Why Washington’s Bangladesh gamble could ignite a new Islamist surge in South Asia

As Bangladesh approaches yet another defining political transition, the country has become the centre of an unusual and consequential diplomatic experiment.

Over the past year, Washington has intensified its engagement with Bangladesh’s Islamist parties, most prominently the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and Islami Andolan Bangladesh (IAB). This shift in American diplomacy — subtle at first, now increasingly explicit — signals a strategic recalibration that could reshape South Asia’s political trajectory in unexpected ways.

The Biden and Trump administrations may disagree on many fronts, but when it comes to Bangladesh, both seem to have converged on a shared assumption: Islamists will hold a larger stake in the country’s future, and the United States must now engage them directly. But this outreach is occurring at a moment when Bangladesh is at its most politically fragile — and when Islamist revivalism is at its most assertive since the early 1990s.

The risk is simple: Washington may be betting on forces whose rise could deepen instability across the region, empower extremist networks, and undermine Bangladesh’s secular foundations — foundations that were laid with enormous sacrifice in 1971.

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A Sudden Pivot

It began quietly. In Sylhet earlier this year, officials from the US embassy held a meeting with leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami’s regional branch — a group historically linked to the massacres and atrocities of 1971. That meeting was followed by a series of additional engagements: a US diplomat meeting a Jamaat leader at the American Club; former ambassadors visiting Jamaat’s headquarters; an embassy-invited Jamaat “delegation” discussing internal democracy and minority rights; and finally, a high-profile July visit by US chargé d’affaires Tracey Ann Jacobson to Jamaat’s central leadership.

The symbolism was unmistakable. Many Bangladeshis saw it as a quiet endorsement — a signal that Washington now considers Jamaat a legitimate stakeholder in the country’s political future.

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Even more striking was the decision to issue a US visa to Jamaat’s ameer, Shafiqur Rahman, despite his long history of incendiary rhetoric targeting Jews, including recent praise for Hamas commander Yahya Sinwar. Rahman’s meetings in New York, Buffalo, Michigan, and Washington DC further cemented the impression that a once-isolated Islamist movement had suddenly become acceptable in Western policy circles.

The Misreading

What explains this dramatic shift?

Three calculations appear to be driving Washington’s approach:

1. A changing political map in Bangladesh

The 2024 uprising that unseated Sheikh Hasina created a power vacuum. The interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus has granted unprecedented political space to Islamist factions long considered beyond the pale.

Washington seems to be adjusting to this new reality — perhaps too quickly and without the caution warranted by Bangladesh’s historical memory.

2. A belief in the “moderation through engagement” thesis

This is a familiar logic in Western diplomacy. From Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood to Tunisia’s Ennahda, US policymakers have repeatedly argued that Islamist movements soften when brought into institutional politics. Yet the evidence across the Middle East suggests the opposite: once empowered, Islamists often entrench themselves and narrow democratic space.

3. Geopolitical competition in the Bay of Bengal

With China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, ports, and defence partnerships, Washington may see political inclusivity — even with Islamists — as necessary to maintain access in a strategically vital region.

But in making this gamble, the US risks misreading the ideological depth of the groups it is courting.

Islamists Being Mainstreamed

The Yunus-led interim government has played a central role in normalising groups previously associated with extremist activity. Jamaat and IAB, once constrained by court rulings and electoral regulations, have re-entered political life with new confidence.

But this mainstreaming is not merely political. It is accompanied by a visible decline in Bangladesh’s secular civic space.

Human rights groups and journalists have documented a disturbing resurgence of communal violence, especially against Hindu communities. Jihadist activity — previously contained through extensive counter-terror operations — has shown signs of revival. Calls for stricter blasphemy laws and censorship have grown louder. Vigilante groups, some linked to Islamist student wings, have reappeared in key districts.

In this environment, Washington’s outreach risks reinforcing the very forces that are eroding Bangladesh’s pluralistic foundations.

A Wider Geopolitical Scramble

Bangladesh’s political transition has triggered a global diplomatic race.

According to local reports, envoys from more than 35 countries — including China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UK, Japan, Iran, Pakistan, and EU member states — have met with Jamaat or their political allies in the past year. This remarkable breadth reflects a widespread expectation: the Islamist parties may be kingmakers — or even coalition leaders — after the upcoming election.

For India, the implications are profound. A Jamaat- or IAB-influenced government in Dhaka could:

• Amplify cross-border radicalisation

• Fuel extremist networks in West Bengal and Assam

• Re-open strategic space for Pakistan’s ISI

• Complicate counter-terror cooperation

• Revive Rohingya-linked insurgency pathways

• Increase pressure on Hindu communities inside Bangladesh and along border districts.

For China and Turkey, however, the Islamist revival offers potential leverage. Both countries have cultivated ideological or economic ties with Islamist movements across various regions. Beijing has already positioned itself as a patient investor. Ankara sees ideological affinity. Pakistan sees an opportunity to re-enter Bangladesh’s political equation after decades of marginalisation.

In this crowded geopolitical field, Washington’s outreach looks less like a strategy and more like a hurried attempt to retain influence.

Washington Continues to Ignore

The US approach in Bangladesh is not an isolated phenomenon. It mirrors a long-standing trend in Western foreign policy: the belief that Islamists can be reliable democratic actors if integrated early into political processes.

This assumption collapsed dramatically in the Middle East:

• In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to capture state institutions rather than broaden democratic participation

• In Libya and Tunisia, Islamist factions contributed to political fragmentation.

• In Yemen, US-funded programmes strengthened Al-Islah, leading to disastrous unintended consequences.

But despite this history, publicly funded American institutions — especially the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) — continue to invest heavily in engaging Islamist parties throughout the developing world.

Bangladesh is now becoming the next testing ground for this deeply flawed doctrine.

The Stakes Could Not Be Higher

If Jamaat, IAB, and their allies rise to significant political power in Bangladesh, several outcomes are likely to reshape South Asia’s security environment:

• Repressive blasphemy and censorship regimes

• Accelerated communal violence targeting minorities

• Deepened ideological alignment with Turkey and Pakistan

• Increased vulnerability to jihadist recruitment

• A rollback of women’s rights and secular protections

• A new wave of radicalisation in India’s border states

• For India — and for the Bay of Bengal region — the strategic implications would be immense.

Far More Dangerous

What the United States views as inclusive diplomacy may, in effect, be legitimising the most regressive forces in Bangladesh’s political arena. The stakes extend far beyond Dhaka’s internal dynamics. Bangladesh is one of South Asia’s most important buffers against radicalisation, a key maritime actor, and a major partner in regional connectivity.

If Washington’s engagement ends up empowering Islamist actors with a long history of violence, sectarianism, and ideological hostility to democratic pluralism, the strategic costs will be felt across the subcontinent — especially in India.

Bangladesh today stands at a crossroads. And the choices foreign governments make in the coming months will determine whether South Asia moves toward stability — or slides into a new era of ideological confrontation.

(Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury is an award-winning journalist, writer, and Editor of the newspaper ‘Blitz’. He specialises in counterterrorism and regional geopolitics. Follow him on X: @Salah_Shoaib. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)