Sheikh Hasina at crossroads: Bangladesh's high-stakes election is a brewing battleground for secular and radical forces

In exactly less than a month Bangladesh goes to the polls. Election observers across the world are terming it as one of the most crucial elections in South Asia. Indeed, it is a very important election for India as well. After all, most Bangladesh watchers are keenly watching as to whether the secular forces can retain power and not pave the way to the barrack politics backed by radical Islam. Such a prognosis makes sense when the geopolitics of the region is taken into account. The return of the anti-liberationist forces of 1971 would sound the death knell to Bengali nationalism that had characterised the triumph of culture over religion. But if history has to be harked back to, it must be that there are in reality, two Bangladesh’es’. A pre-1971 grouping continues to be loyal to the founding principles of Bangladesh. However, there has been the emergence of a new formation which is largely from the post-1971 era. This assemblage identifies itself with Pakistan and even the global Salafi movement that is attempting to storm troop across the world. The aspects that would be on Sheikh Hasina’s important pre-election “to-do” list could include:  

1. Rein in the flock within the Awami League that could be against her leadership in the party. It is reported that there has been a growth of a bloc that is close to China and Pakistan. Hasina has to rein in this faction with impunity.
2. Reaffirm her secular stand and steadfastness towards Bengali nationalism and culture.
3. Assert her proximity to India which has stood by her side when she needed help.
4. Eschew Chinese overtures that few among many are trying to persuade her to accept as opposed to India

India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his US counterpart Jake Sullivan on Wednesday held delegation-level talks in June 2023. It was ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s State visit to the US. Devoting considerable focus on the role of China in Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), both the security czars expressed their concern about China’s expanding footprints across Asia with a specific focus on its long-term designs in the IOR. Doval stated that two of India’s neighbours — Maldives and Bangladesh — will be going to polls soon and India believes that no initiatives should be launched in its neighbourhood that impacts its national interests adversely. It is in this backdrop that it is important to recall a few passages from JN Dixit’s shaping work, Liberation and Beyond at this juncture. The former Indian national security adviser and foreign secretary of India stated that the founding father of Bangladesh, Mujibur Rahman was slowly “distancing” himself from India. The reasoning seems to be, in Dixit’s own words: “a metamorphosis in the social and political scene of Bangladesh had occurred, first because Mujib’s own lack of confidence about transforming his country into a genuine secular-democracy and, second, because he had consciously (emphasis: Author’s) allowed re-induction of pro-Pakistani and anti-liberationist elements into Bangladesh’s politics, civil services and armed forces. He adopted such a strategy in order to reduce the influence of political leaders and armed forces personnel who were actively involved in the freedom struggle.” It seems, therefore, if Dixit’s analysis is to be believed, that Mujib, incarcerated in West Pakistan throughout the Liberation War, felt “left out” and was not exactly in awe of people like the pro-India, first prime minister of Bangladesh, Tazzuddin Ahmad, who he felt had fought and won the war. Dixit made another very interesting point. He said, “Whosoever came to power in Bangladesh has to fulfil two stipulations for surviving in power: first, that he or she should maintain a certain amount of distance from India and second, the person should confirm the Islamic identity of Bangladesh.” Now, Dixit’s analysis may not altogether be correct, especially as the present Awami League regime under Sheikh Hasina has taken steps in certain important directions. Seeking to address the issue of Islamisation of the country, for instance, Hasina restored Article 12 of the 1972 Constitution, which prohibited religion-based politics and communalism of all hues. Her dispensation has also taken several steps—reportedly at some odds—to restore the country’s central values that were incorporated after the Liberation War of 1971. The Bangladesh Supreme Court’s declaration of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution enacted in 1977 as null and void was a significant ruling. In its judgment, the apex court decreed its “total disapproval of martial law and suspension of the constitution or any part thereof in any form.” The events that may emerge as a result of the quashing of the 5th Amendment may have to await the time, but notwithstanding the wisdom with which the verdict was pronounced, it has to be understood that it both censured and served restraint on Bangladesh’s military, a bold step given the adventurism that characterises certain countries in the sub-continent and has time and again witnessed military-over-legislature-judiciary assertiveness. Another important step that Sheikh Hasina took was the opening of the War Criminal Trial Tribunal. Over 1200 cadres and supporters belonging to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and the Islamic Chatra Shibir were detained and many were tried and sentenced to death. These initiatives led to an outcry in the JeI and even Pakistan. But notwithstanding threats to her safety, she took courageous steps to root out Islamism of the rabid sort from her country. Indeed, how she has expressed her gratitude to India for the aid that she and her party have received from India has been remarkable. This was in evidence, especially when she handed over Indian insurgent leaders billeted in her country to India as well as the honour that she bestowed on Indians for supporting the liberation war in 1971. However, even as such action endeared her to a majority of the Bangladeshis there was a section that has been silently seeking her removal. It must also be comprehended that Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, which spearheaded the 1971 Liberation War, has been in power in Bangladesh for only 21 out of the 50 years since the country came into being. 29 years were in the hands of the 5th Amendment scriveners and their surrogates. However, recent events have witnessed a somewhat changed Bangladesh with not only a section of its population once again raising its ugly head by way of attempting to identify itself with the global salafi movement that the world has been witnessing, but with even a section within the Awami League and the government seeking to tilt the balance in favour of anti-India powers. It is in this context that JN Dixit’s prophetic words about maintaining “a certain amount of distance from India” by balancing Bangladesh’s polity by reaching out to anti-India forces such as China might be viewed. It must be understood that there is no political opposition to Sheikh Hasina inside the Jatiya Sangsad with the main opposition political party Bangladesh Nationalist Party having only seven seats as opposed to the overwhelming 302 that the Awami League has. While the huge majority that her party has in the national parliament has made Sheikh Hasina a “unquestioned leader” in the mould of her father, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman who was assassinated on 15 August 1975, the fact of the matter is that there would be people within her own party who would be harbouring ambitions of upstaging her, perhaps even by choosing to side with China. It is perhaps one of the reasons why Prof Gowher Rizvi the International Affairs Adviser to Sheikh Hasina told this author when he quietly met him in Dhaka on 26 March 2016 when the author visited Bangladesh as a member of an Indian delegation for “Track II Dialogue” that the “prime minister needs to create an opposition inside the parliament”. With almost the entire political opposition outside the Jatiya Sangsad, a sense of antagonism towards him within her rank and file seems to be growing. Also, it is not immediately known whether she has groomed any second-rung leader to take her position if and when she exits the scene. These are aspects that India should not overlook. It is also important to take note of how Bangladesh has emerged as China’s second-largest procurer of arms. Of late, it has signed an important deal with Beijing for a maintenance and overhaul facility hub in Bangladesh for its FM-90 surface-to-air missile systems. These, in the years to come, observers believe, might come up by way of a production assembly line of the same missile system and its advanced variants. Earlier, Dhaka procured two submarines from China. The strategic implications of a permanent PLA Navy presence, albeit even by way of trainers inside outdated diesel Ming class submarines are obvious. Exactly 790 nautical miles from India’s Eastern Naval HQs, one of Bangladesh’s submarine bases in Chittagong’s Kutubdia Channel could well be the observation post of the PLA Navy. The derision with which this author’s caution was greeted by former admirals of India in a lecture that the author delivered a few years ago in Delhi about Bangladesh procuring submarines from China is interesting. The attempt at mockery was largely about the outdated quality of the two submarines, while all the time the author was attempting to drive home the fact about a) the presence of PLA Navy trainers and stealth observers inside the two submarines even as they conduct sea trials in the vicinity of Vishakhapatnam providing them thereby complete knowledge of India’s maritime movements and b) that it was not so much about obsoleteness of the submarines procured as is the importance of the action that was undertaken by Dhaka to acquire the boats from an enemy country when in effect it could have purchased them from India. L’affaire missile and submarine are deliberate moves by forces inside Bangladesh to message India and one which New Delhi would do well to heed. In sum, it must be understood that Sheikh Hasina could well be under certain compulsions inside her country and even pressure—as aforesaid—from “Closet Chinese” within her party. A recalibration exercise to empower her and the leadership should be uppermost in the minds of security managers in New Delhi. India cannot afford the construction of a Chinese “string of pearls” around her neck nor a 1975-like scenario when it lost all ground to anti-liberationist forces that Indian soldiers had fought against alongside the Mukti Bahini and had secured for both Bangladesh and India. The writer is a conflict analyst and bestselling author. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.