Defence minister strikes right chord in his message on winning hearts and minds

Thirty-four years of sponsored proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir has seen all kinds of situations. We were taken by surprise by the ferocity of terrorism let loose on the state in 1989. The situation then was then extremely conducive to conflict initiation. The Indian Army responded with energetic intent, employing kinetic power and neutralising the separatists and local terrorists. It forced Pakistan to reframe its strategy and induct foreign terrorists to fight the proxy hybrid war, confident that a local insurrection and militancy would be insufficient. It knew that sooner than later an army as professional as the Indian Army, would taper its kinetic operations and balance its approach with adopting a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. Such a campaign if run professionally and with the same vigour as a military operations campaign stood the greatest chance of upsetting the Pakistani intent and strategy. It would wean away the local content isolating the foreigners whose number therefore needed to be high to maintain control of the proxy war. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, during his visit to Jammu and Rajouri on 27 December, in the wake of the terrorist ambush of 48 RR’s reinforcement team near Bafliaz, has conveyed the same message very clearly. “I want to make a very special request to you” he told the troops at Rajouri. He said, “While fulfilling the responsibility of defending the nation you also have a bigger responsibility of winning the hearts of your countrymen on your shoulders”. What the defence minister was saying was a reiteration of the time-tested policy of military civic action (MCA) in counter insurgency/counter terrorism (CI/CT) operations, accompanied by military soft power to win ‘hearts and minds’. For the uninitiated who perceive that such operations are won by the barrel of the gun by the extermination of the last terrorist, this statement is something to mull over. Eliminating the last terrorist takes a humongous effort in which too many mistakes can be made, especially if drills and SOPs are not tailored to the situation. Perceiving that one set of guidelines applies to all operations, from initiation to termination, is the surest way to failure. Calibrated operations are the winning way and it involves the incorporation of MCA and soft power in a strategy of balanced proportions. The defence minister’s message – “……….success can be achieved by meeting the people, listening to their problems and raising those issues at an appropriate level for redressal” could not have been more appropriate. These words were accompanied by the advice that there would be zero tolerance towards terrorism. At conflict initiation, kinetic power takes priority with a higher percentage of effort allocated towards it. This tapers as the security forces succeed and the strength of terrorists is brought down to more manageable proportions. In our case, in Jammu and Kashmir, the strength of terrorists was brought down from a high of over 3,000 terrorists to as low as 600 by 2006 and subsequently, the number kept dwindling. We calibrated our doctrine in the most effective way. There is no better example of the employment of military soft power than the 1997 adoption of Operation Sadbhavna as the core of the MCA campaign of the Indian Army. There were two purposes behind this. First, the civil administration was incapable of addressing all the administrative needs of the people, especially in the border districts, due to the ongoing violence related to terrorism. The army could easily supplement the efforts in the fields of education, medical aid, small infrastructure, sports and recreation, women empowerment and national integration. Second, this afforded a chance for greater interaction with the people of the state, to understand their sensitivity, local faith and culture; all so essential for the generation of goodwill. The army went on to virtually declare the ‘awam’ (people) of Jammu and Kashmir as the centre of gravity of the counter-terrorist campaign. If the people would not support terror then terrorists would be isolated without being extended the support of the people. Operation Sadbhavna had different functional levels with some projects at the Corps level and the majority at the unit and sub-unit level. Subsequently, it was realised that the material benefits of Operation Sadbhavna were by themselves insufficient. A deliberate outreach to the people was also necessary to remove all perceptions of separatism and the goodwill generated by Operation Sadbhavna was to be extended to gain their willing support. This outreach enabled the local administration to bandwagon on the shoulders of the army to go anywhere and later even the elected political representatives joined in to reach out to their constituencies to give more meaning to democracy. The ‘hearts and minds’ campaign model is exactly what has enabled the government to create stability and peace in the Valley after the removal of Article 370. Operation Sadbhavna has been extended from the Army’s MCA to become an ‘all of government’ campaign with all entities joining in. The Lt Governor has done a fine job in his outreach programmes with his articulation and ability to think big in the emerging situation. Lots of organisations including civil society have also joined in to extend support. It’s not as if incidents of the kind reported in the aftermath of the Bafliaz encounter, involving alleged extrajudicial actions by soldiers, have happened for the first time. Whenever these have occurred in the past they are exploited by the adversary, international and local human rights communities and wily political leaders. The good work of the army in so many other domains then gets neutralised and years of ‘hearts and minds’ efforts get undermined. In many cases, the allegations of excesses by soldiers are not even judicially proved but the fact that they catch the media and public eye is sufficient for those who wish to tarnish the army’s image and the overall national interest. The army can keep defending itself but many times half-truths stick and image dilution is achieved by the anti-nationals. The defence minister was warning against precisely this phenomenon. The army is too professional to allow losses and negatives to curtail its initiatives. Sooner than later, it will return to winning ways through changes in procedures and response strategy. To find shortcuts to overcoming a perceived image deficit through the adoption of lawless methods is not what is associated with the uniform. The defence minister’s choice of words could not be better. He mixed regret with motivational words to balance his advice. The core of the message was that ‘hearts and minds’ is a key doctrine which needs to be adopted suitably. At the operational and higher tactical levels, strategy evolves based on the ground situation. As a response to incidents and many a time when operations are far and few, it’s always good to remind the rank and file that some things do not change whatever the dynamism of change in the environment. Goodwill and ‘hearts and minds’ are two such things. The writer is a Member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. 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