The March 23 Movement (M23) rebels, active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, seized a strategic town called Masisi, local politicians said on Sunday (January 5).
Masisi lies near the provincial capital Goma, the capital and largest city of the North Kivu, the province where the rebels are based.
The Tutsi-led M23 group’s recent battlefield successes are somewhat reminiscent of the lightning offensive carried out by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other Syrian rebels in the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Could the M23 rebels, allegedly backed by Rwanda, enact a repetition of the startling power-grab that happened in West Asia?
To answer this, we take a look at who the M23 rebels are and what’s common between their situation in Congo and the Syrian rebels’ circumstances.
What is M23?
M23 is a rebel military group primarily made up of ethnic Tutsis that broke away from the Congolese army a little over ten years ago due to a combination of grievances and longstanding ethnic tensions.
The rebels went on to stage a large offensive in 2012. They took over the provincial capital of Goma– the same city they are threatening now– close to the border with Rwanda.
Rwanda has been accused by Congo, and experts from UN of giving military aid to M23.
M23 rebels have claimed that they are fighting a threat from a Congolese rebel group linked to the Congo army and partly made up of ethnic Hutus who were perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide against Tutsis.
For some, the group was an expression of popular anger towards a dysfunctional Congolese government, along with issues of corruption and abuses— particularly abuses historically experienced by Congolese of Rwandan origin.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsSimilarities with HTS-led Syrian rebels
Backing by foreign powers: Congo’s M23 group have a lot in common with the HTS-led Syrian rebels, especially their circumstances before the toppling of Assad.
Like opposition forces in conflict-hit regions around the world, both Syrian rebels and M23 are known to have the backing of external powers.
In the case of HTS in Syria, Turkey was one of the prominent backers. Of the other rebel groups, many have had the support of Western countries at different points.
The M23 group, as previously mentioned, allegedly enjoys the backing on Rwanda. Reports in the past have also accused Uganda, which shares a border with Congo, of supporting these rebels.
Resilience: Another commonality is how both HTS and allied rebels in Syria, and M23 in Congo, have resurged after being almost decisively defeated.
In Syria, the HTS and its allies had been confined to their small Idlib province stronghold by 2018. This followed a series of military defeats—including after the chemical weapon attacks in 2013 and 2017— at the hands of the Iran and Russia-backed Assad regime.
The rebels’ resilience was apparent to the world when they mounted their lightning offensive in November 2024.
For M23, the supposed defeat had come in 2013. They had even signed a treaty with the Congo government in Nairobi, Kenya. That deal confirmed the dissolution of M23 as an armed group. Its fighters and leaders had surrendered.
However, the group resurged in 2021, accusing the Congo government of failing to hold up their end of the deal signed in nearly a decade ago. Since then, the M23 has rapidly seized vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province.
Intention to govern: HTS-led rebels in Syria, in the run-up to their November offensive, had been making efforts to govern the territories under their control, not just terrorise them. This was part of projecting themself as a viable governing body.
M23 in North Kivu has followed a similar route.
In Congo, customary chiefs play a vital role in local land governance. They mediate conflicts, unify communities through rituals, and embody the symbolic connection between a community and its land.
According to a 2024 research report by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS), M23 has actively worked to replace customary chiefs with individuals appointed by M23, at times resorting to assassinations of local leaders.
Many Congolese believe that the group’s primary goal is to gain control over local power structures by undermining existing authorities.
In North Kivu, M23 has established mechanisms to control and extract profits from the local economy, particularly through mineral supply chains. The group operates checkpoints along major routes, imposing taxes on minerals smuggled into Rwanda and on other trade activities. This control allows M23 to consolidate power and fund its operations in the region.
Control over relatively small chunk of territory: The Idlib governorate, which remained the HTS’ stronghold despite major setbacks, occupies around three per cent of the total area of Syria.
For the HTS, Idlib provided enough of a base to launch an offensive to take over the entire country.
North Kivu province, which houses the bastion of the M23 rebels, occupies around 2.5 per cent of the total area of Congo.
It follows that M23 at the moment, and HTS before it took over Damascus, exerted control over a comparatively tiny territory in their respective countries.
The key differences
The similarities only paint half the picture. Whether the success of HTS and allied rebels may be reproduced by M23 is actually likely to be determined by the key differences.
Intention: The most crucial point here is that M23’s ambitions do not mirror those that the Syrian rebels had. Their goals are more localised and cater to a rather specific population– Congolese of Rwandan origin.
It is also important to note that in Syria, the support the rebels received was widespread, especially due to resentment towards Assad’s regime. The M23 group is unlikely to garner that kind of support or legitimacy in Congo.
Geopolitical context: Idlib played a critical role in Syria’s civil war, while M23’s territory does not carry equivalent strategic importance in Congo.
Moreover, the dynamics among the players in West Asia, and those involved in Syria, are starkly different from those of actors around Congo in Africa.
Despite its backing of M23, Rwanda does not appear intent on changing the power balance for the entirety of Congo. Reaping economic benefits and maintaining control over a crucial border region are more apparent objectives.
The missing element of surprise: The HTS-led Syrian rebels’ success can in part be attributed to the element of surprise in their offensive. With Russia focused on its war in Ukraine, and Iran occupied with the conflict between Israel and the ‘Axis of Resistance’, Assad’s forces had become vulnerable.
There was no time to plan and no reinforcements were coming– a huge benefit for the opponents.
That element of surprise is missing in M23’s advances. The gains the group has made can be attributed to internal problems– key among them that the Congolese army appears to be in disarray.
In July 2024, Jason Stearns, a former UN investigator who now runs the Congo Research Group at New York University had said that “many units have less than half the number of soldiers they are supposed to have due to desertions and casualties[…]there is a lack of accountability and morale.”
New military leadership has been appointed, and efforts have been made to weed out officers suspected of disloyalty or corruption. Congo’s military budget has been pumped up, too.
There are still major issues. The root of the issue hasn’t been tackled yet, and the frequent change in commanders has created confusion.
Still, the situation is quite different from Syrian government forces under Assad, as Congo is actively taking steps to fend off the rebels and has reinforcements and funds to pour in.
In a nutshell
While it is probable that M23 rebels make some more gains in the mineral-rich North Kivu, a surprise offensive from them that results in the group taking over much larger chunk of Congo’s territory appears unlikely.
With inputs from agencies