Will China and Russia's strategic partnership last in the face of unresolved differences over time?

The conclusion of the recent two-day visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping from 21-23 March 2023 to Russia amid the Russia-Ukraine war generated many eyebrows regarding China’s position on the war. Incidentally, the visit took place at the same time when Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida visited Ukraine. The joint statement issued is a mere “repetition” of earlier joint statements between the two countries highlighting bilateral trade relations, joint cooperation in the field of energy, restructuring the nature of international relations and multilateral organisations like BRICS, G20 and the Eurasian Economic Union(EEU). The joint statement between Russia-China also emphasised the connectivity projects between the two neighbours. The visit of President Jinping can be studied in the context of a marked escalation of war between Russia and Ukraine and Russian president Vladimir Putin’s threat to deploy the nuclear weapon in the strategically important Belarus, another country that belongs to the Slavic geocultural space. Similarly, just before the visit of Jinping to  Russia, China also unveiled a 12 points plan to defuse the crisis in Ukraine. However, the West has also accused China of supplying weapons to Russia for its war against Ukraine. At the same time, China is also engaged in a protracted conflict with Taiwan. Similarly, China is involved in a territorial dispute with Japan and Vietnam in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. It is also a fact that China is showing its aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence, China’s proposal to address the Russia-Ukraine crisis lacks much credibility when looking at its imperial power credential. While it is traditionally believed that Russia-China relations have been in a state of bonhomie over the years, things are quite different on the ground. The relationship between Russia and China grew substantially after the post-1991 era due to the latter’s growing energy demand. China realised the importance of energy to its economy and started importing from Russia. Taking advantage of Russia’s economic weaknesses in the post-1995  era, China invested heavily in Russia’s energy sector and controlled several energy fields in Siberia and the Far East parts of Russia through joint ventures. Along with investment in the energy sector, slowly and steady large-scale influx of Chinese labour force into this part of Russia has also alarmed the Siberia and Far East Administrators. However, there was a lack of credible response from the Federal government of Russia. Similarly, taking advantage of the economic weaknesses of Russia, China started to resolve the boundary dispute between the two countries in a hush-hush manner, much to the disdain of the local population of Siberia and the Far East. Though the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo in 1997 brought together both Russia-China on a common platform of the anti-Western alliance, there were apprehensions from the ordinary people regarding China’s ulterior motives in  Russia. The same was also reflected in the writings of Russia’s geopolitical thinker Alexander Dugin who, in his book Foundations of Geopolitics published in 1997, aptly summarised Russia’s position in “Heartland.” Dugin stated, “ Only  Russia can speak on behalf of Heartland with full geopolitical justification” (P.94). This he said in the context of Chinese expansion towards Siberia and the Far East of Russia.  To quote him further, Dugin stated, “It is necessary to take large-scale geopolitical steps”(p.192) on the part of Russia to prevent Chinese expansionism.

However, Russia and China relations took a new upsurge following the  post-2001 era because of complementarities of interests. For China, it was a case of securing energy, positioning itself as a significant player in the Siberian and Far East, and securing tacit consent from Russia to expand its geopolitical footprint in Central Asia, as it is a fact that this region has been considered to be the “ soft underbelly” of Russia for centuries. Central Asia is important for China’s geography because of its location and resources. China wants to extend its leverage in the post-Soviet Eurasian space by keeping Russia in good humour so that both can also checkmate the West led by the United States in this geopolitical space. This is more so after the 9/11 incident. The United States got some key strategic bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. There was also a growing rapprochement between the West and the Central-Caucasus countries in the post-2001 era. An excellent example of this is the operationalisation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project in 2005. Similarly, for Russia, the reasons for building bridges with China were basically to secure a market for its oil and gas and an ally in its quest to challenge the West’s growing preponderance in the post-Soviet space. This was more visible after the Colour Revolution in three countries of Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine. The subsequent crisis of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and war with Georgia helped Russia consolidate its gripe in the post-Soviet space. Similarly, the Crimea crisis and outlining the EEU concept gave Russia a preponderant position in the post-Soviet space. However, when Russia’s actions in South  Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea raised a concern at the international forums including at the United Nations (UN), and Moscow was on the back foot, its strategic partner China kept mum. This, to a significant extent, annoyed the Russian leadership. On the economic front also, although China strengthened defence and energy cooperation with Russia, as reported by various Russian analysts, Beijing put many restrictions on the financial transaction with Moscow in the aftermath of the sanctions of 2014. Russia’s move in East and South East Asia has also annoyed China. Similarly, Russia’s engagement with the Philippines also irked China. The irony of Russia and China’s relationship is that there is no bonhomie between the two at a deeper level. China always treats Russia as its “junior partner” in bilateral engagement. It is a fact that Chinese policymakers have apprehensions when Russia launched its EEU project in Central Asia. China thought it was an attempt on the part of Russia to checkmate its One Belt One Road (OBOR) project in Central Asia, as analysts argue. The relationship between Russia and China is not on equal footing in Central Asia. This is more so after China and Turkmenistan entered into an energy negation, resulting in the China-Central Asia Gas pipeline Project opening in 2009. This put Russia’s Gazprom in a disadvantageous position in Turkmenistan’s energy sector. Even in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meetings on many regional and bilateral issues, China and Russia do not see eye to eye. China’s move in recent years in the aftermath of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is also raising suspicion about the relationship between the two. These include China’s ambivalent position in the present war with Russia-Ukraine; the shifting of Chinese industries from Russia to Kazakhstan, including the Huwaei company, along with reamending of relations between the US and China in the post-Covid era is generating a certain degree of apprehension over the likely nature of relations between Beijing and Moscow. This will shape the dynamics of the geopolitics of Eurasia( post-Soviet space) in the near future. In addition to some factors, Russia and  China have soured their historical past, which deter the strategic partnership between the two countries. The immediate cause of the discord between Russia and China is the present war in the Slavic space. It was expected from Moscow that   Beijing would provide wholehearted support in the former’s war with Kyiv. However, China took a calculative move. For instance, in the initial months of the war, Chinese president Jinping consulted with US president Joe Biden and other European leaders to defuse the crisis. Similarly, China heeded the advice of the US and did not supply any essential aid to  Russia in the initial months of the war. Various analysts have also observed that the China-United States is growing faster. This factor, to a significant extent, shapes China’s relations with Russia also. For instance, China’s “total import from the US in 2022 was 153,837.1 million US$ and export to the United States was 536,754.1 million US$” as per the 2022 report of the US Census Report on Trade with China. This shows the volume of trade transactions taking place between the two countries. In this context, China does not want to lose a significant market in the form of the US. Geoeconomic interest is the primary driving force behind the present relations between Washington and Beijing. At the same time, both countries do not want to ignore each other. Similarly, China’s trade with the EU is rising faster. As per the European Union’s Report on Trade in 2021, total EU import in goods was “472.8 billion Euro and export was 223.6 billion Euro” from China. In the service sector also, the same report adds, “total EU import was 36.6 billion Euro and export was 20.06 billion Euro from China”. At the same time, China also shares a perfect strategic equation with Ukraine. One may recall here that in the post-1991 phase, Ukraine supplied defence equipment to China, including the naval aircraft carriers, as reported. Similarly, China-Ukraine trade relations are also growing at a faster pace. Analysts highlight that China is keen to engage with Ukraine to promote its own economic interest in other European countries. Ukraine serves as a strategic base. On several occasions, foreign ministers of China and Ukraine met in the post-February 2002 era. Even there are reports that China’s President Jinping is planning to visit Ukraine. So, one can see here that China is keeping its option open in the present war between Russia and Ukraine. Analysts believe prolonging the war between Russia and Ukraine will suit China’s interests. As this will make Russia more vulnerable in its dependence on China. Looking at the nature of complex geopolitics prevailing in the post-Soviet Eurasian space following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, it can be stated that China is more interested in aggravating the vulnerability of Russia. Hence looking at historical conditioning and present strategic reality,  it can be stated that China is not a credible strategic partner of Russia. The author teaches at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal. Read all the Latest News, Trending News, Cricket News, Bollywood News, India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.