade, were therefore a result of longrunning diplomatic efforts and not merely a reaction to Trump’s actions. And to dub ongoing India-China engagement as a reaction to Trump’s actions would therefore be a very simplistic —and incorrect— explanation for a complex emerging relationship between India and China.
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Impact Shorts
More ShortsAnnouncements during Wang’s visit were low-hanging fruits and neither reflect any real realignment nor resolve the fundamental stressors — the fact remains that China continues to occupy more than 43,000 square kilometres of Indian territory in Aksai Chin for decades, disputes India’s sovereignty over Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, and supports Pakistan to the hilt against India.
However, recent statements from China, including statements from the Chinese military leadership, signal Beijing’s push to renew bilateral ties. India, however, has been cautious in trusting its northern neighbours given a long history of reversals after friendly moves. Trump’s tirade against India has just highlighted the recent reshape in India-China ties.
Ahead of the PM Modi-Xi meeting, the China’s defence spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang referred recent bilateral talks, describing them as “positive” and “constructive” to say that the two should work together to keep peace and calm along their shared border.
This is the first time that China’s defence spokesperson has spoken publicly about the outcome of bilateral talks, saying that both sides exchanged views openly and reached several agreements.
The 24th round of talks on the India-China boundary issue took place on August 19 in New Delhi, led by India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Zhang said this year marks 75 years of diplomatic ties between China and India, making it a good moment to build on this progress. He called for both countries to strengthen mutual respect and trust, peacefully coexist, and pursue common development and cooperation.
Officials in Delhi see these comments from the Chinese military as a positive sign for the future of relations between the two countries.
On the other hand, experts don’t seem to be too excited about recent moves by China. Anushka Saxena, a China researcher at the Takshashila Institution’s Indo-Pacific Studies Programme, says, “China still continues to withhold granting India any clearly specified concessions because it sees tensions on the border as a leverage — like a burning pot they can reduce and enhance the heat on when they deem necessary."
“There is also no softening from China on India’s ties with the United States. China understands that India will continue to balance between itself and the United States, and finds itself in an advantageous position because Trump has decided to deal with China alone. If India-US ties don’t improve, China may aim to use the strain to its advantage,” says Saxena.
Realism drives India’s approach to China
At a time when the United States, India’s principal partner in tackling the Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, has itself turned into a problem , India’s approach to China has been shaped by a realistic understanding of the power differential between the two countries and deep dependence on China-centric supply chains. But that does not mean that outcomes of the reset have been one-sided that favour China.
Last year, a notable success of the boundary deal for India was the inclusion of areas that China had long declared to be off-the-table, according to Saxena.
“During negotiations, China often termed patrolling at Depsang and Demchok and the issue of grazing areas as out of the scope of talks. Even though disengagement earlier happened in Pangong Tso and Gogra-Hot Springs areas, the issue of Depsang and Demchok remained deadlocked as China dubbed them ‘legacy issues’. So, it was a win for India that patrolling and grazing rights there were secured,” says Saxena.
Yet, at the same time, in the reflection of the fact that the deal involved both sides arriving at a middle ground —as is the purpose of negotiations— instead of either India conceding to Chinese aggression or China relenting fully to Indian demands, China was allowed to patrol again in the Yangtse area near Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang.
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In ongoing India-China negotiations, there are signs that a similar middle ground is being sought as positions of both sides appear to be evolving.
In the Indian readout about Wang’s talks in New Delhi, India’s position appears to have evolved from the previously-stated position about the boundary question. To some observers, it appears to be a “softening” aimed at easing tensions.
For example, the ‘Early Harvest’ proposition agreed upon in talks with Wang appears to be an evolution —Saxena puts it as “major softening”— of India’s position which had not mentioned any fast-track settlement starting with the Sikkim sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto India-China border, in recent years.
“Voices from the military leadership in India even argued that New Delhi should first propose restoration of status quo ante in Ladakh and Galwan Valley regions, and subsequently move on to de-escalation and de-induction. Now, the Indian press release mentioned ‘de-escalation’ and ‘delimitation’ —settling some non-contentious stretches of the border on the map— as opposed to ‘de-induction’ — permanent removal of troops,” Saxena says.
This may be a signal that the Indian position has evolved — a “slow and slight reversal of its stance of all or nothing of 2020-22” in Saxena’s words.
Moreover, India and the rest of the world have realised China has a trump card in the form of rare earths — China controls around 90 per cent of the world’s supplies. Until India with like-minded partners come up with substantial alternatives, it is in India’s interests to stabilise the relationship with China by arriving at a middle ground to talks to continue.
Cooperate, compete, and confront
India appears to be following the adage that’s often repeated about China: cooperate where you can, compete wherever possible, and confront wherever you must.
As Trump’s anti-India campaign —ranging from tariff war to offering to mediate on the Kashmir issue , something non-negotiable for India, and Operation Sindoor to aligning with India’s adversaries— has put the extent of US support under question, a peace understanding with China in managing frontier s serves Indian interests. Similarly, as Xi increasingly focuses on Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, it is in China’s interest to keep India fronts quiet.
As up to 60 per cent of Indian exports to the United States are set to be affected by Trump’s tariffs , India is exploring not just new export destinations but also sources of investments. And that’s where the improvement of ties with China comes into the picture.
As Firstpost previously reported, proposals are under consideration for revising the ‘PN3’ notification of 2020 that essentially barred Chinese investments in India. It has been learnt that the harsher provisions could be diluted and certain safeguards with strict enforceability requirements could be brought in. This could be part of the trade-offs that India and China are making as part of their complex negotiations.
If China asks India to make concessions in PN3 in exchange for easing export licensing restrictions in rare earths and magnets, it most likely is India’s national interest to consider it, says Saxena.
However, none of these developments —announcements during Wang’s visit, possible PN 3-rare earths trade-off, boundary talks— mean that India and China have changed their fundamental approaches to one another. As recently as May, China supported Pakistan to the hilt in an armed conflict with India to the extent that Lieutenant Rahul R Singh, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, said that China was India’s backdoor adversary and India was in fact fighting three adversaries in the conflict: Pakistan, China, and Turkey.
Saxena tells Firstpost, “Settling the LAC question once and for all is a long-drawn marathon that the two sides will run at their own paces, and there is no guarantee that another future unilateral assertion by China may not derail talks. It is also important to note here that China understands well that this delimitation exercise means much more to India than to itself, which is also why it has pushed so hard to seek concessions rather than grant them.”
India is of course aware of this and that’s why even as talks are progressing with China, there is no slowdown in infrastructure development in border areas or withdrawal of soldiers. India is also working towards improving surveillance capabilities that allow for better monitoring of border areas. With the reset, the two sides are moving to a new normal instead of the pre-2020 period where India had a far more accommodative stance.
In any case, the extent of the differences is such that not even a border agreement could make India change its stance. Saxena highlights that India and China have structural faultlines that make resolving the issue a complex and difficult challenge.
Even as India and China reached a border agreement last year, neither India gave up on enhancing the partnership with the United States or the relevance of Quad in the Indo-Pacific nor India relaxed its stance on investment and trade and the securitisation of economics remained, according to Saxena.
Now that Trump is engaging directly with China and has tampered with the relationship with India, engagements with like-minded middle powers such as Australia and Japan are important in addressing the challenge from China. But this may not mean the Quad is dead as Trump-induced slump may not be permanent.
“It is highly useful for India to partner with middle powers in the face of managed competition between the United States and China. This is because assuaging tensions with the two powers cannot mean that India halts diversification of supply chains or discontinues investments in other alliances,” says Saxena.
“Similarly, under Trump, the Quad may not matter much but it could under the next president. So it also wouldn’t make sense for India to abandon the institution, and at least build linkages with Japan, Australia, and interested stakeholders —political or corporate— in the United States through endeavours like Quad Investors’ Network (QUIN),” says Saxena.
Some other commentators have already started suggesting that the Quad, if Trump continues his current policies, could give birth to a triad of India, Japan and Australia for maritime security and disaster relief in the Indo-Pacific. PM Modi spoke about during his bilateral talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba during his just-concluded visit to Tokyo.