Why Muslims made a profound mistake over the Ayodhya dispute

To the many “ifs” of post-independent India’s history (what “if” Partition had not happened, what “if” Gandhi had lived longer, what “if” Indira Gandhi had not imposed the Emergency) let’s add one more: what “if” Muslims had voluntarily given up their claim to the disputed Ayodhya site and settled the issue in a spirit of mutual accommodation? As the nation prepares to celebrate the grand inauguration of Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, it is a good occasion to look back and reflect on the roads not taken on the long journey to the 22 January consecration. Could the history of the Ayodhya dispute and indeed the Hindu-Muslim relations of the past 40 years have turned out differently if Muslims had not dragged it through the courts? Contrafactual history is one of those great unknowns that even historians struggle to divine. So, we will never really know a definite answer. But the question can’t be ignored. Whether or not, it would have changed the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in is debatable, but that doesn’t detract from the fact that Muslims made a profound mistake by not settling the issue amicably. The most compelling factor in favour of a negotiated settlement was the stark reality that given the community’s political isolation and the strength of Hindu sentiment on the issue there was little prospect of winning the day on their terms. It made no sense prolonging a dispute that had become an albatross around their neck. Given the odds against them, it was in their own interest to defuse tension and avoid confrontation which, in the long-term, was bound to hurt them more – as indeed subsequent history showed. In return for a “grand gesture” on their part, they could demand a legally binding guarantee that other Muslim-era monuments would be left alone. A Muslim gesture may not have necessarily stopped the Bharatiya Party (BJP) from pursuing its long-term Hindutva project, but it might have slowed down the momentum and lowered the temperature. It might have also put the Sangh under pressure from moderate Hindus to refrain from reopening old historical disputes as envisaged under the 1991 Places of Worship Act freezing the status of religious places of worship as they existed on 15 August, 1947. Muslims missed an opportunity to open a dialogue that held the possibility of normalising Hindu-Muslim relations. An outcome that would have benefitted Muslims more as a minority community. Another important reason that should have weighed with Muslims was the fact that the disputed site held greater religious pull for Hindus as the birthplace of Lord Ram. There are many Ram temples across the country but this one was special to the Hindus because of its association with his birth. Many didn’t subscribe to the Hindutva agenda but still professed strong religious attachment to it. According to them, the site had the same sanctity for practising Hindus as Mecca and Medina had for Muslims and the Vatican City for Christians. For Muslims, on the other hand, it had no religious or historic significance and was simply a property dispute. Nor was Babri Masjid a protected monument which could not be relocated to another site. Contrary to some claims, there is no Islamic injunction against relocating or pulling down a mosque, if necessary. In the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, mosques are routinely bulldozed or relocated to make way for roads and flyovers. Moreover, it was not a functioning mosque having been sealed by the authorities because of the ownership dispute. For the sake of perspective, it is important to point out that there was a sizeable Muslim opinion which did favour a “grand gesture” to avoid a showdown in which the community had little chance of winning. They included many ordinary Muslims, especially in Uttar Pradesh, whose lives and livelihood had been rudely disrupted by the agitation. They believed that it was not worth picking up a fight over a  disused mosque. But their hardline leadership had its own political agenda. The Uttar Pradesh Babri Masjid Action Committee (UPBMAC) convenor Zafaryab Jilani sought to justify its non-compromising position saying:  “If we lose this mosque to Hindus, the already oppressed minority community will lose whatever little reason they have to be the citizens of this country.” The statement exposed the Muslim leadership’s slender grasp on reality. The issue quickly became a vehicle for assorted Muslim groups vying with each other to consolidate their positions. For the so-called secular parties, especially the Congress and the broader liberal establishment, the dispute became a proxy to pursue their own ideological culture wars with the Hindu Right. In November 1988, India Today carried a special report on how Muslim groups and their “secular” political allies were milking the Ayodhya issue for political ends. “The Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi issue is now totally in the realm of vote-politics, and no objective settlement of the problem appears possible,” it wrote. The demolition of Babri Masjid was still three years away and Muslims could still have theoretically averted it by reaching a face-saving compromise. Instead, their key leaders like Babri Masjid Coordination Committee chair Syed Shahabuddin further fuelled tensions by ruling out “surrendering the mosque to the Hindus”. In October that year, he announced a provocative plan to offer en masse “namaz” in the disputed shrine. Predictably, it prompted groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Ram Janmabhoomi Mukti Yagna Samiti to announce a five-day-long “Shri Rama Maha Yagna” in Ayodhya around the same time. With over a lakh VHP and samiti supporters turning up to counter the “namazis” Shahabuddin was forced to drop the plan after being warned that it risked causing mayhem. It was an egregious case of Muslim leadership’s brinkmanship at a time when the situation demanded extreme caution. Muslim leaders insisted that they only desired a peaceful solution but this “peaceful solution” was never spelt out clearly. Because, in reality, there was no political will to find a solution. The whole “save the masjid” campaign was misconceived and short-sighted as later events proved. If the community had shown better judgement, it would have at least had the satisfaction of doing the right thing given the circumstances. The writer is an independent columnist and the author of Unmasking Indian Secularism: Why We Need A New Hindu-Muslim Deal_. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect_ Firstpost_’s views_. Read all the Latest News, Trending News, Cricket News, Bollywood News, India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.