 "60 years before Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Ayub Khan lost 1965 War to Lal Bahadur Shastri’s India")
Almost 60 years before the current Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir — now promoted to the rank of field marshal — found himself caught in hostilities with India after the Pahalgam terror attack, another military leader, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, suffered a major strategic defeat at the hands of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.
The war, driven by Pakistan’s ambition to take control of Kashmir, not only failed to achieve its objectives but also left lasting scars on the subcontinent’s geopolitical landscape.
While Ayub Khan was the first Pakistani Field Marshal to lose a war with India, now, decades later, history seems to echo.
General Asim Munir, elevated to the same rare rank of Field Marshal on Tuesday, has found himself in similarly troubled waters. While officially celebrated for leading Pakistan through a supposed ‘victory’ in recent India-Pak conflict, the reality on the ground tells a different story.
On May 7, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’, a series of precision strikes on terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), in retaliation for a Pakistan-backed terror attack in Pahalgam that claimed 26 civilian lives.
India targeted and destroyed nine terror launch pads, including known terror hubs in Bahawalpur and Muridke. This was followed by a military escalation, with intense artillery exchanges taking place on May 8 and 9.
India inflicted significant damage on 11 Pakistani airbases and other strategic military installations. However, despite the scale of the damage, the Shehbaz Sharif-led government in Pakistan claimed victory after a ceasefire agreement was reached between the two nations.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsNotably, while Pakistan has been claiming victory in the recent conflict, India has busted its lies with evidence at various forums.
Ayub Khan was not only Pakistan’s first Field Marshal but also the first to suffer a military defeat at the hands of India. Here’s how he lost the 1965 war and how that failure continues to echo in Pakistan’s military history.
Origins of the 1965 Conflict
The roots of the 1965 war lay in Pakistan’s aggressive gamble to alter the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions escalated in August 1965 with Pakistan’s launch of Operation Gibraltar, a covert mission intended to infiltrate Indian-occupied Kashmir and ignite a local uprising. The goal was to destabilise Indian control and pave the way for Pakistani acquisition of the territory, leveraging the region’s Muslim-majority demographics and India’s perceived post-1962 military vulnerability.
This undeclared war marked a major strategic miscalculation by Ayub Khan’s regime, which was guided by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s conviction that Kashmiris would rise against Indian rule if prompted by Pakistani support. Instead of inciting mass rebellion, the infiltration alerted India to Pakistan’s intentions and triggered a full-blown conflict.
Capture and return of Haji Pir Pass
In the early stages of the war, India gained a critical tactical edge by capturing the Haji Pir Pass on August 28, 1965. Located along the ceasefire line, the pass had served as a key infiltration route for Pakistani forces. Its seizure dramatically shortened the logistical route from Jammu to Srinagar by over 200 km and simplified control over the region.
However, in a controversial move, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri later agreed to return the Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan as part of the Tashkent Agreement, in exchange for a Pakistani pledge to “abjure war and maintain peace.” While some have attributed the decision to Soviet pressure or a diplomatic oversight, others believe India underestimated the pass’s strategic significance, a mistake that continues to be debated today.
India’s surprise offensive on Lahore
The turning point of the war came on September 6, 1965, when the Indian Army launched a surprise cross-border attack on Lahore, Pakistan’s second-largest city. This bold move was in retaliation for Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam, a renewed offensive in the Jammu region that threatened India’s positions in Akhnoor.
India’s goal in targeting Lahore was twofold: to divert Pakistani attention and resources away from Jammu and Kashmir, and to gain leverage by occupying territory close to a major urban center. Indian forces advanced swiftly along the Grand Trunk Road, capturing key points including Batapur, a suburb of Lahore, and reaching the Ichhogil Canal, the city’s main line of defence.
The Pakistani military, unprepared for an Indian offensive beyond Kashmir, was caught off guard. Reinforcements had to be hastily diverted, and the Pakistan Air Force, previously focused on the Kashmir sector, was redeployed to defend Lahore.
Strategic restraint and calculated pressure
Despite the rapid advance, Indian commanders, including future Punjab Chief Minister Capt Amarinder Singh, emphasised that India had no intention of capturing and occupying Lahore, which would have required an unsustainable commitment of troops.
Instead, Indian strategy aimed to apply pressure by threatening infrastructure such as the River Ravi bridge and the Lahore-Wazirabad highway, without escalating to total urban warfare.
Ceasefire and the Tashkent agreement
The war concluded on September 22, 1965, following a UN-mandated ceasefire. Both India and Pakistan retained small portions of each other’s territory, but the broader objectives remained unfulfilled, particularly for Pakistan, whose aim of seizing Kashmir had failed.
On January 10, 1966, the Tashkent Agreement, brokered by the Soviet Union, formalised the return to pre-war positions. While the agreement sought to restore peace, it also sowed seeds of political unrest.
In India, Prime Minister Shastri’s sudden death in Tashkent under mysterious circumstances sparked national mourning and speculation. In Pakistan, dissatisfaction with the outcome and Ayub Khan’s handling of the war contributed to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s resignation and growing dissent within the military establishment.
Who won the war?
Victory in the 1965 war ultimately depended on the goals of each side. Pakistan initiated the conflict to claim Kashmir but failed to achieve that aim. India, despite limited territorial gains, successfully defended its sovereignty and repelled the incursion, earning a strategic and moral victory.
The war cemented Shastri’s legacy as a strong and decisive leader, while exposing the flaws in Ayub Khan’s military strategy — flaws that continue to serve as a cautionary tale in Pakistan’s civil-military discourse.
Sixty years later, as General Asim Munir navigates his own turbulent chapter in Indo-Pak relations, the shadow of 1965 looms large — reminding both nations of the costs of miscalculation and the fragility of peace.
With inputs from agencies
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