India, China reach border agreement, but Delhi should still walk cautiously

The India and China possible agreement on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) reported by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri on October 21, 2024, could mark a significant milestone in ongoing efforts to de-escalate tensions in the Ladakh Sector. This decision, following extensive diplomatic and military negotiations, could suggest a strategic breakthrough in resolving a border standoff that has persisted for over four years, with more than fifty thousand troops stationed on both sides.

The disengagement at key friction points in areas like Depsang and Demchok represents a potential step toward stabilising one of the most contested borders in the world. Yet the given past reputation of Chinese rubbishing agreements when convenient (though China has confirmed that a resolution has been reached), this announcement presently will at best serve to prepare the atmosphere for Modi-Xi talks on the sidelines during the ongoing BRICS summit in Russia.

The Line of Actual Control: A Historical Flashpoint

The root cause of the India-China conflict lies in their shared 3,440-kilometre-long border, commonly referred to as the Line of Actual Control. This ill-defined frontier, running through challenging terrain, has been a constant source of tension between the two nuclear powers. Unlike conventional international borders, the LAC remains a de facto boundary, the perception of which differs significantly between the two countries. India and China have historically held different views on the demarcation of the LAC, leading to frequent disputes over the exact control of strategic points along the boundary.

The Galwan Valley clash in June 2020 was a stark reminder of the volatility that characterises the border. This incident, the first in 45 years to result in casualties, escalated bilateral tensions to unprecedented levels and has been a catalyst for both nations to build up their military presence and infrastructure along the frontier.

Diplomatic Efforts and Strategic Calculations

In the wake of the Galwan Valley standoff, both India and China engaged in a series of negotiations to mitigate the risk of further escalation. Diplomatic and military dialogues, such as those led by India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and China’s Director-General for the Department of Asian Affairs Li Jinsong, were possibly instrumental in achieving the recent breakthrough. The Chinese Defence Ministry’s statement last month about reducing differences and building consensus reflects both nations’ recognition that a prolonged military standoff is unsustainable, especially as they compete for regional influence.

These discussions gained additional momentum with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s scheduled visit to Russia for the BRICS Summit, a multilateral forum where both India and China have overlapping interests. The timing of the agreement highlights the significance of multilateral diplomacy in diffusing bilateral tensions, suggesting that external diplomatic engagements may have created a conducive environment for the latest round of negotiations.

Depsang: The Gateway to Key Infrastructure and Supply Lines

Depsang, situated in northern Ladakh, holds significant military importance due to its location near the Karakoram Pass and the Siachen Glacier. This area serves as a critical gateway to key military infrastructure and supply lines for India. Control over Depsang allows India to maintain a defensive posture in the Siachen sector, a militarised glacier that plays a crucial role in India’s national security.

However, Depsang has been a long-standing site of contention, with China frequently blocking Indian patrols and attempting to prevent India from accessing key areas. Should this disengagement be fully realised, it could not only ease tensions but also improve India’s ability to secure its supply lines and infrastructure in northern Ladakh. Yet, the tactical importance of Depsang means that any shift in control here would have far-reaching consequences for the balance of power along the LAC.

Similarly, Demchok, located in southeastern Ladakh, is another critical region, both strategically and symbolically. It lies near important infrastructure and supply routes, such as the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road, which is crucial for maintaining India’s connectivity to remote border areas. The region’s proximity to the Tibet Autonomous Region also makes it a key point of interest for China. Any shift in control here could have significant implications for India’s border management and its ability to secure key supply lines.

A Step Toward Sustainable Peace or a Temporary Respite?

While the agreement on patrolling arrangements signals progress, the underlying tensions between India and China are unlikely to dissipate quickly. The December 2022 clashes in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh, though less severe than the Galwan incident, underscore the fragility of peace along the border. Both nations have invested heavily in military infrastructure in the region, signalling that they remain prepared for potential conflict despite ongoing talks.

The larger question is whether this disengagement represents a genuine move toward a lasting resolution or a temporary measure designed to buy time. China’s rise as a global power and India’s strategic partnerships with countries like the United States make the LAC a key battleground in the broader contest for influence in Asia.

Trust Issues and China’s Ambiguity: A Cause for Concern?

One notable aspect of the recent agreement is the absence of an official confirmation from China regarding the disengagement and patrolling arrangements along the LAC. While Indian officials have expressed optimism and announced progress, China has often been less transparent in its statements, which raises questions about Beijing’s true intentions.

Historically, China has been known to employ a “salami-slicing” strategy, advancing its claims incrementally while projecting an image of cooperation. This ambiguity raises doubts about whether the latest agreement is a genuine step toward peace or a tactical move designed to induce complacency in India. By creating a temporary lull in tensions, China could buy time to consolidate its position along the border, build further infrastructure, or shift focus to other strategic objectives, leaving India vulnerable to future provocations. This lack of trust remains a fundamental obstacle to achieving long-term stability in the region, requiring India to remain cautious and vigilant even in the face of diplomatic progress.

Conclusion

The agreement reached between India and China on patrolling arrangements along the LAC needs to be approached cautiously. It will be tested by the realities on the ground. Yet if true, it could reflect the success of sustained diplomatic efforts and a shared interest in avoiding further military confrontations. However, the deeply entrenched differences over the LAC’s exact demarcation, coupled with the broader geopolitical rivalry between the two nations, mean that this agreement is likely a small step in a much longer process.

The need is disengagement, followed by disengagement. The disengagement, if fully realised, could set the stage for more comprehensive solutions, but sustained peace will require continued dialogue, confidence-building measures, and mutual restraint. However, it would be wise for India, given the Chinese chameleon culture, not to allow any complacency set in which may compromise national security. Meanwhile, Indian Defence Forces are fully prepared to stymie any miscalculations of the Chinese and ensure the territorial integrity of the nation.

The author is former Director General, Mechanised Forces. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.