9/11 pilots who rammed planes into Twin Towers were CIA agents?

New Delhi: Uncensored documents from the Guantanamo Military Commission which is handling the cases of defendants accused of carrying out the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York have seemingly revealed that the attackers were CIA agents. According to a Russia Today report, the original version of the papers was made public through a Guantanamo Bay court docket, but it was entirely redacted. Later, uncensored copies were obtained by independent researchers, who revealed that the papers documented account of Don Canestraro, a former DEA agent who was appointed as the principal investigator for the commission. Canestro was primarily asked by defendants’ attorneys to investigate possible Saudi Arabia government’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks. He reportedly found that two of the hijackers were under close CIA surveillance, and it’s possible that the agency hired them long before they carried out the attacks. Until March 2022, when a large number of FBI records were declassified at the White House’s request, those shocking details were kept from the public’s gaze. The two pilots Activities of Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in the 18 months preceding the day of 9/11 attacks are one of the numerous persistent mysteries that have not yet been fully clarified more than 20 years later. Despite being repeatedly recognised by the CIA and NSA as potential Al Qaeda terrorists prior to their arrival into the US in January 2000, the pair entered the country on multiple-entry visas, documents revealed. They attended an Al Qaeda gathering in Kuala Lumpur just days prior to their arrival, where important decisions regarding the 9/11 attacks are thought to have been made. The CIA’s Alec Station, a special unit set up to follow Osama bin Laden, requested that Malaysian authorities discreetly picture and record the meeting. Oddly, no audio was recorded. However, this information should have been enough to deter Hazmi and Midhar from entering the US, or at the very least, to alert the FBI to their presence. As it transpired, the CIA prevented Bureau representatives in Alec Station from informing their superiors about their admission for a six-month period without incident at Los Angeles International airport. The documents reveal that one officer named Mark Rossini, who was then a member of Alec Station tried to warn FBI about the two men and the fact that they had multiple entry visa to the US. “We’ve got to tell the Bureau about this. These guys clearly are bad. One of them, at least, has a multiple-entry visa to the US. We’ve got to tell the FBI,” Mark recalled discussing with his colleagues. “[But the CIA] said to me, ‘No, it’s not the FBI’s case, not the FBI’s jurisdiction.’” As soon as they arrived, Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national who lives in California, was contacted by Hazmi and Midhar in an airport café. He co-signed their lease, paid them $1,500 towards their rent, helped them find an apartment in San Diego over the course of the following two weeks, and introduced them to Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam at a nearby mosque. In 2011, a US drone strike in Yemen resulted in the death of Al-Awlaki. After 9/11, Operation Encore, an FBI investigation into possible Saudi participation in the attacks, naturally turned its attention to Bayoumi. He explained that he met Hazmi and Midhar by accident in a 2003 interview with Riyadh-based investigators. He said he overheard them speaking Arabic, realised they couldn’t speak English, and decided to help them out of kindness. The Bureau came to a quite different conclusion: Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence agent and a component of a larger militant Wahhabist network operating in the US that dealt with a wide range of potential and real terrorists and kept tabs on anti-Riyadh dissidents’ overseas activities. Additionally, both the Saudi government and Encore believed there was a 50/50 possibility he knew of the 9/11 attacks before they occurred. The recently made public Guantanamo Military Commission document provides additional insight about Bayoumi’s interactions with Hazmi and Midhar, the CIA’s intense interest in them, their activities during their stay in the US, and their failure to inform the FBI of their presence until late August 2001. The content strongly implies that the CIA hindered official investigations to hide its infiltration of Al Qaeda based on an examination of classified information maintained by the FBI and Pentagon, as well as interviews with representatives of both agencies. What do the evidences say? Canestraro, according to the leaked documents, talked to four agents who investigated 9/11 attacks. One Bureau agent, identified in his report as “CS-23,” who claimed to have “extensive knowledge of counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters,” made the most explosive accusations. His investigation revealed that FBI was being deceived and played on the matters of Bayoumi on a daily basis during those days. He gave an example to support his claim in which he said, he was aware that the CIA had multiple operational files on Bayoumi notwithstanding Agency officials’ claims to Operation Encore representatives that they didn’t have any information on him. This created a substantial paper trail, according to him. Next, CS-23 was confident that the CIA utilised Riyadh as a middleman to try to recruit Hazmi and Midhar while avoiding rules forbidding the Agency from conducting espionage activities on US soil by maintaining a liaison connection with the Saudi intelligence services. Another FBI agent, ‘CS-3,’ who supports this version further asserts that CIA helped Bayoumi with opening a bank account for two hijackers in San Diego. They also got them an apartment on lease, the documents revealed. It was said that at that time Alec Station was getting all the information about Bayoumi. The fact that this CIA unit was based in the US and manned by analysts struck CS-3 as peculiar considering that case officers skilled in covert operations based overseas are generally in charge of such tasks. This structure, according to “CS-IO,” was “highly unusual” and made it “nearly impossible” for “Alec Station” to cultivate informants within Al Qaeda from its base, which was located thousands of kilometres away from the nations where Al Qaeda was thought to be active. CS-23 asserts that senior FBI officials suppressed additional inquiries into the CIA’s relationship with Bayoumi and the recruitment of Hazmi and Midhar in spite of these promising leads, and that Bureau witnesses testifying before the joint Senate and Congressional 9/11 inquiry were under orders not to disclose the full extent of Saudi involvement with Al-Qaeda. For their side, CS-3 said that, prior to them and their coworkers being questioned by the joint investigation, CIA officials at Alec Station warned them not to fully comply with investigators and that they were aiming to “hang someone” for 9/11. Canestraro does not draw any inferences as to why, prior to the attacks, the CIA withheld crucial information from the FBI that may have prevented their execution and why, subsequently, the Bureau cooperated with the Agency’s coverup. Specifically, the Agency was trying to influence and lead an Al Qaeda cell’s operations in order to create terrorism, outside of the usual recruitment routes, as opposed to infiltrating an Al Qaeda cell to prevent terrorism. After discovering such a horrifying conspiracy, the FBI would have been wise to ignore the entire matter. Read all the Latest News , Trending News ,  Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.