Rajnath Singh’s visit to Maldives was fruitful but Chinese machinations and volatile domestic politics keep ties shaky

During his recent visit to the Maldives from 1 to 3 May, the first by an Indian defence minister to the Indian Ocean archipelago in 11 years, Union defence minister Rajnath Singh achieved quite a few objectives in his characteristic understated style. Ever since the Ibrahim Solih government came to power in 2018 and the pro-China former president, Abdulla Yameen, was sent to jail by a criminal court for 11 years on charges of money laundering and corruption, Indians have been breathing easy. Solih embarked on an ‘India First’ foreign policy and sought to put bilateral ties with New Delhi back on track that had suffered grievous damage under Yameen. With Yameen in jail and Solih the sole candidate for presidential elections due later this year, an impression persists that India no longer needs to worry about developments in its maritime backyard. This impression is wrong. Assumptions of comfort are cold. A flurry of recent high-level visits from India indicates that New Delhi anticipates air pockets ahead in bilateral ties. External affairs minister S Jaishankar went to the archipelago in January and signed a number of agreements on developmental assistance, launched several key India-supported infrastructure projects and handed over two sea ambulances under a grant assistance scheme. He was followed by India’s defence secretary Giridhar Aramane in March, who co-chaired the fourth Defence Cooperation Dialogue (DCD) in Male where ongoing bilateral defence cooperation activities were reviewed. In his first overseas visit since taking over as Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral R Hari Kumar went on a three-day visit to the Maldives last April. Defence Minister Singh, along with his Maldivian counterpart Mariya Didi, laid the foundation stone for the MNDF (Maldives National Defence Forces) Coast Guard ‘Ekatha Harbour’ at the Uthuru Thila Falhu naval base during his visit. The harbour aims to make the Maldivians self-sufficient, and it might be used for docking, maintaining, and repairing vessels without having to send these to India. Th Ekatha Harbour repair hub at Sifavaru in UTF atoll, one of India’s  biggest grant-in-aid projects, is expected to boost the capacity building of the Maldivian coast guard, facilitate regional HADR efforts and help Maldivians control and conduct surveillance in their exclusive economic zone. India is already assisting the Maldives in building a  naval dockyard at the UTF atoll and the harbour, the agreement for which was signed during Jaishankar’s visit in February 2021, reinforces India’s image in the Maldives as a reliable partner and a provider of economic benefits and security. Singh came bearing two more gifts. He handed over two critical ‘Made in India’ defence platforms to Male — a fast patrol vessel and a landing craft assault ship. According to a defence ministry readout, the fast patrol vessel is capable of coastal and offshore surveillance at high speeds and was commissioned as the MNDF Coast Guard ship Huravee. It is not just about the projects and gifts. The rhetoric that emerged during the defence minister’s three-day stay also demands equal attention. Singh defined India’s outreach towards the Maldives under the broad frameworks of Neighbourhood First and Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). The clarity in messaging is essential. From these broad frameworks, the outreach is then defined further and made granular. The first is ‘shared commitments’, where the Indian defence minister described the handing over of the two critical indigenous defence platforms as a ‘symbol of the shared commitment of India and the Maldives towards peace and security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)’ and called for creating a “symbiotic relationships where we can learn from each other, grow together and create a win-win situation for all. India’s commitment to support the Maldives will only get stronger with time.” He was careful to point out though, as the defence ministry readout made it clear, that India’s “enhanced defence partnership” is only for “friendly foreign countries, that is accommodative of their national priorities and capacities.” The message won’t be lost on a country where bilateral ties under President Yameen, a China lackey, was so dire that the island nation had asked New Delhi to take back a naval helicopter that was gifted to Male. Second is security partnership where India sees its role as net security provider. On the bilateral talks on defence cooperation between Singh and Didi, the India-Maldives joint communique stated that the “ministers welcomed the progress made in ongoing defence cooperation between the two neighbours, including joint exercises and exchanges of visits by military officials. They also noted the importance of sharing best practices and expertise in areas such as counter-terrorism, disaster management, cyber security and maritime security.” The Maldives enjoys membership of the trilateral maritime security dialogue along with India and Sri Lanka. The fourth edition of the dialogue was held in 2020 when national security advisor Ajit Doval went to Colombo after a gap of six years. Bangladesh, Mauritius and Seychelles have observer status in the dialogue. India’s efforts, as the joint statement indicates, remain focused on preserving the status, integrity, interdependence, and integral nature of both nations’ security architecture. The third part of the messaging relates to China, and this is where things get explicitly interesting. Given the strategic location of Maldives, a key maritime neighbour whose security is intrinsically linked to India’s national security, the growing Chinese presence and the resultant geostrategic rivalry is of immense concern to New Delhi. Beijing’s massive resources and willingness to use its resources to gain and entrench leverage in the island states within India’s sphere of influence have left New Delhi with almost no margin for errors. Among the small island states in the Indian Ocean such as Sri Lanka, Mauritius or Seychelles, where India hopes to remain the security contributor and a ‘partner of choice’, New Delhi is increasingly being made to sprint just to ensure that it remains on the same spot. Singh, in his message during the visit, made a significant statement while handing over the fast patrol vessel and a landing craft assault to MNDF. He said, “The Indian Ocean is our shared space. The primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in the region rests with those who live in the region. Peace and security of a region are best secured with cooperation and collaboration of the regional players”. The words are a thinly veiled swipe at non-resident troublemaker China and a message to Maldives. That message was entrenched further when the joint statement at the end of Singh-Didi bilateral talks read: “Both ministers reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace, stability & security in the region and recognised the need to work together to address common security challenges. They underscored the importance of respecting international law & rules-based international order and expressed their commitment to upholding these principles.” Singh’s dig at China on Maldivian soil is one thing, though that still denotes the changing equation under the Solih government. But getting Maldives to make tacit anti-China statements given the fact that Solih is careful not to burn the bridges with China even as he hews the country closer to India, is quite another. It indicates that India has managed to create some space for itself when it comes to competing for public opinion on the archipelago, but New Delhi still faces considerable challenges in a nation where China is aggressively expanding its footprints and stepping up multifaceted engagements. First, Maldivian domestic politics is unpredictable. Solih is still the sole presidential candidate for upcoming elections later this year, but h0 is Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) is plagued with internal squabbles and one-time mentor and party chief Mohammed Nasheed has turned against him. Solih won the MDP primaries in January, but former president Nasheed has refused to accept the results. Meanwhile, even though Yameen is in jail, his challenge in the upcoming polls is by no means over. Yameen had polled 42 per cent vote share in the 2018 elections that he lost to Solih, but his Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) has refused to field an alternative candidate and is likely to take Yameen’s case to the country’s Supreme Court where an acquittal (if on time) may mean that the former president will be back in the game. Yameen’s ‘India Out’ campaign may again be revived as the election dates draw near. One of the reasons why that campaign has found resonance on the ground is increased radicalization among Maldivian youth, leading to anti-India sentiment. The Pakistani hand in Islamist radicalization of the youth is increasingly visible. N Manoharan relates in Deccan Herald how “over the past decade, the number of Maldivians drawn to the ISIS and Pakistan-based madrasas and jihadist groups has risen. Protests by Islamists bearing ISIS flags are frequent on the island…It is the same forces that are involved in anti-India activities in the archipelago.” The author goes on to add, “Pakistan-based jihadist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) have exploited these fault lines through their charitable fronts to establish a foothold, especially in southern Maldives, in the garb of relief operations.” The third point of worry, of course, is China. While India has focused on reinforcing security ties and boosting longstanding civilizational and cultural connect with Maldives, China has made big ticket investments in key sectors and placed the country under a massive debt burden. Beijing’s involvement in Maldives includes the expansion of Velana international airport — part of the BRI projects, construction of roads, five-star resorts, housing projects such as one of 7,000 apartments on the reclaimed island of Hulhumalé near Malé, the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, a land reclamation project According to Radhey Tambi in The Diplomat, Maldives is one of the largest debtors of Beijing, and its total debt is roughly $6.5 billion, amounting to over 30 per cent of its gross national income. Of that, Maldives owes an estimated $1.4 billion to China – and possibly as much as $3.5 billion. For a nation where tourism constitutes almost 75 per cent of the GDP, says an estimate by Asian Development Bank, China’s status as the biggest source of tourism for Maldives gives Beijing even more leverage. India’s proximity and longstanding status as Maldives’ closest security partner bring its own set of challenges with New Delhi-funded projects often falling prey to domestic political brinkmanship. For instance, India’s proposed opening of a consulate in southern Addu atoll — that would have been the first diplomatic post for any country outside of Male — had in principle support from the Solih government and even the local community and representatives, but the project remains ultimately in limbo on charges of India’s ‘heavy handedness’. India’s position in Maldives, as in other small island states on its periphery requires careful calibration, constant attention, and a deft touch. Given Maldives’ location, India cannot afford to drop the ball. It must work towards ironing out the wrinkles in ties while ensuring that it doesn’t become an issue in domestic politics — an eventuality that sometimes becomes impossible to avoid. The author is deputy executive editor, Firstpost. He tweets @sreemoytalukdar Read all the Latest News, Trending News, Cricket News, Bollywood News, India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.