Why does Trump’s ally Orbán keep buying Russian oil despite Western pressure?

Despite mounting pressure, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán remains firm in his refusal to end Russian oil and gas imports, even as other European Union (EU) members diversify away from Russian energy supplies.

At the heart of the issue lies Orbán’s close relationship with United States President Donald Trump.

The Hungarian leader’s stance has not only angered Washington but also complicated the EU’s efforts to impose stronger sanctions on Russia amid its ongoing war in Ukraine.

Trump’s demand: Nato must stop buying Russian oil

In his recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, Trump intensified his calls for Nato allies to cut off Russian energy completely.

Standing alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whom he described as a “brave man,” Trump publicly criticised Nato nations for continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas.

“China and India are the primary funders of the ongoing war by continuing to purchase Russian oil. But inexcusably, even Nato countries have not cut off much Russian energy and Russian energy products … I found out about it two weeks ago, and I wasn’t happy,” Trump said.

He went further, framing the purchases as an act of self-sabotage by Nato nations, “They’re funding the war against themselves. Who the hell ever heard of that one?”

Trump has repeatedly argued that for US-led sanctions to have any meaningful impact on Moscow, Nato members must join Washington in implementing similar measures.

He declared that he would not impose the “very strong round of powerful tariffs” he has long promised against Russia until Nato nations act in unison.

“They have to immediately cease all energy purchases from Russia. Otherwise, we are all wasting a lot of time,” Trump warned.

In a post on his Truth Social platform, he added: “I am ready to do major Sanctions on Russia when all NATO Nations have agreed, and started, to do the same thing, and when all NATO Nations STOP BUYING OIL FROM RUSSIA.”

Trump’s frustration stems from the fact that nearly three years into the war, some European countries remain dependent on Russian energy, blunting the effect of Western sanctions. He also hinted that Nato should consider more aggressive defence measures, such as downing Russian aircraft if they violate alliance airspace.

However, he later clarified that this would depend on the circumstances. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio struck a more cautious note, saying such action should only be taken “if they’re attacking.”

Hungary: The last major importer of Russian oil in Nato

While Trump’s comments were directed at Nato as a whole, they were aimed most directly at Hungary, which is now one of only two EU countries — alongside Slovakia — still importing significant volumes of Russian oil.

Hungary’s state-owned MOL Group brings in approximately five million tonnes of crude annually via the Druzhba (“Friendship”) pipeline. This infrastructure links Russia to Central Europe and supplies refineries in both Hungary and Slovakia.

For Orbán’s government, this dependence on Russian imports has grown rather than diminished since the start of the war. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 61 per cent of Hungary’s oil came from Russia.

Today, that figure has climbed to 86 per cent, making Hungary more reliant on Russian energy than at any point in recent history. Slovakia has also moved in the same direction and is now thought to be almost entirely dependent on Russian oil.

Natural gas follows a similar pattern. Hungary and Slovakia both receive Russian gas through the TurkStream pipeline, which runs from Russia across the Black Sea and into southern Europe.

These two countries have consistently been the most vocal in opposing EU-wide bans on Russian energy imports, arguing that they have no feasible alternatives.

Hungary’s defence: “A purely physical question”

Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has defended his government’s position by framing it as a matter of infrastructure and energy security rather than politics.

“We can’t ensure the safe supply [of energy products] for our country without Russian oil or gas sources,” Szijjártó told The Guardian on the sidelines of the ongoing United Nations General Assembly.

While acknowledging that he understood Trump’s stance, Szijjártó claimed that Hungary’s situation is unique.

“For us, energy supplies are a purely physical question,” he said.

“It can be nice to dream about buying oil and gas from somewhere [besides Russia] … but we can only buy from where we have infrastructure. And if you look at the physical infrastructure, it’s obvious that without the Russian supplies, it is impossible to ensure the safe supply of the country.”

This position reflects Hungary’s heavy reliance on the Soviet-era Druzhba network and the fact that most of its energy infrastructure is geared toward imports from the east.

According to Szijjártó, until sufficient alternative pipelines and routes are available, cutting ties with Russia would threaten the stability of Hungary’s energy grid and economy.

Choices versus necessities for Budapest

Independent research organisations argue that Hungary and Slovakia do have realistic alternatives to Russian energy — they simply have not pursued them aggressively.

A report by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) highlighted several options.

For crude oil, the countries could tap into Croatia’s Adria pipeline, which has spare capacity and could supply non-Russian sources of crude.

In the case of natural gas, Hungary and Slovakia could access liquefied natural gas (LNG) through existing European infrastructure.

LNG terminals in Germany, Poland, Italy, and Greece already handle global supplies, meaning these countries could secure deliveries from producers outside Russia.

While the Hungarian government argues that Russian imports are cheaper, European Commission data paints a different picture.

Gas prices for end consumers in Hungary and Slovakia are among the highest in the EU, suggesting that ongoing purchases from Moscow are not delivering cost savings to households or businesses.

Critics accuse Budapest of deliberately deepening its ties with Moscow despite knowing that this money is helping to finance Russia’s war in Ukraine — the largest conflict in Europe since World War II.

Slovakia signals willingness to shift

Slovakia, while aligned with Hungary in resisting immediate sanctions, has shown more flexibility in recent weeks.

Slovak Economy Minister Denisa Saková stated that her country has already spoken with the US about its energy dependence and received a sympathetic response.

“As long as we have an alternative route, and the transmission capacity is sufficient, Slovakia has no problem diversifying,” Saková said.

This stance suggests that Bratislava may be open to transitioning away from Russian energy if the necessary infrastructure and logistical support are put in place.

Orbán’s political calculus

Orbán’s refusal to cut ties with Russia is also influenced by domestic politics. Hungary is set to hold parliamentary elections next year, and the availability of affordable energy is a key issue for voters.

By maintaining a steady flow of Russian oil and gas, Orbán can portray himself as protecting Hungarian households from rising costs, even if data shows consumers are paying some of the highest rates in the EU.

This strategy has worked for Orbán in the past. He has repeatedly used his veto power within the EU to delay sanctions against Moscow, only backing down when offered concessions or financial incentives.

This has earned him a reputation as a skilled negotiator willing to leverage Hungary’s position within the bloc for political gain.

At the same time, Orbán has maintained cordial relations with both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has been outspoken in his criticism of Ukraine and has positioned himself as a defender of Hungarian sovereignty against what he views as EU overreach.

With inputs from agencies