Why Pakistan's deepening economic meltdown will jeopardize its ability to survive a war with India

If the past is any indicator, Pakistan, caught in the middle of an unprecedented economic crisis, like many other Third World nations, could be expected to divert national and/or international attention to the Indian borders. But this time round, the recent American anticipation/assessment of such a war with India could be costlier than ever, for the Rawalpindi-Islamabad combo to provoke, as they may not be able to whip up the kind of national momentum required to sustain what otherwise should still be a losing war. In context, should Pakistan try it out now, it should be a revival of cross-border terrorism and unrest in Jammu and Kashmir for the nation’s internal consumption, though it would be a slow process for their people to catch up. It can be a war with India, fought openly or by proxy or unacknowledged, if it wants the international community to revert some of the attention away from the unending Ukraine War of the past year. In the past, the Pakistani establishment, independent of the political party or leader in power, has encouraged cross-border terrorism to keep India on the defensive and to tell its soldier class that they were still living by Zia’s ‘thousand cuts’ strategy against the larger south-eastern neighbour. Of course, at the sudden withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, they needed to re-employ the combined troops of mercenaries and religious zealots from across the world, and Indian border and the ‘Kashmir issue’ provided the much-needed diversion, if they had to be gainfully employed but without hitting and hurting Pakistan from inside. On conventional warfare, the Bangladesh War (1971) is the only one that Pakistan was forced to play honourably, acknowledging that regulars were at it. In 1948, 1965 and 1995 (Kargil War), they first sent in irregular or regulars disguised otherwise. When the heat became too much, when those ‘irregulars’ dropped dead on the Indian side with their identity cards in their pockets, and the facade of a handful of them would not work, then alone did Islamabad acknowledge that it was a regular war fought by regular soldiers. Two-front war The vote should be for reviving cross-border terrorism, which may still be cost-effective, yes. But then, given the mood of the West, Pakistan may not be able to either disprove its role or convince the US and the rest for the much-needed IMF bail-out package, among others. Of course, Pakistan would also know that in the backdrop of the Ukraine War on the one hand, and the increasing western efforts to marginalise China (after allowing it to grow to monster proportions, as always) on the other, the West cannot ignore Islamabad. This is so despite having India as a ‘strategic partner’. If nothing else, the West cannot afford to have Pakistan on China’s side just now. From an Indian perspective, any threat of a war, whether with Pakistan or China will be accompanied by an assessment and consequent possibility of a two-front war. The question after Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) is about the possibility of China increasing border tensions as a stand-alone affair or doing so if India is to engage Pakistan along their shared borders. The reverse may not fructify as much. India may have to be prepared for a western sector war with Pakistan if the provocative first fire occurs in the East, from China. There may be a Chinese perspective, too. How far will India’s post-Cold War friends go if it came to defending their South Asian friend or ally, as the case may be? Japan was the only nation to criticise China on Doklam, almost instantly. The rest of them, including the US, took time reacting. It was a message that was read as much in Beijing as in Delhi. In comparison, post-Galwan, almost all of India’s western friends criticised China, without loss of much time. The next time round, China would also want to see if any or all of them would rush around India, flexing their military muscle, as the US especially has been doing in the case of Taiwan. But the ground situation is different between the two, and any kind of India-centric military intervention or a blockade against China would have consequences. After all, China knows from the Ukraine War now and the post-Cold War US-led intervention in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that the UN system is a talking shop and nothing more. It would care less unless the West gets involved directly, not stopping with statements and resolutions. The closest that the West can come to military assistance, if not participation, will be ‘sanctions’ against China. Already, China is suffering enough of it, and more of it may or may not make an impact. That need not be the case for Pakistan. A sanctions regime could just finish off that country, worse than already. The IMF may not release subsequent tranches if it had already released one. Psychological profile For India, the economic crisis in Pakistan is a political situation that is impacting society in multiple ways. According to reports, residents in PoK have taken to the streets, demanding food, medicines, electricity and whatnot. From across the LoC, they would also be hearing and seeing about the way their Kashmiri brethren are living on the Indian side – no shortages, no tensions, and no problems, other than those triggered by the ISI, one way or the other. It is the psychological profile that needs no effort to turn against Islamabad, if not in favour of India, as yet. PoK is only one part of Pakistan where people are fighting for food and every other essential. In a loosely-knit nation where Pakistan still remains, tensions of every kind can tear the nation apart, emotionally, socially and politically, if not physically as yet. The current economic ills are only symptoms of a deeper ailment for which the nation is in no mood to find a panacea. Pakistan media reports also freely talk about the continuing gap between the traditional rich and the conventional poor, with Partition Independence not having produced the kind of middle class that India now has. The problem owes to Pakistan externalising its domestic policy since Independence and making the Kashmir issue the raison d’etre of its very nationhood. There are two lessons for contemporary India and Indians in this. One, by focusing on socio-economic development through the Five-Year Plans and affirmative action of every kind, the Nehruvian model, kept it all within the Indian borders. Politics and elections, parties and leaders lost. India never lost. So much so, India could take the 1962 reversals against China with equanimity and could devise security strategies suited to the evolving times and conditions. India has not produced an equivalent of Zia’s ‘thousand cuts’ strategy, which Pakistan, China and the international community, starting with the UN scheme, should appreciate. Those in India braying for Pakistani and/or Chinese blood should learn from those two nations how ‘externalising’ national policy comes with a price. While the Pakistani story is well known, even the evolving problems of China (especially on the economic front) are only an inevitable western reaction to Xi Jinping ‘externalising’ the nation’s policies, with the economic wealth accumulated since Deng’s days as the base and basis. That leads to the question, of why Pakistan, especially Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto, is getting increasingly hyper about India, whether it is in the UN or in bilateral fora as happened in Berlin, Germany, late last year, or to a domestic audience. It would look as if Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff has no control over the young Bhutto, as they also come from what traditionally was rival political parties, namely the PPP and PNP-N. Imran Khan’s continuing relevance, or whatever that remains, alone has kept the other two together. Living up to past image Clearly, Bhutto, Jr, is trying to live up to the past image of his late maternal grandfather, who lost his dear life to Zia’s noose, for talking too much, and too much out-of-turn. In the Indian context, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had sought to shame India in multiple fora, in multiple ways, but ended up shaming himself and his nation. India’s deep-seated conventional wisdom and equanimity has always won the day. Bilawal seems to want to re-create the non-existent Zulfikar past, little realising that even Pakistan may have no use for the likes of them all. Else, Imran, for instance, would not have succeeded in the first place and become prime minister. Elections to Pakistan’s National Assembly, or Parliament, are due in October. Whether the government will have money to fund the elections is another question, but that can also provide the so-called justification for the government to try and postpone the same, almost indefinitely. If nothing else, Rawalpindi has not given its verdict on conducting elections, as of now – and that would be the deciding factor, so to say. If Imran has a chance to win, then, no one in power, either in Pindi or Islamabad, would want elections. Or, this is a simple, though not simplistic way to look at it. If elections are still held, in October or a few months later, clearly, young Bilawal is becoming increasingly restless without being in the driver’s seat. He seems to have concluded that there is still a ‘traditionally nationalist’ constituency in the country that would love to hate India and thus love any leader who hates India and tells them loud and clear that he hates India even more than all of them put together. The chances are that Bilawal has got it all wrong. Yet, if he has to become prime minister from within the existing combo, his PPP has to win more seats in the National Assembly than Prime Minister Sharif’s PNP-N. Obviously, the foreign minister cannot paint a rosy picture on anything domestic to his constituency, now or on the election eve as party chief. The same goes for the prime minister and his party, too. So, attacking India by words is the only option available to both, as also Imran, who too has no magic wand to turn over the economy.  Bilwal has beaten the other two to it and making himself heard, loud and clear – away from the myriad of issues for which, he too does not have any solution and in which the other two are entangled, too. It is saying a lot for India. And thankfully, the Indian parliamentary polls are not due before the summer of 2024. Hopefully, the Pakistani polls should have passed off, and a new government or government formation should be the hot topic for a domestic audience in the country. It is viz India that suggestions are made about another Balakot-like ‘Surgical Strikes’ in the coming months. Possibly, the American assessment too may be hinting at one (more) of the kind, if there is an equal provocation of the kind. The writer is a Chennai-based policy analyst and political commentator. Views expressed are personal. 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