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RJD won the most votes in Bihar. So why did it lose the election?

FP Explainers November 15, 2025, 17:59:33 IST

The Bihar election produced a striking outcome; the RJD secured the highest vote share at 23 per cent but won only 25 seats, while the NDA swept 202 seats. The result exposed gaps in seat distribution, alliance disunity and caste-based miscalculations that prevented the Mahagathbandhan from converting statewide support into victories

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RJD leaders Lalu Yadav and Tejashwi Yadav. File Image/PTI
RJD leaders Lalu Yadav and Tejashwi Yadav. File Image/PTI

The 2025 Bihar assembly election delivered a dramatic contrast between statewide voter preference and the final distribution of seats.

The Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), which headed the Mahagathbandhan coalition of opposition parties, secured the largest share of votes among all political parties but suffered one of its worst seat outcomes in recent memory.

Despite contesting in more constituencies than any other party and running a visible, high-energy campaign, it finished with only 25 seats.

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Meanwhile, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) registered a sweeping victory with 202 seats, enabling the BJP-JD(U) alliance and its partners to retain control of Bihar without much resistance.

So why did a party with the highest popular support end up so far behind in the final results?

How RJD failed to convert seats

According to Election Commission data, the RJD won 23 per cent of all votes cast, surpassing not only its allies but also both major NDA constituents, the BJP and JD(U).

This level of support was marginally lower than the 23.11 per cent it achieved in 2020, but still enough to make it the single-largest vote-earning party this time.

However, seat totals tell a very different story. The RJD finished with only 25 of the 143 seats it contested, a significant drop from its 75-seat performance five years earlier.

In absolute numbers, the RJD received 1,15,46,055 votes, while the BJP, contesting 42 fewer constituencies, received 1,00,81,143 votes and secured 89 seats.

This disparity shows how the spread of votes across constituencies influences the outcome in a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system.

The RJD’s substantial vote share reflected strong competition in many constituencies, but in a large number of seats, its candidates finished as runners-up. While these votes contributed to the party’s total tally, they did not convert into legislative representation.

The phenomenon was also shaped by the party’s decision to contest the highest number of seats among all parties. The RJD fielded candidates in 143 constituencies, compared to the BJP and JD(U), each contesting 101.

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More candidates create more opportunities to accumulate votes, including from losing candidates. But without strategic concentration of vote banks, this can inflate the vote share while not necessarily improving the seat count.

In effect, the RJD won more total votes than the BJP but did so across constituencies where those votes were not strategically distributed to convert into victories.

How Tejashwi Yadav’s campaign could not deliver seats

Tejashwi Yadav’s campaign marked a generational shift in Bihar politics. Positioned as the principal face of the Mahagathbandhan, he conducted large rallies, attracted sizeable turnouts, and attempted to project himself independently of his father Lalu Prasad Yadav’s political legacy.

His prominence indicated that his personal appeal remained strong across many parts of Bihar, despite constant references by opponents to the “jungle raj” of past RJD administrations.

While he succeeded in establishing himself as the central figure of the opposition, the campaign’s heavy reliance on his persona sidelined other alliance leaders, weakening representation from Congress, CPI(ML)L, CPI(M), CPI, and VIP across constituencies.

RJD framing its manifesto as “Tejashwi Pran” highlighted this personality-centric tactical choice. Alliance workers from the smaller constituents struggled to feel connected to a campaign dominated by one leader.

The result was that the large gatherings did not reflect an equivalent level of support on ballot day.

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How the Mahagathbandhan alliance fractures contributed to problems

Seat-sharing negotiations within the Mahagathbandhan lingered until the final stages of the pre-election period, delaying candidate announcements and weakening campaign groundwork.

Several party candidates were declared only on the last day of nominations, leaving inadequate time for constituency-level mobilisation.

The most damaging outcome of this disorganisation was the appearance of rival candidates from within the alliance in multiple seats.

In constituencies such as Vaishali, Chainpur and Bachhwara, Mahagathbandhan constituents directly competed against one another. In Bachhwara, this internal split enabled the BJP to win in a triangular contest that featured opposing candidates from the Congress and CPI.

Such internal contradictions led to widespread confusion among voters and significantly diluted the coalition’s ability to present a united alternative.

In contrast, the NDA, despite housing multiple parties with their own interests and resentments, publicly projected a cohesive image throughout the campaign.

Their branding as the “Five Pandavas” — the BJP, JD(U), HAM, RLM and Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) — reinforced this perception of coordinated unity.

How Mahagathbandhan failed to grasp the caste dynamics in Bihar

Caste arithmetic is central to electoral outcomes in Bihar, and both coalitions attempted to consolidate core vote banks.

Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs), comprising roughly 112 castes and accounting for approximately 36 per cent of Bihar’s population, became a crucial demographic target.

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The Mahagathbandhan sought to appeal to this large voter bloc by projecting Mukesh Sahni — a leader from the Mallah community — as its proposed deputy chief minister.

The Mallah community represents around 2.6 per cent of the state population, and the alliance hoped his prominence would attract support from across EBC communities.

However, this strategy did not translate into successful results. Sahni’s party contested in 12 seats but won none.

A key reason was the lack of shared identity among EBC sub-castes, many of which did not consider Sahni as representing their interests. This limited the influence of his projection as a major leader within the bloc.

In parallel, the Mahagathbandhan did not position any representative from the Muslim (around 17 per cent) or Scheduled Caste (19 per cent) communities as a potential deputy chief minister.

This decision appeared to have created dissatisfaction within these demographics, as they traditionally form significant segments of the alliance’s support base.

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This oversight likely contributed to the coalition’s inability to generate high turnout from critical communities in several regions.

How differing election promises aided NDA

Tejashwi Yadav’s flagship pledge was to provide a government job for every household, a proposal that would require nearly 26 million jobs.

While this promise was aimed at addressing a major youth concern in Bihar, the lack of an articulated implementation roadmap caused many voters to view it sceptically.

The NDA exploited this uncertainty, consistently arguing during the campaign that the pledge was unrealistic. Without a clear counter-narrative, the Mahagathbandhan struggled to neutralise this criticism.

At the same time,Bihar  Chief Minister Nitish Kumar introduced a direct-benefit scheme promising Rs.10,000 to women, a move that significantly boosted his credibility among female voters.

Bihar saw an exceptionally high turnout of women voters — approximately 71 per cent of those who voted — making this policy announcement particularly influential.

The Mahagathbandhan’s competing promise of Rs. 2,500 for women under the Mai Behan scheme did not generate equivalent traction, partly due to the alliance’s inconsistent messaging and limited visibility across its partners.

The Congress attempted to highlight concerns about what it described as vote theft and fraud through a Vote Adhikar Yatra, with Rahul Gandhi joining Tejashwi Yadav during the latter’s campaign in parts of Bihar.

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But, after this phase, the Congress’s senior leadership largely stepped back from extensive campaigning within the state, leaving the alliance without a sustained narrative on key issues like employment, roads, public health, and education.

What the final results in Bihar say

The final results reflected the cumulative impact of organisational weaknesses, misjudged political strategies, caste dynamics, and narrative dominance.

  • RJD: 25 seats (highest vote share at 23 per cent)

  • Congress: 6 seats out of 61 contested

  • Left parties (CPI(ML)L, CPI(M), CPI): 3 seats combined

Mahagathbandhan total: 35 seats

  • BJP: 89 seats

  • JD(U): 85 seats

  • LJP (Ram Vilas): 19

  • HAM: 5

  • RLM: 4

NDA total: 202 seats

The numbers illustrate how effectively the NDA converted its collective vote share into seats, while the Mahagathbandhan, despite strong individual pockets of support, failed to achieve the consolidation needed across constituencies.

With inputs from agencies

Follow the Bihar Election Results Live, for real-time counting, seat tally, and key updates, and explore more stories on our Bihar Election 2025 for in-depth coverage. Stay informed with Firstpost for explainers, sharp opinions, and the latest news from India and around the world.
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