Could Trump's return be tougher on Russia than expected? 3 reasons Ukraine may benefit

Among the  first world leaders to speak with Donald Trump following his election victory on November 5, 2024 was Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Congratulating the US president-elect, Zelenskyy expressed confidence in the “ potential for stronger cooperation ” between the two nations.

Others are  less sure . For  many foreign policy observers , Trump’s victory – together with his  lukewarm attitude toward Nato ,  criticism of the amount of US aid  being sent to Ukraine and  vows to reach a deal  to end the ongoing war in Eastern Europe – has stoked uncertainty over Washington’s commitment to doing everything it can to support Ukraine repel Russian invaders.

As a  scholar on Eastern Europe , I understand where these concerns come from. But I also offer a counter view: that a Trump White House  may not necessarily be bad news  for Kyiv.

Nato’s mission to counter Russia remains unchanged

It is common to hear Trump  described as isolationist , nationalistic and an anti-interventionist on the world stage. He has encouraged such a view through claims, for example, that the US would shirk its responsibility to come to the defense of a Nato member against a Russian attack  if that country was not meeting its defense spending targets  in line with the alliance’s commitments .

But such rhetoric is undercut by established facts and prior Republican positions.

In December 2023, the US Congress passed bipartisan legislation prohibiting a president from unilaterally withdrawing the US from Nato, maintaining the overarching security and stability of Europe is in the US’s interests. The Republican co-sponsor of that bill, Senator Marco Rubio, has in recent months emerged as a key Trump surrogate  and is expected to be named as  Trump’s secretary of state , according to reports.

The  US and Europe remain  each other’s  most important markets . As such, the United States will be highly motivated to maintain a role in European security so long as instability in Europe can influence the global – and US – economy.

Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the incoming administration will deviate from those of Obama, Biden and indeed Trump’s first term in seeing  China as the primary threat to the US And Beijing has thrown its support behind  Russian President Vladimir Putin during his military efforts in Ukraine.

Continued US cooperation with allies in Europe will also strengthen Washington in Asia. Direct military cooperation, such as coordinating with the British to produce submarines for Australia, helps the US strategy to counter and contain China’s threat in the Pacific. It would also signal to US allies in Asia – such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – that Washington is a dependable security partner in times of crisis.

Trump isn’t as cozy with Putin as often portrayed

Much has been made of Trump’s perceived  cozy relationship with Putin . In the run-up to the election, Trump insisted that, should he win, he would bring peace to Ukraine even before he was inaugurated and called Putin “ genius” and “savvy ” for the Ukrainian invasion. On his part, Putin  congratulated Trump on his victory , praising him for being “courageous” when a gunman tried to assassinate him. Moscow has also indicated that it is ready for dialogue with the Republican president-elect.

Trump’s actual policy toward Russia during his first term was notably more hawkish than these words may suggest. Indeed, there is a good argument that the Trump administration was more hawkish on Putin than the Obama one it replaced.

For example, Trump  provided the Ukrainians with anti-tank missiles after the Obama administration had refused to give them such weapons. Also, in 2018, the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty , citing the previous violations of the treaty by Russia. In contrast, in 2014, then President Barack Obama  accused Russia of breaching the INF treaty  after it allegedly tested a ground-launched cruise missile but chose not to withdraw from the treaty.

Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, referred to that move as “ a very dangerous step .” The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty constrained the US from developing new weapons and tied Washington’s hands in its strategic rivalry with China in the Pacific.

Then, in 2019, Trump  signed the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act , which included sanctions halting the construction of the Russian-backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline directly connecting Russia to Germany, via the Baltic Sea. The pipeline, which has since been rendered inoperable by a sabotage attack in 2022, would have bypassed Ukraine, prompting the Ukrainian government to label it an “ economic and energy blockade .” It was one of 52 policy actions  undertaken by the first Trump administration  to restrict Russia.

In contrast, the Biden administration waived Nord Stream 2 pipeline sanctions in 2021, only to  reimpose them  on Feb. 23, 2022 – one day before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

‘Drill, baby, drill’ will hurt Russian oil

Almost three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s war machine still  runs on energy revenues . Despite unprecedented Western sanctions aimed at restricting sales of Russian oil, countries continue to purchase from Russia. For example, India has become  the biggest buyer of Russian seaborne crude oil .

And here a Trump policy not aimed directly at Russia may, in fact, harm Russian interests.

Trump has made repeated promises to introduce a new wave of drilling for oil and gas on American soil. And while it might take time for this to filter through to lower prices globally, increased production from the US – already the world’s top crude oil producer  – has the capacity to make an impact.

Trump’s return to the White House could mean tougher enforcement of US oil sanctions against Iran, reducing Tehran’s capacity to sell weapons to Russia. Iran has supported Russia  both diplomatically and militarily since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And since 2020, Iran’s revenue from oil exports nearly quadrupled,  from US$16 billion to $53 billion in 2023 , according to the US Energy Information Administration.

Predicting what Trump, a notably unpredictable leader, will do in power is difficult. And US foreign policy can be a slow-moving beast, so one should not expect immediate breakthroughs or major surprises. But his record serves as a counter to the views of observers who have suggested that his victory does not bode well for Ukraine.

Tatsiana Kulakevich , Associate Professor of Instruction in the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, Affiliate Professor at the Institute for Russian, European, and Eurasian Studies, University of South Florida

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .