Strategic encirclement of India's North East: Time to get out of the straitjacket

One of the most important reasons for the continuance of insurgency in the North East, primarily Manipur and areas in Arunachal Pradesh and Upper Assam, is the region’s proximity to outer lands. The strategic encirclement has not only provided the expanse with a conduit to countries such as China, which welcomed number of insurgent batches from Nagaland, Manipur and Assam, but also bases for training, sustenance and launching pads for operations against India. This has been seen in the case of Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and even Bhutan, the last of which is a country that is a virtual protectorate of India. Therefore, although the primary motivations for the beginning of an insurgency may range from underdevelopment, social alienation and geographical distance, an important factor that allows an insurgency movement to grow is the presence of efficient conditions by way of a neighbourhood that is either hostile or indifferent to India’s national security interests. The hostile neighbourhood provides insurgent groups waging war with the Indian state a variety of sustenance including the crucial aiding of efforts to internationalising such movements, a move that can be particularly embarrassing for New Delhi. To put the matter of internationalisation into perspective, it was the entry of NSCN (IM) into the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organisation in January 1993, which met in The Hague, Netherlands, that began the process for a serious political reconciliation move and in July 1997 a ceasefire was signed. Even ULFA had sought to internationalise its movement by sending one of its cadres to the Geneva based United Nations Commission on Human Rights, a forum which separatist organisation’s worldwide vie for a place in. This author had earlier written, “Way back in 1997 a John David Salomar was seen moving around the UN offices in Geneva. The sub-Commission on Human Rights was in session and Salomar was slated to speak at the meeting on atrocities allegedly committed by the Indian army in Assam. Indeed, had it not been for the timely intervention of India’s then Permanent Representative to the UN at Geneva, Arundhati Ghose, Salomar would have stepped onto the podium in order to deliver his package. An alert Ghose had notified the UN security who in turn questioned Salomar. Soon after, Salomar vanished into thin air, with his undelivered agenda. Armed with a perfectly valid Bangladeshi passport and Swiss visa, John David Salomar was in fact none other than ULFA’s general secretary, Anup Chetia.” The episode was confirmed many years later, in 2007, when Ambassador Ghose and this author were members of the “Track II Dialogue” between India and Bangladesh and the two had occasion to exchange notes. Historically, hostility has showcased itself by way of East Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) and China, with Myanmar providing the corridor for various Indian Insurgent Groups, especially in their efforts to seek aid from the Peoples’ Republic of China. Indeed, the Naga insurgents were the first to reach China, when “sometime in January 1967, “Brig” Thinoselie and Muivah reached Yunnan” (as retold in Nirmal Nibedon’s Nagaland: Night of the Guerrillas) after a 97-day trek through the inhospitable Myanmarese terrain. An aside that may be recounted is the manner in which the “tired men” from the Naga Hills were greeted by the Chinese when they reach the Middle Kingdom. Nirmal Nibedon writes, “They were surrounded by “tall” Chinese soldiers…We have come from Nagaland for training. Your leaders know about our coming. The Chinese received them as credentials were checked. Someone remarked: “How can you short men fight a mighty nation like India? “Major” Tangti Ao looked back defiantly. He was only five feet tall.” The import of alluding to the excerpt at this juncture is only to report to the readers the fact the “short men” from Naga Hills are still engaging “a mighty nation” 56 years after the derisive statement was made. Indeed, the Naga insurgency is the longest running insurrection in the world. Later, the footsteps of the Naga insurgents were to be retraced by ULFA “chief of staff” Paresh Baruah and his “staff officer” Lohit Deury, the latter during his interrogation, Deury revealed to this author, on 15 August 2000, after his surrender to the Assam Police, details about ULFA Missions Lachit and Chilarai to China, when Paresh Baruah met uniformed Chinese officials as well as functionaries of an agency that Deury termed as “Black House”. Research conducted by the author in the aftermath of the admission did not unravel the provenance of “Black House,” but several years later, speaking to Bertil Lintner in this author’s Guwahati residence, it came to light that “Black House” is in all probability a Chinese arms conduiting agency. Also, in Mandarin, “Black House” translates into “Hei Shehui,” which simply means “Black Market.” The arms manufacturing factories of China, primarily the ordnance manufacturing company structure, NORINCO, it is reported, provides the bulk of the weaponry that make up the Indian Insurgent Groups’ arsenal. This is done by selling off the obsolete surplus weaponry, even as PLA shapes itself into a modern army, which it envisages would be “leaner” and “meaner.” Therefore, Chinese support for Indian Insurgent Groups is part of recorded history, especially in the aftermath of the border war of 1962. But despite the fact that varying observations seem to be of the opinion that China stopped its support to Indian Insurgent Groups since the late-nineteen eighties (which roughly coincided with Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988), recent anecdotal accounts seem to state that groups such People’s Liberation Army of Manipur and ULFA have been seen in Yunnan, with at least one report suggesting that ULFA has a “base” in one of Yunnan’s prefectures (Tinsum County, Prefecture 20). ULFA’s need for opening up new channels with China was perhaps necessitated by the crackdown it is facing in Bangladesh, with almost the entire leadership of the organisation being handed over to India by the Bangladesh authorities. Indeed, it was fear of apprehension—in the manner in which other members of his organisation were taken into custody and subsequently handed over to India—that led ULFA “chief of staff” Paresh Baruah to flee to Yunnan, where he is reportedly attempting to revive his floundering organisation. This has become necessary in the face of the split in ULFA, which came to be as a result of  a) releasing the incarcerated leadership of ULFA and b) by expecting the released leaders to come together as an executive council and open a political reconciliation process with the government. The peace process has almost “left out” Paresh Baruah, who has made clear his stand against dialogue with the government were it to be without a discussion of “sovereignty of Assam” on the agenda. The man who visualises himself as a modern day Lachit Barphukan (the Ahom general who successfully fought off the Mughals from Assam) continues, despite kidney ailments, be belligerent and could, if necessary, join hands with every conceivable anti-India force, be it the Pakistani ISI, the anti-India lobby in the Bangladesh army and DGFI or the Chinese MSS. At any rate, the present scenario, by way of the strategic encirclement has changed considerably since the subterfuges that characterised the days when Phizo of Khonoma near Kohima first made his way into East Pakistan in the early 1950s. A pro-Indian Awami League government is in power in Dhaka, and as aforesaid, it has acted against the Indian Insurgent Groups. It is heartening that Bhutan—which is India’s friend and ally—acted decisively against the Indian insurgents in December 2003 and ousted them from Southern Bhutan. However, it is this author’s view that ULFA, NDFB and KLO that were taking shelter in Sandrup Jongkhar and Kalikhola could have been managed in a more imaginative manner. But, a separate column for that missed stratagem. But, Myanmar is another story. Indeed, despite the fact that there has been a military takeover, a channel has been opened for dialogue between the Indian army and the Myanmar army. A meeting took place in Imphal a few months ago. But the sought for clamping down on the Indian Insurgent Groups is yet to happen. The situation poses a precarious problem with the Valley-Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs) having gotten into an “agreement” with the Myanmar army. In return for safe haven in Sagaing Division, the insurgents would aid the Tatmadaw to quell the civil strife that erupted after the putsch. It is not immediately known as to why New Delhi cannot (now that a meeting has taken place in Imphal) leverage Naypyidaw to severe the connection with the VBIGs. The following recommendations are made for consideration:

• A senior, retired Indian army officer should be made the envoy to Myanmar. The military to military idiom would work wonders where the Foreign Office has failed to deliver
• The accent should be to appease Naypyidaw and if necessary provide it the armaments it needs, if necessary at throw away price. This would make it less dependent on China for its arsenal.
• The new envoy to Naypyidaw should coordinate joint operations, in the manner in which Op Golden Bird, Op Sunrise-I and II were undertaken.
• The shut iron gates that this author had met when he toured Moreh in 2022 should be immediately opened so that Modi’s vision of “Acting” East actually “Goes East”. There should be no further delay in this direction.
• Constitute a Peace Mission comprising former, senior bureaucrats, army Generals and Myanmar specialists to undertake a Track II Dialogue with both the Tatmadaw and the National Unity Government leaders and attempt to cobble an amicable arrangement for stability to return to the Land of Irrawaddy.

North East India’s fortunes are inextricably intertwined with that of Myanmar. It is, therefore, imperative—particularly in an election year—that the Modi government embarks on a course correction exercise that would make the Indian electorate laud the fulfilment of his vision for a peaceful North East (free of insurgency), steamroll the “Act East Policy” and the “Neighbourhood First Policy” that he had so ambitiously unfurled way back in 2014 when he first rode to power. The author is a Conflict Theorist and Bestselling Author. The views expressed are his own. Read all the Latest News, Trending News, Cricket News, Bollywood News, India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.