Shadowy alliances and the expected reemergence of ISIS

ISIS has been an interesting entity for conflict watchers. The group’s lightning-fast emergence and equally impressive consolidation of a working structure, the disproportionate barbarism that they displayed, or their superhuman ability in establishing military dominance over a sizeable chunk of Iraq and Syria in record time, remained lined with suspicion in the minds of those who were watching them: these Toyota-driving-thugs were not their own masters; they had some solid backing. Indications towards the identity of the backers started floating in as the months progressed. The US made 8,000 strikes against ISIS but their missiles and drones religiously failed to track or destroy their mile-long Toyota convoys (how were they getting so many Toyotas?) in flat deserts. Not only that; Uncle Sam kept air-dropping ammunition ‘by mistake’ in their midst. Continuously. It helps to remember that the US was supposed to be ‘fighting the ISIS’ during those days. Then came the news of oil racketeering. When they began stealing oil from the Syrian oilfields, Turkey stood there by their side buying all that oil from them. When injured, they received treatment in Israeli hospitals. So, as the West, with all its tech advancements kept ‘trying hard’ to minimise the ISIS threat, these guys went from strength to strength. They increased the size of their army, their territorial influence, and their wealth – all in the span of just a couple of years (between 2012 and 2014). And they would have probably taken over Syria were it not for Russian president Vladimir Putin who decided to wade into the conflict in September of 2015. However, whispers about the story of ISIS or their backers don’t end there. When Russia began its aerial assault, it took them about a few months to achieve what the West was ‘trying’ for years, and, by the end of 2016, it became clear that the previously elusive (and invincible) ISIS had taken a series of quite serious hits; at that rate, their survival could be at stake. By the end of 2017, most of them were gone – they dropped off the radar as mysteriously as they had popped up! Who could be their backers? To understand that a little more, we have to track the movements of these black-masked, nameless and faceless terrorists, and their acts of appearances and disappearances. Let us take the case of Iraq. A recently published  analysis notes that during its height, ISIS had 35,000 fighters in Iraq. Though 25,000 of them were killed, it is the remaining 10,000 whose movements attracted a lot of attention. Most of these terrorists fled to Syria and Turkey as the tables turned. Syria is still fairly lawless – an easy place to hide, while Turkey has always enjoyed good relations with ISIS (recall the oil racketeering). And when Abdullah Qardash began as the new caliph of ISIS in 2019, these terrorists were summoned back to Iraq, so they began returning. But Iraq borders had become quite stringent by then. Slipping past was difficult. This crossing over would be facilitated by American shelling of the Iraqi border posts and that would allow the terrorists to slip in in the ensuing chaos. The analysis also reports on a place in Iraq called the Houran Valley. It is the largest one in Iraq and is one of the most dangerous places in terms of lack of security. Apparently, according to Iraqi politicians, the Americans have transferred from different locations hundreds of ISIS fighters and are responsible for their protection and training. The rest of the story is similar to the Iraq border shootings: an Iraqi MP, Hassan Salem calls for an army-led clean-up of the Houran Valley; Iraqi PMU units approach the area; American aircraft target them, shoot at them, and push them back. ISIS in Afghanistan A little south-east along the map, and away from Iraq is Afghanistan, and any observation about ISIS and their backers would be incomplete without the mention of ISKP – ISIS in Khorasan Province. As the faceless Islamists began dropping out of the Middle Eastern radar following Russian bombings, they began resurfacing in pockets of central and west Asia – notably Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. We can leave aside the debatable topic of who provided their transport and safe passage, to an issue we know: who provided them with safe havens in these places. ISKP was formed in Afghanistan in 2015 with nine members of Al Qaeda and TTP joining to create the unit following the ISIL (Levant ISIS) call for establishing a caliphate extending to Pakistan and Afghanistan. As they grew weaker in the Levant, they got stronger at their Khorasan wing; they created a bureaucratic and administrative structure, and by 2019, when they were more or less routed in the Middle East, the ISKP provided the fleeing terrorists with a second address – to strengthen and spread their Af-Pak operations. This came undone once the Taliban took over Afghanistan, and killed hundreds of their members. But more than that, the US fleeing Afghanistan was a watershed moment in the ISIS chronology: this incident even made the ISKP drop their predominantly geographic ambitions (caliphate, more territory under control) to focus more on disruptive urban warfare. This shift of priorities is an interesting adaptation; one that falls neatly in place when viewed from a distance. As long as the Taliban maintained their ambiguity towards US presence in the region, the US held the opinion that they were an outfit that could be ‘negotiated with’. ISKP existed but as a distant and minor irritant – their main focus being a caliphate in the Middle East. But from the time the Taliban turned and expressed a desire to take complete control of Afghanistan, the ISKP first began harbouring ambitions of a Khorasan caliphate, which mutated into them reemerging as urban guerillas fighting the Taliban. As the US-backed mujahideens of yesterday became the government today, they found in ISKP the US-protected mujahideens of today. In 2020, only 7 per cent of ISKP attacks targeted the Taliban; that became 33 per cent in 2021 and 72 per cent in 2022. The role of Pakistan The last few years have been a see-saw ride for Pakistan’s regional imperatives. Their high of seeing a friendly government in power in Afghanistan extending them their cherished ‘strategic depth’ against India underwent a rude awakening as the Taliban expectedly dumped them right from the time they formed a government in Kabul. Since then, there has been the abrupt removal of Imran Khan; China has kept stalling the CPEC project; there has been the rise of a TTP predominance along their lawless frontier, which has resulted in a major loss of political power in that region; Baluchi insurgency movement has gained steam; and with funds from both the USA and China drying up, their economy has tanked. With most to lose, it has always been the Pakistan Army butting in during times like these. The first among the quick few changes that they brought in to revive their primacy was a realignment with the US. The IMF noose loosened as a result, which has helped the Army survive so far. About the price that Uncle Sam would extract as a quid pro quo, here are two guesses based on the history of their association:

1. Decouple with China: Though it is not clear how much actual pressure the Biden government wants to put on China with the neocon war lobby running busy along two fronts (Ukraine and Palestine), things might indeed change if Donald Trump wins. Trump has his priorities in place already. He doesn’t regard Russia as the main antagonist; he is hawkish on China. And his team might be in for a surprise if they have a compliant Pakistani army.

2. Consolidate ISKP: Though speculative, this could be team Biden’s focus as of now. The unknown gunmen and their exploits all around Pakistan during the past few months that has the subcontinent heaping praises on Ajit Doval and his supposed network, could well be an ISI and/or Pak Army initiative – operating with the agenda of cleaning up of all the old go-betweens that were used during the Taliban days.

With Taliban now out of their scope – if CARs and India have indeed made it to the list of geographies that Uncle Sam aims to destabilise – there needs to be a new breed of intermediaries that would probably take up the job of manning the posts between Pakistan Army and the new mujahideens (read ISKP). Hence the cleaning up of the Hanafi-Deobandi clutter, perhaps to make way for the Salafist crew (ISIS is essentially Arab Salafists; they don’t gel with the subcontinental Deobandi school)? There is no way of proving this, however, if ISKP indeed emerged in the next few years as a regional disruptive tool with shadowy connections and deep pockets (like ISIL once was) – one can be fairly certain about this theory. The reemergence The indications are too strong to ignore. As the Israel-Hamas conflict continues to scale the ladder of intensity with Iran’s proxies stepping up their game along the Bab el Mandeb Strait or along the southern borders of Lebanon, there has been an ISIS-executed suicide bombing in Iran that killed many people. This opens up the possibility of ISIS operatives resurfacing once again in Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Iran too. Uncle Sam is adept in engaging services of proxy militias – from Latin America to Ukraine – wherever they have the means. And, the Afghan ‘jihad’ episode has proven beyond doubt their eagerness to partner even with the most hardcore and medieval-minded guys as a means to justify the end. Besides, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi or his successor Ibrahim Al Hashimi, Abu Al Turkmani, Haji Bakr etc high-value terrorists were all US prisoners once in Camp Bucca in southern Iraq; all of them (along with many more) were released inexplicably at some point. It doesn’t take an effort even for the most unimaginative ones among us after sampling all of this, to connect the dots. Even if one is willing to disregard the above speculation sub-titled ‘Consolidate ISKP’, the fact that over the years ISIS’ and US enemies – from Assad-Qaddafi then, to Iran-Taliban now – have always remained the same governments/countries/peoples. That appears too shifty to be some random coincidence. The author is a geopolitical analyst and the author of JourneyDog Tales, The Puppeteer, and A Matter of Greed. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.