How China’s V-Day parade is more psychological warfare than a proof of strength

Every time Beijing decides to roll out its men and machines in a parade, the world is made to watch. Missiles taller than buildings, tanks painted for effect, troops goose-stepping in perfect rhythm, all crowned by the Party’s leaders waving from their balcony. It is a theatre of cognitive war, scripted down to the second. The message is simple: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modern, mighty, and ready.

But are these parades really proof of military power, or are they theatre dressed up as strength? That is not an idle question. For India, facing a China that was confronted at Doklam, clashed at Galwan, and massed in Ladakh, the answer has direct implications for strategy and security.

An Army That Hasn’t Bled in Decades

The last time China fought a proper war was in 1979, when it tried to teach Vietnam a “lesson”. The lesson went the other way. The PLA suffered heavy losses, revealed a lack of coordination and hobbled back across the border. Since that time, China has created an impressive arsenal: hypersonic missiles, stealth fighters, nuclear submarines, cyber units, and space assets. On paper, it looks impressive. But paper doesn’t fight.

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Modern wars demand something more than equipment lists and parade discipline: adaptability under fire, morale when things go wrong, and logistics that don’t crumble. None of these has been tested in China’s case. Contrast this with the Indian Army, which has faced battle across terrains—from Kargil’s icy heights to counter-insurgency in Kashmir and the northeast. Our military may not put on parades on a Chinese scale, but it has been bloodied and knows the chaos of real combat.

When Chinese Gear Met Indian Firepower

If you want proof that Chinese equipment doesn’t always translate into battlefield edge, look at what happened in Operation Sindoor. Pakistan came armed with Chinese-origin platforms—fighter jets, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and artillery systems—but when it came to actual operations, their performance was ordinary at best, if not outright disappointing. Systems that looked sleek on brochures and parades crumbled against Indian defences and air power.

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That experience should temper assumptions about the PLA’s own arsenal. If the Chinese kit, given to Pakistan, cannot tilt the scales even in limited confrontations, how much confidence should the world place in its ability to deliver decisive results in a larger conflict?

The Pakistan experience is a warning: hardware may look impressive in parades, but combat is the only test that counts.

Cognitive War: Where Beijing Plays Smart

What China does understand—and exploit—is the power of the mind. The “Three Warfares” doctrine (public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare) has been absorbed into every PLA move. Parades are part of that game.

Domestically, they feed nationalism and anchor the party’s legitimacy. Internationally, they plant fear and doubt. When China rolls out hypersonic missiles in front of the cameras, the message is less about technical capability and more about inevitability: resistance is futile.

We saw this in the Taiwan Strait in 2022. Amphibious rehearsals, missile launches, encirclement manoeuvres — all broadcast with precision. Did they represent a concrete invasion plan? Likely not. But they rattled Taipei, unsettled Washington, and reinforced the narrative that China could act when it chose. That is cognitive warfare in practice.

Cracks Behind the Spectacle

The parade may be grand, but the underlying structure is still shaky. The PLA is still absorbing a massive reorganisation into theatre commands, forcing services to fight jointly, and professionalising an officer corps long used to hierarchy and rigidity. Such shifts are disruptive and far from smooth.

Corruption has eaten into the system, too. The purge of Rocket Force generals, men running China’s crown jewel, its nuclear and missile arsenal, exposed rot at the very core. No number of goose-steps can erase that.

Then there’s the soldier. Unlike Indian regiments that carry history, pride, and tradition into battle, the PLA depends heavily on conscripts and political commissars. Soldiers are taught loyalty to the Party, not to the profession of arms. That discipline works in peacetime, under the gaze of surveillance cameras. But in prolonged war, when casualties mount, can commissars keep morale intact?

And logistics, the dull but decisive factor. Beijing can roll convoys down its avenues, but sustaining forces in Ladakh’s rarefied air or projecting credible strength into the Indian Ocean is another matter entirely. In Galwan, Chinese troops came with numbers, but they discovered what attrition and terrain can do. In Ladakh, their deployments have been heavy, but sustaining them through winters is a different war altogether.

India’s Lesson: Don’t Be Fooled, Don’t Get Carried Away

For India, the temptation is either to dismiss Chinese parades as a circus or to panic at the sight of shiny hardware. The truth lies midway. Beijing has perfected the art of three warfare, and it is employing theatrics to showcase its prowess. That cannot be ignored. But India must not fall into the trap of measuring itself by the parade standard.

Operation Sindoor was a good step, a show of integrated strength, and a reminder that India too can prevail in modern warfare. But that must not lead to complacency or euphoria. War is not won on past glory, nor will two wars be the same. The real task lies ahead: building a force that can deter, fight, endure, adapt and prevail across every domain.

What Needs Fixing Now

India must push beyond symbolism. Four urgent priorities stand out:

• True Multi-Domain Jointness: Functional commands, not endless committees or premature theatre ambitions. Integration that works in war and integrates the multidomain battle space.

• Narrative Power: China plays the cognitive game well. India must sharpen its own messaging to deter, to reassure, and to inspire.

• Technology Independence: Wars will be fought at machine speed. Drones, AI, space assets, and electronic warfare must be homegrown. Imports won’t save us mid-battle.

• Cut the Red Tape: Procurement delays, bureaucratic inertia, and service silos are peacetime luxuries. They are wartime liabilities.

Closing Note: Beyond the Parade

China’s parades are powerful theatre, no denying that. They impress, they intimidate, and they sustain the Party’s story of inevitability. But behind the show, the PLA remains untested, riddled with corruption, and struggling with reform. Its equipment has already shown its limits in Pakistani hands. Its soldiers haven’t tasted modern combat.

India’s task is clear. Respect the psychological game, but don’t be trapped by it. Avoid the comfort of our own spectacles, however uplifting they feel. The real grind is in building a joint, resilient, multi-domain capability that can withstand attrition, fight in difficult terrain, and operate seamlessly across cyber and space.

Wars are not won with salutes on Chang’an Avenue. They are won in Galwan, in Doklam, on Ladakh’s icy ridges, in the dark waters of the Indian Ocean, and in the silent grids of cyberspace. That is where India must prepare for the fight, not the show.

The author is former Director General, Mechanised Forces. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.