US President Donald Trump described his recent meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping as “amazing” and even rated it “12 out of 10.” The two leaders met on the sidelines of the Busan summit, where trade was once again a central theme. But behind the optimism lies a complex reality, China’s soybean surplus and market dynamics could still limit any rebound in American exports.
Diplomatic thaw after years of tension
The Busan meeting marked a symbolic easing of US–China trade hostilities that began during Trump’s presidency. According to Trump, Beijing pledged to resume large-scale purchases of American soybeans, promising 12 million metric tons by the end of 2025 and up to 25 million tons annually thereafter.
Markets initially viewed this as a breakthrough that could restore some of the trade flows lost during the tariff wars. However, China’s Ministry of Commerce has yet to confirm the figures and there are no public purchase orders from state-owned trading firms such as COFCO or Sinograin.
Analysts say that while the summit’s tone was conciliatory, its substance remains unclear. Without verifiable import commitments, the optimism expressed by Trump risks being more political than practical.
China’s soybean glut complicates trade hopes
China’s hesitation is not just political, it is economic. Domestic soybean inventories have surged to over 10 million tons, enough to meet several months of crushing demand. Feed consumption growth has slowed, particularly with weaker livestock production.
This soybean glut has left importers with little incentive to procure new US cargoes. “The problem isn’t willingness, it’s capacity,” one analyst told Bloomberg. “China simply doesn’t need more beans right now.”
Compounding the challenge, U.S. soybeans remain more expensive than their South American counterparts. Even after partial tariff relief under the recent trade truce, American beans still face a 13 percent import levy — eroding their competitiveness against Brazilian shipments, which dominate China’s market share.
A lasting shift in China’s sourcing strategy
During the height of the 2018–2020 trade war, China accelerated efforts to diversify its soybean supply chain. It built stronger agricultural ties with Brazil and Argentina and expanded its domestic crushing capacity. That diversification has since hardened into long-term policy.
Today, Brazilian soybeans account for more than 70 percent of China’s imports. Lower freight costs and established trade routes make them more attractive, even when political conditions improve with the United States.
Quick Reads
View AllTrade data since early November shows little change in this pattern. While small test shipments were booked ahead of the Busan summit, Chinese crushers have continued to prioritise cheaper South American supplies.
US farmers remain cautious
For many American soybean farmers, the supposed breakthrough has brought little comfort. Prices initially spiked on news of the Trump–Xi meeting but quickly fell as traders realised that Beijing had not placed concrete orders.
Farmers interviewed by CBS News described the situation as “a waiting game.” Many have already scaled back acreage or diversified into corn and wheat after years of uncertainty stemming from tariffs. The lack of tangible deals now risks deepening that fatigue, even as Washington celebrates a symbolic diplomatic win.
Between politics and market realities
Politically, Trump’s “amazing” meeting fits his broader narrative of reclaiming U.S. trade leverage. Yet in practical terms, the episode highlights the limits of summit diplomacy in reshaping global commodity flows.
China’s economic priorities, stabilising feed costs, managing inflation and sustaining local production — outweigh any short-term political overtures. Even with improved relations, it may take months or years before structural demand conditions align in favour of American exporters.
For now, the soybean story remains a reminder that goodwill at the top does not always translate into action at the ground level.
With inputs from agencies


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