How Kargil War reflected the biggest weakness of Pakistan's military that still exists

Commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Kargil Vijay Diwas, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that Pakistan, the main perpetrator of the war, “did not learn anything from the history”. He lambasted the country for being nefariously involved in carrying out the “proxy war” and called it “patrons of terrorism”.

“I want to tell these patrons of terrorism that their nefarious intentions will never succeed. Our soldiers will crush terrorism with full force and the enemy will be given a befitting reply…” the prime minister said while addressing the families of Kargil veterans in Ladakh. “In Kargil, we not only won the war, we also gave a wonderful demonstration of ‘Truth, Restraint and Strength," he furthered.

What the prime minister mentioned was not actually wrong. While for Pakistan the Kargil War may have been tactically innovative since India wasn’t prepared for it, the ‘miniwar’ eventually turned out to be a major strategic catastrophe. Here’s a look at what did not work for the country’s military and how some of these problems still persist.

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A surprise attack but to a strong enemy  

The Kargil War was triggered after infiltrators from Pakistan crossed the Line of Control (LoC) and occupied the high positions in Ladakh’s Kargil district. The attackers were initially thought to be ‘jihadis,’ however, India soon realised the direct involvement of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the infiltration turned into an all-out war that was fought militarily and diplomatically as well.

In response to this, India initiated two subsequent operations, they are: Operation Vijay which was conducted by the Indian Army and Operation Safed Sagar in which the Indian Air Force showcased its might.

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The two operations helped India to re-capture a majority of the position on the Indian side of the LoC and the whole ordeal turned out to be a major embarrassment for Pakistan.

Where did Pakistan fail? 

While there were a lot of political and diplomatic factors that contributed to Pakistan’s loss in the war, the following are the two major factors that led to the country’s defeat:

Lack of Communication between the three wings

In the book titled ‘The Idea of Pakistan,’ author Stephen Philip Cohen wrote that the Kargil War emphasised the major weakness of the Pakistan army, notably its “lack of interest in joint service operations”. The Pakistani army “is not only the dominant political power in Pakistan, it does not share this power with the other services, treating them strategically like a junior partner,” Cohen wrote in the book.

Pakistan failed to understand the “multiplier effect” of combined air-ground operations and did not realise the importance of sea power in any war. While Islamabad had a joint staff system for more than twenty years, it was the Rawalpindi army headquarters that made all the important decisions.

Similar sentiments were also echoed by Pakistani fighter pilot Kaiser Tufail. In a piece for the CLAWS Journal, titled “Role of the Pakistan Air Force During the Kargil Conflict,” Tufail noted that there were four protagonists of what he called the “Kargil adventure”: General Pervez Musharraf: Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt Gen Aziz Khan: Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed: Commander 10 Corps, and Maj Gen Javed Hasan.

He insisted that in an effort to keep the plan secret, the army leadership “took no one into confidence, neither its own operational commanders nor the heads of the other services.”

Tufail listed out some of the major failures, they are as follows:

• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating major strategic effects.

• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.

• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly capture territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.

• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.

• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.

Weak technological base

The Pakistani military also had a weak technological and scientific foundation this reflects the poor scientific and technical capabilities of Pakistan itself, the tight budget and the reluctance of the United States and the European Community to become major military suppliers to Pakistan also contributed to the whole ordeal.

In an earlier interview with Firstpost, Pakistani scientist and author Pervez Hoodbhoy elucidated how politics and religion weakened Pakistan’s educational and scientific foundation.

Underestimating the enemy

As mentioned by Tufail, one of the major reasons why Pakistan faltered in its operation was because the country not only underestimated India’s military might but also didn’t expect such kind of response.

In the initial phase of the war, it can not be denied that Pakistan took India by surprise. The Pakistani military also had the higher ground in the war until it didn’t. While India was new to high-altitude warfare, it soon managed to adapt to the situation and counter it.

In his book, Cohen also mentioned that the Pakistani leadership also assumed that since both nations have nuclear capabilities, India would give a “soft response to the attack”.

“As the Kargil miniwar demonstrates, being a nuclear power does not bring political and strategic wisdom. Pakistan mounted a serious provocation, but the threat of escalation to nuclear war did not prevent India from responding by conventional means, and the blame for the conflict fell squarely on Pakistan,” Cohen wrote.

Pakistan’s inability to hide the defeat 

On July 4, Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met then-US President Bill Clinton, seeking a way out of the crisis. Unlike in past instances, Washington favoured India and on Clinton’s advice, Sharif asked his generals to retreat from Kargil.

“The army was infuriated at what they regarded as a betrayal by an uninformed civilian, especially since they claimed that Nawaz had been briefed fully on the operation. He had, but probably did not fully understand the implications of what he was being told by the generals,” Cohen wrote.

But the major thing was what happened after the war ended, the Pakistani regime was filled with embarrassment after the defeat. The access to global media seriously weakened the effectiveness of state propaganda.

“While Pakistan managed to gloss over the mistakes it made during the 1965 and 1971 war. The Kargil fiasco is well known to informed Pakistanis who had access to cable television and Internet sources. The common public got to know that the Pakistani government was not only incompetent but was outrightly lying to them.

Army dominance still persist

Pakistan Army is still considered the epicentre of the country’s military. The prime wing still takes the major chunk of Pakistan’s budget. In the year 2024-25, Pakistan’s budgetary allocation of PKR 2,122 billion constituted 1.7 per cent of the cash-strapped country’s GDP.

The army received the lion’s share, getting 47.5 per cent of the defence budget. The Air Force received 21.3 per cent and the Navy received 10.8 per cent.

Not only this, the Pakistani army notoriously continues to have a political sway in the country ensuring a pro-military government in the Parliament. Hence, it will be safe to say Rawalpindi’s influence goes beyond the military realm.