How Russia-Ukraine conflict will have a major fallout on Indo-Pacific

The ongoing war in Ukraine has put the painful story of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis on the back-burner, subordinated to the challenges in European security. It appears to have sucked some oxygen out of the other geostrategic discourse even as the Quad leaders reaffirmed in a virtual meeting their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom from military, economic and political coercion. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, regardless of reasons, demonstrates that a state with an economy the size of South Korea’s, about half that of India, can mount a massive conventional military invasion of a neighbouring state, the combined opposition of the US and the EU notwithstanding. Sanctions against Russia, especially US and EU sanctions, may spur the trend towards self-reliance in many countries, including China and India. To deal with the economic fallout, the economies of the Indo-Pacific will be compelled to review their critical supply chains and to plan on alternatives in a globalised economic context in which decoupling even from adversaries is not easy. The US and many European countries are still buying Russian oil and gas. For India, the importance of developing self-reliance and reliable supply chains in the defence sector cannot be overemphasised. Russia’s action has highlighted the limits of NATO’s reach and resolve in the European theatre, leaving one wondering how far NATO, or its member states, would be willing to involve themselves in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region where most Western nations have fewer stakes. This could not have gone unnoticed in Taipei or even in Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra which are covered by treaty alliances with the US. The sudden spike in the German defence budget is likely to be mirrored by further hikes in defence spending across the Indo-Pacific. Putin’s military resolve and genius, or foolhardiness, depending on how one chooses to view it, has implications for Beijing. It potentially signals to President Xi Jinping that China should follow more muscular policies in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait. After all, both Ukraine and Taiwan are objects of irredentist claims by bigger powers. The difference is that in the case of Ukraine, there is no US or NATO treaty commitment to its defence. In the case of Taiwan, expectations are different even though the US prefers “strategic ambiguity”. The mutual defence treaty of 1954 and the Taiwan Relations Act were necessary but perhaps not sufficient guarantees. Remember, the 1954 Treaty covered only the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores. That is why the US stood by and watched when China shelled Jinmen and Matsu islands during the second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. And this, China accomplished without the backing of nuclear weapons at the time. Putin’s militarism could have some unexpected impact on Xi Jinping. If Putin succeeds, the pressure would mount on China, the senior partner in the Sino-Russian equation, to do better. However, the risk would be great. China’s globalised economy, prosperity, the “China Dream” and Xi Jinping’s future would be jeopardised, regardless of whether an invasion of Taiwan is successful.

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China’s inability to undertake a military offensive against Taiwan that is fraught with uncertainty and high costs could prompt her to look for an alternative target to burnish Xi Jinping’s “tough guy” image to match Putin’s. India must remain prepared at all times, given the unresolved differences over the boundary issue. The Ukraine crisis also demonstrates that at the end of the day, a sovereign state must fight its own battles. Others may help with weapons, intelligence and moral support but they cannot be expected to do the actual fighting. This was true of Afghanistan, where all resistance collapsed like a house of cards in the face of the Taliban onslaught when US troops left. Putin’s sounding of the nuclear alarm sharply contrasts with the joint P-5 assurances given on 3 January this year. They had affirmed that nuclear weapons — for as long as they continue to exist — should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. Ukraine’s fate complicates matters in the run-up to the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) later this year. Ukraine was a de facto nuclear power after its independence in 1991 until it acceded to the (NPT) in 1994 and gave up the legacy nuclear weapons it had inherited following the break-up of the Soviet Union, ostensibly on the understanding that its sovereignty would not be violated by Russia. Nuclear deterrence will now increasingly be regarded as indispensable by those that possess nuclear weapons, including North Korea, as well as by aspirants such as Iran in our part of the world. Earlier, they had no doubt drawn lessons from Libya’s fate as well. Caught in the tussle between the US and Russia, Ukraine’s predicament reminds many smaller nations around the world, including in the Indo-Pacific, of the old African saying — when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers! The psychological impact of the denouement in Ukraine on other states in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the ASEAN nations, will unmistakably be that taking sides in Great Power contestations, as Ukraine did, does not help matters. Russia’s idea of “Russky Mir” (Russian World) is not dissimilar to China’s notion of “Middle Kingdom”. Russia’s war in Ukraine reminds one of Halford Mackinder’s Theory of the Heartland propounded a century ago. Mackinder said, “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the World (Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 150). Today, when one examines the geography of Mackinder’s “Pivot Area” of the Heartland, it neatly fits the Eurasian landmass at the centre of contestation in Eastern Europe. Alfred Mahan’s “sea power” theory stands similarly vindicated against the backdrop of China’s assertiveness and the mounting maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific. There is little doubt then that Eurasian security and the future of the Indo-Pacific region are intrinsically linked. The author is the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal. Read all the Latest News , Trending News ,  Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.