The Yangtse Trail: Why China wants to open up another front at Tawang

On 9 December, PLA troops carried out an incursion across the LAC in Yangtse area of Tawang sector in Arunachal Pradesh and attempted to unilaterally change the status quo. The attempt was foiled by Indian troops. Post the incursion, much hullabaloo focused around China’s objection to rapidly growing Indian border infrastructure, which in turn may have triggered Chinese actions. But no, on closer scrutiny, it is a different story. The genesis of China’s actions lies in executing a unilateral and rigid perception of their own interests. The Chinese are known to patiently put together plans that are executed in an opportune time in future. In China’s case, the past is an interesting and authoritative way to decipher its present thinking on Tawang. China’s recent plans on Tawang: The Sakteng Angle In June 2020, as China was locked in a tussle with India in Ladakh and at Naku La in Sikkim, shortly before the Galwan clash, an interesting plan was taking shape in Beijing. Sakteng, a wildlife sanctuary in eastern Bhutan spanning 650 square kilometres, began to receive surprise attention from the Chinese. The sanctuary used to receive funds from the GEF Council without much of a hiccup. On 2 June 2020, as Bhutan was set to receive another round of funding from the GEF council, the Chinese government objected. This was intriguing since Sakteng had never before figured among the disputed areas recognised by both Bhutan and China. More so, the sanctuary is in the easternmost part of Bhutan in Trashigang district and is far from the border with China. China’s claims over Sakteng wildlife sanctuary stemmed from the reason that it adjoins Tawang, which China has claimed along with 90,000 sq km of territory in Arunachal Pradesh. It was all building up to a plan. China was going to bring up the issue of Tawang and the monastery one day. But that needed time. Xi Jinping was facing political opposition due to the coronavirus outbreak and the controversial outbreak of Covid-19 from Wuhan that incurred global wrath. The immediate need was to swing attention to an area where a standoff could be sustained for a longer time. From Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh Two weeks later, on 16 June, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Galwan resulting in injuries to both sides. Galwan turned out to be the eye of the storm that swept across Ladakh, holding both sides in an obstinate, sustained impasse. As the focus shifted to Ladakh, China was consolidating infrastructure in the eastern sector — setting up villages as possible harbours of a future large-scale operation to alter the status quo of the boundary between the two countries. The focus was the Tawang monastery. The Tawang monastery, birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama, is critical for China’s plans to control the future stock of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama is getting old and this issue is likely to become a bone of contention in the future. China would like to address that proactively and apply pressure on India. On the other hand, China’s sudden opposition to the Sakteng funds, sudden claims on areas close to Tawang and arming villages close to Tawang raised India’s hackles even as the two countries sparred in Ladakh. Tawang and its state— Arunachal Pradesh – including Bum La, a high altitude pass, is key to India’s national security interests in the North East region. Capturing the mountain pass would give China a huge advantage and potentially expose the Brahmaputra plains to Chinese forces. Both countries are aware of India’s soft underbelly: thus, while the skirmish and standoff in Ladakh made front-page news, Tawang never ceased to disappear from Chinese radar. In fact, in 2021, while the 13th round of talks was about to take place in Ladakh, Yangtse turned into a jostling pit between Indian and Chinese soldiers, who had intruded. The scrapping troops disengaged but China’s threat continued to grow — and any surprise of intent was lost.; Why 2022 mirrors 2020 In response to Chinese moves on Sakteng, India had nudged Bhutan to revisit an earlier plan to build a road from Guwahati to Tawang via the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary. The road was meant to reduce travel time from Guwahati to Tawang from 15 to 10 hours and reduce the distance by around 150 kilometres. The objective was to build capability to mobilise troops quicker to Tawang and the boundary areas. Thus, the emphasis on India’s infrastructure in the area came after China’s Sakteng move which clearly established Chinese intent. The year 2022 bore an uncanny resemblance to 2020. The COVID-19 challenge — ably met by India and many other countries — was messed up by Beijing with its hardnosed lockdowns and failed COVID-19 countermeasures. Xi’s elevation to another five-year-term coincided with a year of misses for the Chinese government. The much hyped reunification campaign involving Taiwan hit an unlikely snag when Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan this year called out the Chinese threat as bark with no bite. The Chinese government’s narrative of possessing the might to carry out the threat of retribution, in case of her visit, was deflated and Taiwan invasion plans postponed. Sixteen rounds of India-China talks on Ladakh resulted in a withdrawal from Gogra-Hot Springs on the western section of the India-China boundary, though there hasnt been a change in Depsang and Demchok areas. Besides, large-scale mobilisation of troops in Ladakh had ceased to impress Xi’s domestic audience anymore. The world, with India setting an example, had managed covid far better than Xi’s China. The protests in China over COVID-19 mismanagement showed that pressure was building up domestically, like in 2020. A new Galwan was sought to be created. It was time to kick off the Tawang plan. Lt General Rakesh Sharma of VIF writes that the Xiaokang Village constructed in Tibet in proximity to Yangste Ridge, with 200 odd houses and all modern communication infrastructure, could well have been used to build-up as a launchpad. The mobilisation of 300-500 Chinese troops towards Yangtse was meant to alter the boundary status quo. Such a large complement of troops is unlikely to have been a patrol with a lesser objective or without the approval of higher leadership or without detailed planning. The sequence of events in 2020 around Tawang establish the role and blessings of top leadership. The connection to the monastery will continue to keep China interested. Chinese plans have been similar elsewhere: creep up and with a large force and plonk on such illegally occupied territory to create a fait accompli. China’s approaches to disputes have reflected a twentieth century mindset — violate protocols, flex muscles and establish an altered status quo, a counter to which would mean going to war. The response of Indian troops at Yangtse caught the PLA by surprise. India’s pushback to Chinese plans of occupying the Yangtse ridge will count as Beijing’s failure to enforce an issue and subsequent face saving to normalise the situation. A successful occupation would have certainly altered the Chinese version. Lt Gen Sharma believes that 628 villages, largely in the Eastern sector, have become launch-pads, and thus need careful monitoring all along the front. Dai Bingguo, special negotiator for boundary negotiations between India and China, had said years ago that Tawang is inalienable from Tibet in terms of its cultural background and administrative jurisdiction. The Dalai Lama is 87 years old. A future dispute could centre around the monastery and the Dalai Lama’s successor — a reason why Tawang is unlikely to recede into oblivion. There are reports of China wargaming AI plans on Arunachal Pradesh. China might deploy unconventional measures as a test laboratory — AI, electronic and cyber — alongside the classical military manoeuvres in Arunachal Pradesh. There have been recent writings on Chinese AI development. It’s possible that China weighs its prospects of deploying AI capabilities on a limited scale to measure its lethal efficacy. India must not be unrealistic and instead candidly evaluate state of preparedness to deal with unconventional threats of this nature. Those aspects must not be discounted in the course of threat evaluation and operational preparedness. Alongside, Chinese forces, pushed back this time near Tawang, are likely to initiate further incursions in other areas and keep the pot boiling in the Himalayas — which serves their purpose of using the boundary dispute to keep Beijing’s woes from becoming the Sword of Damocles over its head. The writer is the author of ‘Watershed 1967: India’s Forgotten Victory over China’. His fortnightly column for FirstPost — ‘Beyond The Lines’ — covers military history, strategic issues, international affairs and policy-business challenges. Views expressed are personal. Tweets@iProbal Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.