Celebrate Kargil Vijay Diwas not just for military victory but also diplomatic triumph

The Kargil War, which is celebrated as Vijay Diwas (Victory Day) on 26 July, was not just a military triumph but also an unprecedented diplomatic success for India. One may say without an iota of doubt that Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil marked the beginning of its isolation in the international community.

Three months before the detection of infiltration of intruders in Kargil in May 1999, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in an attempt to thaw the tensions between India and Pakistan had taken a bus ride to Lahore. A hug that was shared between him and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, however, proved to be a mirage for a long-term bonhomie between the two countries.

On his arrival at Lahore in February 1999, Vajpayee had said, “I bring the goodwill and hope of my fellow Indians who seek abiding peace and harmony with Pakistan. I am conscious that this is a defining moment in South Asian history and I hope we will be able to rise to the challenge.”

Vajpayee was let down as India and Pakistan engaged in a conflict once again, this time in Kargil, Drass and Batalik sectors in northern Kashmir.

This conflict, in military history, has been recorded as an extraordinary example of high-altitude warfare, which came with significant logistical problems for the Indian side. It was also only the second instance, the first being the China-USSR border conflict of 1967, when two nuclear states engaged in conventional warfare. Probably this weighed on Vajpayee’s mind when he decided to drive every intruder out of the Indian territory but under no condition the Indian forces were to cross the Line of Control (LoC).

While the valorous army (Operation Vijay) and air force (Operation Safed Sagar) actions brought success on the battlefield, it was a visionary move on the part of the then Indian leadership led by Prime Minister Vajpayee to move the navy to choke Pakistan, which finally brought it to its knees. The naval action was named Operation Talwar and it saw large deployment in the northern Arabian Sea, with Pakistani media reporting that 30 ships were at the doorsteps of Karachi.

Through the aggressive patrol of the sea, the Indian Navy sufficiently indicated its intent to create a blockade. Nawaz Sharif was to later reveal that on the day it was made known to him about the presence of the Indian Navy close to Karachi, Pakistan had just six-days of fuel in its stock. Faced with the impending economic crisis and the fall of Tiger Hill, Nawaz Sharif flew to the United States on 4 July to seek intervention of President Bill Clinton to end the conflict.

Here Vajpayee’s bus diplomacy stood in the way of US intervention. Clinton mentions in his biography that he could not but applaud Vajpayee’s bus trip and the resolve to not cross the LoC despite Pakistan’s intrusion. Vajpayee’s decision to limit the conflict to Kargil, Drass and Batalik sectors helped retrain the operations from turning into a ‘Kashmir Conflict’, which would have invited adverse international attention.

The US, which had been a great votary of bilateral talks between the two countries, this time around put the condition on Pakistan that talks could begin only after Pakistan had withdrawn its forces from areas designated to be under the Indian control as per the Shimla Agreement. While Pakistan accepted the proposal, its non-state arm United Jihadi Council, a conglomerate of the Pakistan-backed terrorist groups, refused a climb down.

This led to the final phase of assault towards the end of July by the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. Given the rout of the military, facing international isolation, trade blockade and the risk of larger conventional war convinced Sharif to ask Pakistani troops to vacate territories. Vajpayee decided to announce a cease of hostilities only after every inch of territory designated to be under Indian control had been cleared of the intruders.

Pakistan, both militarily and diplomatically, never recovered from the setbacks suffered from this misadventure. Domestically, it led to another military coup; while democracy has been now restored in the neighbouring nation, it remains only in word and not in spirit.

Internationally, Kargil led to Pakistan witnessing loss of a long-time and steadfast ally in the United States. While China continues to support it more for the reasons of creating turmoil in India, it has not helped the beleaguered country come out of the economic turmoil it finds itself in.

Though Pakistan has continued to fan terror activity across the border and despite big episodes like Mumbai-2008, Uri-2016 and Pulwama-2019, the damage had been limited and immediately controlled. India has also rebutted these assaults through surgical strike in 2016 and Operation Bandar in 2019. On both the occasions, Pakistan could not mobilise the support of the international community against the Indian actions.

Despite such emphatic victory and Kargil operations capturing popular imagination, for several years the celebration of the Kargil Vijay Diwas remained a low-key affair. While the heroes of Kargil war became part of the folklore, questions were raised about Kargil being a successful operation.

There is no denying that the initial intrusion by Pakistani elements into the Indian territory was definitely a setback. However, under a resolute political leadership, all the three arms of the Indian military launched operations which were highly successful. Complemented by aggressive diplomatic moves thereafter has ensured that Pakistan has remained cornered on international platforms.

Kargil indeed calls for a celebration for not just winning a military conflict but also establishing Indian finesse in modern warfare and diplomacy.

The writer is an author and president, Centre for Reforms, Development & Justice. Views expressed are personal.

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