War in Our Times | India-Pakistan War of 1965: The great Indian fightback in Kutch and Kashmir

Editor’s note: This series by one of India’s leading military historians of contemporary times showcases chronological vignettes of war and conflict in independent India. Watch out for this column close to all the dates in the year when independent India has had to deal with various national security challenges.

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Testing the Indians in Kutch The summer of 1965 saw a buoyant Pakistani Armed Forces under an overconfident military dictator, General Ayub Khan, test the resolve and preparedness of India’s Armed Forces in the salt pans of the Kutch. The Rann of Kutch is a large peninsular-shaped hybrid marshland cum salt pan which gets partially submerged during the few monsoon months. For a major part of the year however, it remains a marshy area interspersed with hard and dry salt pans and a permanent riverine creek, the Sir Creek, the middle of which marks the current border. Like many poorly defined and demarcated frontier areas in the sub-continent, the Rann of Kutch emerged as a contested area in the mid-1950s with both India and Pakistan laying claims to it despite clear evidence being available in pre-independence records that the Maharajah of Kutch had laid claims to the Rann based on historical evidence. Operation Desert Hawk The Americans had armed the Pakistanis with sophisticated military equipment that included Patton tanks, Sabre fighter jets and field artillery guns since the late 1950s and Ayub Khan was keen on assessing Indian military preparedness before August and September 1965 when he had planned Operation Gibraltar (the armed insurrection in J&K) and its follow-on operation called Operation Grand Slam that would complete the isolation of J&K from the Indian heartland through the capture of Chhamb and Akhnur. While the larger strategic objective of Operation Desert Hawk, as Pakistan named this limited operation, was to analyse the politico-military reaction from the new Indian government led by prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the military objectives were pretty focussed. The first was an evaluation of India’s military preparedness; the second was an opportunity to test the Patton tank in manoeuvre warfare along with the infantry and with artillery support; and lastly, to grab any territory and hold it. Pakistan’s response to India moving its posts towards a border hamlet called Kanjarkot was disproportionate – it moved almost an entire division into the area by early April. Though the Indian Army would ultimately deploy a little over two brigades in the region and reorganise it as Kilo Force under Major General PO Dunne, these were undermanned and did not have the mobility and wherewithal to counter the swift initial assault by a brigade-sized force with a squadron of Patton tanks on 7 April that bypassed the Indian posts of Sardar and Vigokot and made a run for the small town of Dharamsala about 30-odd kilometres inside Indian territory. With only infantry units deployed, the Indian Army sorely missed the armour and mobility that may have allowed them to launch a counterattack towards the important town of Badin, some 30 kilometres inside Pakistani territory as a quid pro quo offensive move. After some fierce fighting and having validated its tactics and equipment including its Sabre jets which did not cross the border or attack Indian forces but used the opportunity to practice Close Air Support missions, units of the Pakistani Army held their position as hectic international diplomacy took over to limit the fallout of the skirmishes. Though New Delhi threatened to expand the conflict, immense pressure from Britain forced Ayub Khan to pull back his forces and agree to a ceasefire and truce with India over the Rann on 6 June 1965. Operation Gibraltar To the north, the inability of Pakistan to sever J&K from the Indian Union in 1948 had turned into a national obsession for Pakistan and its armed forces. Having grabbed large chunks of territory in J&K from India in 1948, it was only natural that Pakistan would look for an opportune moment to occupy the rest of the state and fulfil the dreams of its founding fathers. Operation Gibraltar, the 1965 plan for subversion, infiltration and occupation of Kashmir was supported and inspired by Bhutto. It was then operationally stitched together by Major General Akhtar Hussein Malik, the General Officer Commanding of Pakistan’s 12 Division. [caption id=“attachment_13066582” align=“alignnone” width=“640”] Courtesy Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam (Retd)[/caption] The plan was crafted with certain geopolitical, intelligence and military assumptions, most of which grossly underestimated India’s military response. First, the success of Operation Desert Hawk in Kutch a few months earlier convinced Ayub Khan of the tactical, operational and technological superiority of the Pakistan Army. Second, the intelligence from J&K indicated that the local population was restive and highly vulnerable to subversion, and when the time came, would rise in rebellion and fight against the Indian Army alongside the Mujahids and regulars of the Pakistan Army. Lastly, though Major General Malik appreciated that the Indian Army would be better prepared to counter the infiltration campaign as compared to 1947, he was confident that his own Mujahid battalions would be better trained and equipped than the rag-tag force that assaulted the Kashmir Valley back in 1947. When coupled with the prevailing geopolitical instability in India resulting from Nehru’s untimely death, the relatively stable military regime in Pakistan felt that it was an ideal time to strike Kashmir. Infiltration by the Mujahid battalions and regulars of the Pakistan Army into the Kashmir valley commenced on 05 August 1965, covered by heavy artillery fire and stray engagements between regular units of the two armies. As the Mujahids initially fanned out into the valley along seven or eight thrust lines, the main ones being in Gurez, Kupwara, Uri, Poonch, Mendhar, Naushera and Akhnur, they were surprised by the singular lack of support from the local population. Many of them were captured by the Indian Army and the state police and divulged elaborate subversion plans. It was revealed that the saboteurs were a mix of Razakars and Mujahids and numbered approximately 4,000-5,000. Led by JCOs and a few regulars they carried with them leaflets and pamphlets to incite the local population along with transistor radios pre-tuned to Radio Pakistan. By 12 August, more than 1,200 infiltrators had been captured, many of them in their early twenties and demonstrating a zealously calm countenance when captured, indicating that they had undergone extensive religious indoctrination prior to the operation. By 21 August the infiltration was crushed and the last remnants of Khaled Force, the most stubborn force, retreated into Pakistan after suffering heavy casualties. Harbaksh’s success An overconfident Major General Akhtar Malik, the mastermind of Operation Gibraltar had not done his homework well! He had met his match in the form of the strapping six-foot Sikh warrior, Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, the aggressive GOC-in C of the Indian Army’s Western Army Command. Having operated extensively in the Kashmir valley during the 47-48 conflict, Harbaksh knew the terrain like the back of his hand and had regular forces waiting at almost all entry points. Despite not being permitted to station fighters at Srinagar as per the restrictions laid down after the UN-sponsored ceasefire of 1948, the IAF was not quiet during these operations. Responding with alacrity to a call from Harbaksh, the IAF put together a helicopter task force at Srinagar comprising 10-12 Mi-4 utility helicopters that were fitted with machine guns and modified to carry 25 lb bombs in the gunship role. The ability to shift small-sized forces from one sector to the other along with casualty evacuation capability in the valley was a significant morale enhancer. Surprising the infiltrators in areas that were not accessible by ground forces, the Mi-4s caused a fair amount of psychological degradation and demonstrated good coercive intent on the part of the Indian armed forces. The willingness of Harbaksh to use all resources at his disposal to thwart the widespread infiltration campaign, and forthcoming support from the IAF proved extremely effective in putting down the multi-pronged Pakistan-backed subversion in Kashmir. Tough, unyielding and demanding commander, Harbaksh had ensured that by mid-September, all the infiltrators had been pushed back and the much-awaited ‘Liberation of Kashmir’ was nothing but a pipedream for Pakistan. In the final analysis, Operation Gibraltar ended with a whimper and a resounding victory for India. It was a chastening defeat for Ayub Khan and his rabidly anti-India foreign minister, Bhutto. For India, it was a much-needed morale booster after the reverses in Kutch. Operation Gibraltar in many ways was Harbaksh’s finest hour – what it also did was to give him immense confidence to tackle subsequent battles on the western front with an aggressive mindset. The author is a former fighter pilot from the IAF and an accomplished military historian. He is the author of two defining books on contemporary Indian military history, ‘India’s Wars: A Military History 1947-1971 & Full Spectrum: India’s Wars 1972-2020. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.