In post-Assad Syria, China and Turkey must choose: Competition or cooperation

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria is certainly going to reshape the balance of power in West Asia. With Russia losing its grip on the region, new players might step in to fill the gap. China, expanding its presence globally, and Turkey, a regional powerhouse with deep historical ties to Syria, are the top contenders. While they could work together on Syria’s rebuilding, their competing ambitions might lead to tensions.

China’s calculated caution

China’s approach to the Middle East has been cautious and pragmatic. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning’s underlined Beijing’s priority of ensuring stability in Syria.

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While economically, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides a platform for infrastructure investment in the region, politically, Beijing’s neutral stance allows it to mediate between long-standing rivals like Saudi Arabia and Iran, as evidenced by its brokering of a historic rapprochement between the two in 2023. However, China’s reluctance to deploy military power in the region highlights a key limitation. Beijing continues to rely on US-led security frameworks to protect its trade routes such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz.

In a post-Assad Syria, China might leverage its economic muscle for reconstruction projects and secure critical energy routes. Yet, its influence will be tempered by a lack of hard power projection and a preference to keep neutral.

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Turkey’s ambition

Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations position it as both a competitor and potential partner for China in West Asia. Long-standing tensions with Western allies, exacerbated by disputes over Syria and Eastern Mediterranean energy resources, have pushed Turkey toward a more independent foreign policy. Ankara’s concept of “strategic autonomy” reflects this shift seeking to balance relations between global powers like the US, China and Russia.

In Syria, Turkey’s interests are deeply entrenched. From its military presence in northern Syria to its historical and cultural connections with the region, Ankara views itself as a natural stakeholder in shaping Syria’s future. Turkey’s soft power, based on shared Islamic values and historical ties, often resonates more strongly in Arab countries than China’s economic overtures.

However, Turkey faces challenges in maintaining this influence. Its faltering economy limits its ability to compete with China’s vast financial resources. Additionally, Turkey’s Nato membership and the alliance’s recent characterisation of China as a strategic challenge create friction in its balancing act.

A basis for cooperation

Despite their differences, China and Turkey share several interests that could foster cooperation in post-Assad Syria. Both nations advocate for a multipolar world order that reduces Western dominance. Their shared experiences of resisting Western imperialism and their scepticism of Western interventions create a common ideological foundation.

Economically, Syria’s reconstruction presents opportunities for collaboration. Chinese investment, coupled with Turkish construction expertise and regional ties, could complement each other. The rebuilding of infrastructure, development of trade routes and restoration of basic services would require a joint effort that leverages both nations’ strengths.

Competing ambitions

Yet, this cooperation is unlikely to erase the undercurrents of competition. Turkey and China often find themselves vying for influence in overlapping spheres. In Central Asia, Turkey’s cultural and linguistic ties through the Organisation of Turkic States clash with China’s economic dominance under the BRI. In West Asia, a similar dynamic is evident.

For instance, Turkish and Chinese construction firms already compete for contracts in Arab countries. Syria’s reconstruction could intensify this rivalry. Moreover, Turkey’s soft power, rooted in shared religion and culture, may appeal more to Arab populations than China’s relatively distant approach. This cultural edge, combined with Turkey’s geographical proximity, could make it a preferred partner for some West Asian nations.

The Russia factor

The potential fall of Assad highlights the diminishing role of Russia in the region. Traditionally, Moscow has been a key ally for both Syria and China. However, with Russia increasingly preoccupied with domestic issues and its war in Ukraine, its ability to project power in West Asia has waned.

This creates both opportunities and challenges for China and Turkey. While both nations could step in to fill the void, their differing approaches might lead to clashes. China’s emphasis on economic investments contrasts with Turkey’s more hands-on approach including military involvement and nation-building efforts.

Collaboration or collision?

As Syria transitions into a new era, the roles of China and Turkey in shaping its future will be critical. Both nations bring unique strengths to the table: China with its financial clout and diplomatic neutrality and Turkey with its regional expertise and cultural ties. However, their overlapping ambitions and competing interests may turn them into rivals rather than partners.

Ultimately, the trajectory of Sino-Turkish relations in West Asia will hinge on their ability to navigate these tensions. If they can find common ground in Syria’s reconstruction and broader regional stability, their collaboration could redefine the balance of power in West Asia. If not, their rivalry could further complicate an already volatile landscape. The stakes are indeed high.