Off-centre | PM Modi’s state visit to US: A great opportunity for Indo-American ties

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares for his first state visit to the United States on 21 June, a lingering question needs to be addressed fairly and squarely. The whole world knows that Cold War 2.0 between the Western alliance led by the United States and China, with Russia probably in the same camp, has already started. Which side should India be on? There are essentially three options for India to choose from. Let us consider them in turn. The first is to join the Chinese side. I remember Singapore’s senior diplomat, Indian origin Kishore Mahbubani, making a persuasive case for this position some years back. He said that India had chosen the wrong, that is the Soviet, side during Cold War 1.0. It should not repeat the same mistake by joining the Western, which he believes is the losing side this time around. Indeed, there are many who believe that a China-led world order would be safer, more peaceful, and less exploitative than the Western domination of the world for several centuries. The rapacity of the Western colonial powers, their violent world wars, and hyper-individualistic and consumeristic culture are seen as inimical not only to the poorer nations of the world, but for human survival itself. Climate change, for instance, is arguably one of the deadly outcomes of the modern, Western civilisation which many, including Mahatma Gandhi, criticised for being violent and, in the end, self-destructive. China, on the other hand, has been trying to present to the world its own social and civilisational model as fairer, not to mention peaceful for its residents, with low crime rates and stable social structure. There are obvious advantages in aligning with China. These include economic opportunities and an Asian geopolitical dominance, with the two most populous neighbours being in partnership. With former superpower Russia also part of such an alliance, such an alliance might be very powerful and economically advantageous indeed. Unfortunately, Chinese belligerence on our borders and elsewhere, especially in the Indo-Pacific and the South China seas, has put paid to any such possibility. The whole world knows that China’s so-called “peaceful rise” has been far from peaceful. Over the last decade or so, Chinese “wolf warriors” have bared their fangs in many theatres, quite far from the main Chinese homeland. China’s exploitation of poorer nations through debt traps and extraction of natural resources is also well known. But what put the last nail, so to speak, on the Chinese double-dealing coffin is its deadly export of the Wuhan virus. Whether or not Covid-19 leaked out of a Chinese lab, who can deny that by covering up its severity, underreporting the number of early deaths, and suppressing vital information, China contributed to its global spread. Evidently, it also used its power and clout to browbeat the WHO in suppressing information which could have been crucial in saving millions of lives. I believe that this was the breaking point as far as the Western honeymoon with China is concerned. The idea that the West and China could happily coexist in a partnership with cheap Chinese labour and goods severing world consumption, while the West retained control over higher technology, was also shattered. The United States began to see China as a serious and determined adversary, bent upon taking over as the global hegemon not only by stealing US technology but undermining Western democracies from within through weaponised information. What, then, is India’s second, some would say, obvious option? To join the Western alliance by partnering with the US. Indeed, that is what the latter wants from us. But India’s foreign policy has been shaped by its historical experiences, its geopolitical interests, and its values. During the first Cold War, though leaning toward the USSR, India adopted a policy of non-alignment, which meant not joining either power bloc. India also sought to play a leadership role among the newly independent countries of the Third World. India’s non-alignment was based on both idealism and pragmatism, as it allowed India to pursue its own interests and maintain its autonomy and sovereignty. With the declining power of the US, some old style anti-imperialists would still argue that the West cannot be trusted. However, they too agree that the two largest and greatest democracies in the world have much in common, including a prosperous, powerful, and increasingly vocal Indian diaspora inside the US. In recent years, the US has decisively dropped its closeness to Pakistan and shown its increasing willingness to be India’s strategic partner. It has also supported India’s rise as a global power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is the advanced technology from the US that India most needs to secure its borders. The US, on the other hand, also needs India to counter China’s aggression and expansionism in Asia and beyond. The third view that maintains that India should remain neutral or non-aligned in the Cold War 2.0 is also very strong. According to this view, taking sides would limit India’s options and expose it to risks. They emphasise that India has a unique position and role in world affairs, that India has good relations with both US and Russia, not to mention a working relationship with China. India can thus benefit from both sides, as it has by buying cheap Russian oil during the Ukraine war. The non-aligners therefore assert that remaining neutral would enable India to preserve its independence, flexibility, and avoid being dragged into conflicts that are not in its interest. Strategic autonomy, balancing regional powers, and economic diversification are the additional advantages of not joining either the Western or the Chinese side. Determining the best option for India is a complex decision that requires considering multiple factors, such as India’s national security concerns, economic goals, regional dynamics, and long-term strategic interests. India’s foreign policy decisions are typically guided by a combination of these factors, and they can evolve over time based on changing geopolitical circumstances. The best option for India depends on how it defines its national interest, how it assesses the changing global order, and how it balances its opportunities and challenges. There is no easy or definitive answer to this question, as each option has its pros and cons. However, one thing is clear: India cannot run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. It is time to drive a good, though not necessarily hard bargain, with the US. NATO plus by any other name would suit us, even a bilateral agreement, provided we get: 1) a permanent seat in the UN security council; 2) defence and technology guarantees; 3) easing up of immigration rules for skilled and service sectors from India. The time is ripe to take India-US relations to new heights. We must not forego this opportunity. The writer is an author, columnist, and professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Views expressed are personal. Read all the  Latest News,  Trending News,  Cricket News,  Bollywood News, India News and  Entertainment News here. Follow us on  Facebook,  Twitter and  Instagram.