When Ukraine gave up world's 3rd-largest nuclear arsenal, did it set stage for Russian invasion?

In 1991, the third-largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world was with an unexpected nation: Ukraine.

Over the next decade, Ukraine gave up all of those weapons in a multinational arrangement which included security guarantees in lieu of nuclear disarmament.

Over the next decade, the security guarantees unravelled and Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine’s Crimea and annexed it in 2014. The multinational agreement as well as security guarantees were dead and buried.

Now, as Russia’s war on Ukraine is set to enter the fourth year in coming weeks, Putin has made threats of nuclear attack central to his messaging to Ukraine and the world. With no nuclear weapons of its own, many now wonder if giving up nuclear weapons was the biggest blunder that paved the way for Putin’s invasion.

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How Ukraine got 3rd largest nuclear arsenal

At the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a large chunk of its nuclear arsenal was stationed in Ukraine. As Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union, it came in possession of the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal — much larger than British, French, or Chinese arsenals.

In 1991, Ukraine had around 5,000 nuclear warheads, including around 3,000 so-called ’tactical’ nuclear warheads and 2,000 ‘strategic’ warheads, according to Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal at the time included 176 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers with some 1,240 warheads.

These missiles included 130 SS-19s, each capable of delivering six nuclear weapons; 46 SS-24s, each armed with 10 nuclear warheads; and 14 SS-24 missiles.

There were also several dozen strategic nuclear bomber aircraft armed with around 600 air-launched missiles and gravity bombs.

How Ukraine gave up nukes in ultimate blunder

Even though there were voices in and out of Ukraine that called for the retention of these nuclear weapons, Ukrainian leaders at the time decided to give up the weapons in exchange for security guarantees and help with the development of a civilian nuclear energy programme.

In 1994, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and United Kingdom signed the ‘Budapest Memorandum’ for the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine.

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However, even before the signing of the agreement, Ukraine had removed all 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons from its soil by 1992, according to FAS.

Under the Budapest Memorandum, the signatories —including Russia— assured Ukraine that no nation would use force against Ukraine and all nations would respect its boundaries and sovereignty. They assured Ukraine that if anyone attacked it, they would initiate immediate aid to Ukraine via United Nations Security Council (UNSC) — the United States, UK, and Russia are permanent UNSC members.

Notably, when Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons, the weapons were not dismantled, but were transferred to Russia. This meant that Russia’s nuclear arsenal was strengthened at the cost of Ukraine’s — and US and British governments facilitated it.

The weapons that could not be transferred were dismantled and weapon-launch platforms were also demolished. The United States bore the cost of the dismantling and demolitions, totalling at around $399.2 million, according to FAS.

There were warnings that the nuclear disarmament could be a blunder for Ukraine.

In 1993, political scientist John Mearsheimer argued in an article that it was “imperative” for Ukraine to hold onto nuclear weapons “maintain peace” as these nuclear weapons would be a deterrent and would ensure that Russians, “who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it”.

Now, three decades later, Mearsheimer stands correct. In the absence of any nuclear deterrence, Putin has occupied a fifth of Ukrainian territory and has plunged Europe in the worst security crisis since World War II. He is showing no signs of relenting and is aiming to maximise his gains on the back of support from China, North Korea, and Iran, at a time when a friendly leader in Washington —Donald Trump— is expected to cripple the West’s support to Ukraine.

But how realistic are Russian nuclear threats?

The success of Putin’s revanchist policy is in a way a result of Ukraine’s disarmament.

Had Ukraine not given up its nuclear arsenal, it is unlikely that Putin would be attacking Ukraine with ballistic missiles and invoking threats of nuclear attacks every now and then. To be sure, he would have still waged war on Ukraine out of his quest to restore the Soviet Union, but the nature of the conflict would not be as lopsided in his favour as it is today.

Steven Pifer, a negotiator of the Budapest Memorandum and a former US envoy to Ukraine, told The New York Times that the disarmament-for-security guarantees arrangement fell apart because of the “collective failure” of the United States and Ukraine to take into account the rise of someone like Putin.

Last month, Russia formally adopted a new nuclear weapons doctrine that significantly lowers the threshold to use nuclear weapons. It allows the usage of nuclear weapons even in case of a conventional attack. Putin and senior Russian leaders, such as Dmitry Medvedev, have repeatedly threatened to hit the UK or France with nuclear weapons . Are such threats realistic though?

Ksenia Kirillova, an analyst at Washington DC-based think tank Jamestown Foundation believes that Putin’s threats of using nuclear weapons is blackmail and part of a scheme to scare the West into accepting his terms for the end of war on Ukraine.

Kirillova tells Firstpost that even though Putin has a distorted world view in which he does not consider Ukraine a legitimate nation and does not recognise the will of people, he is logical in that world view and is not suicidal.

“I don’t think Putin is going to launch a nuclear attack because that would be suicidal as no one can survive a nuclear war. Putin is not suicidal. In fact, he loves his life. The fact that he has increased nuclear threats and launched the Oreshnik missile after Western nations allowed Ukraine to strike deeper inside Russia, possibly even hit Moscow, shows that he is afraid that Ukraine’s newfound capabilities could reach him personally,” says Kirillova.

Instead of a prelude to an actual war, the nuclear threats are a tactic to negotiate better terms with the West, particularly with Trump, says Kirillova.

“The threats of nuclear weapons and a stronger posture on the battlefield allows Putin a better position to negotiate with the West and Trump. He will tell Putin that by ending the war in Ukraine at the earliest, he would not just be ending a local conflict but preventing World War III. Trump would also benefit as he would be able to portray himself as a man who prevented World War III — irrespective of whether Ukraine wins or loses. Instead of a nuclear war that would be deadly for everyone, such an arrangement suits Putin better. The nuclear threats are therefore a means to end the war on favourable terms,” says Kirillova.