All of Europe has anxiously watched the bloody Russia-Ukraine war unfold at its doorstep for three years now.
Bit by bit, and rather cautiously, the continent has put its faith in the faintest of hopes: the possibility of a ceasefire.
Even so, this fragile yearning may not turn out as expected.
According to a recent report by the Institute for the Study of War, even in the event of a negotiated settlement or ceasefire, Putin remains unlikely to pursue full or rapid demobilisation of the vast troops Russia had assembled as the war dragged on month-after-month.
What is demobilisation?
demobilisation refers to the process of discharging military personnel from active service and reintegrating them into civilian life after the completion of military operations or a conflict– or in this case, a ceasefire deal .
Specifically, it involves returning soldiers to civilian status, ending their military obligations, and addressing their needs for employment, healthcare, psychological support, and social integration.
For Russia, following the Ukraine conflict, demobilisation would entail reintegrating over 700,000 veterans into Russian society.
Why Putin won’t demobilise Russian troops
Putin, the ISW report says, is reportedly reluctant to undertake this process, fearing that an independent veterans-based civil society could emerge.
What’s the problem with a veterans-based civil society, you ask?
To start off, there is the fact that having received military training and served the country during the conflict, these groups are bound to have high organisational capacity and credibility among the population.
There could potentially be a time when the combination of those two factors could pose a challenge the Kremlin’s authority.
Putin is not merely concerned about individual dissent but the potential emergence of cohesive, influential groups with the capacity to galvanise public opinion.
This isn’t mere speculation, though. There is historical precedence to back it up.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsFear of veteran-driven political instability
Veteran groups, historically, have played an important role in shaping political outcomes in Russia. The aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 offers a cautionary tale for the Kremlin.
The Soviet government’s failure to adequately reintegrate psychologically traumatised veterans led to widespread social discontent. To this day, it is remembered in Russia as the “Afghan syndrome.”
Having experienced the horrors of war firsthand, veterans returning from Afghanistan were disillusioned and often critical of the regime, contributing to the broader erosion of Soviet political stability.
It is likely that the consequences of Afghan syndrome are those that Putin–who was working for the KGB throughout the course of the Soviet-Afghan war– remembers.
The Russian leader has already launched a pre-emptive campaign aimed at preventing the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society.
The preparation began at least towards the end of 2022, as in December that year, the Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko had declared that Russia will not allow the repetition of Afghan syndrome.
The Kremlin’s coordinated initiatives since late 2022 involve co-opting loyalist veteran figures and establishing state-controlled veterans’ organisations.
These efforts are presented under the guise of preventing “Afghan syndrome.” However, the real objective is clear: to suppress any group that could credibly challenge the Kremlin’s narrative or question the government’s decisions.
Permanent militarisation of Russian society
Putin’s campaign to manage veterans is not a temporary measure but part of a broader effort to militarise Russian society at all levels– federal, regional, and local.
The state-controlled veterans’ organisations are designed not only to suppress dissent but also to serve as instruments of support for the Kremlin’s agenda.
These groups can function as ideological enforcers, sustaining the pro-war sentiment necessary for the Russian government’s long-term strategic ambitions.
The deliberate integration of veterans into this framework indicates a clear intention: to retain a militarised population that could be swiftly re-mobilised if necessary.
In essence, the Kremlin is institutionalising war-readiness as a permanent feature of Russian society.
Implications for Europe
As is obvious, that will not be looked upon favourably in Western Europe.
The Kremlin’s fear of veteran-driven unrest suggests that even a ceasefire or negotiated settlement would not lead to a substantial reduction in Russian military posture.
A Russia that refuses to demobilise fully remains capable of re-escalation at short notice. The permanent militarisation of society also indicates that Moscow will continue to project military strength as a cornerstone of its foreign policy.