Modi-Xi talks: China is playing hardball; India can’t let G20 summit needs distract it from border issue

The subplot to the BRICS summit, the inherent tension between founding members India and China, is threatening to engulf and overshadow the main plot. No sooner did the Johannesburg edition conclude, controversy erupted in India over a ‘conversation’ between prime minister Narendra Modi and Chinese president Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the summit in South Africa. Everything about the purported conversation, including the buildup to it, is intriguing. Not the least India’s strange reticence to provide information. It is a void that China is always happy to fill with its own brand of half-truths and misinformation. Strategic ambiguity is a double-edged sword. With New Delhi poised to host the high-profile G20 summit next month — an event that Xi is expected to attend — Opposition parties have smelt an opportunity around the lack of clarity on easing of tensions along the LAC and have stepped up the attack. They are accusing the Centre of ‘hiding information’, and a national security issue has become a political football with all manner of TV debates, accusations, ‘analysis’ and ‘hot takes’ shaped along partisan lines. Polarized politics harms diplomacy. Tribalism and posturing over national security issues, especially while tackling a slippery adversary such as China, makes achieving of objectives harder. That said, the Opposition is not obligated to conform to a bipartisan foreign policy consensus. It is incumbent on the government to manage the situation. This is where ambiguity becomes a problem. On the ‘conversation’ in question, for instance, controversy has also broken out over who made the first move. The sequence of events is interesting. According to media reports and a briefing conducted by India’s ministry of foreign affairs on Thursday, prime minister Modi told Xi — their first interaction since the tête-à-tête at Bali G20 summit last year — that normalization of ties depends on maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas and observing and respecting the LAC. Foreign secretary Vinay Kwatra who conducted the presser did not specify when the exchange took place. According to a report in The Hindu, quoting “sources”, the meeting happened on Wednesday, but the information was held back by a day. Hindustan Times in a report also puts the interaction date on Wednesday, while adding that “the two leaders were part of several informal interactions during the summit.” The foreign secretary’s comments mention no such details. Kwatra, according to an MEA readout, said, “On the sidelines of the BRICS Summit, Prime Minister had interactions with other BRICS leaders. In a conversation with President Xi Jinping of China, Prime Minister highlighted India’s concerns on the unresolved issues along the LAC in the Western sector of the India-China border areas." “Prime Minister underlined that the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas and observing and respecting the LAC are essential for the normalization of the India-China relationship.” Kwatra added, “In this regard the two leaders agreed to direct their relevant officials to intensify efforts at expeditious disengagement and de-escalation.” The last sentence is significant. It suggests that the deadlock along the last two holdouts at the LAC in eastern Ladakh, Depsang Plains and Demchok, might be easing. But we shouldn’t get ahead of events. Several issues remain intricately tangled. Though India and China have so far disengaged from five friction points — Galwan valley, northern bank of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range, PP17A (Patrolling Point) in Gogra and PP15 in Gogra Hot Springs — the military standoff continues with 50,000-60,000 troops on each side, heavy artillery and equipment remaining deployed along the LAC, and resolution evading the sticky pockets in Depsang and Demchok. At the Depsang Plains in the DBO (Daulat Beg Oldie) sector Indian troops have been blocked at ‘bottleneck’ or Y-junction by the PLA, denying access to five traditional patrolling points, and the Charding Ninglung Nullah (CNN) junction near Demchok, where so-called ‘civilians’ are squatting on Indian side of the LAC. To these problems, add the fact that part of the no-patrolling buffer zones — that were created during the disengagement process — fall on India’s side of the LAC as a so-called ‘temporary measure’, and you have an intractable, multi-faceted problem. In this context, Kwatra’s last sentence indicates that the dialogue process — that resumed with the 19th round of Corps Commander talks at the Chushul-Moldo border on 13-14 August followed by local commanders picking up the thread over the weekend — is going to be intensified, and some confidence-building measures may be implemented that includes “freezing” of “additional build-up of troops and equipment along the LAC”, as The Print has reported. Nothing is so simple or linear when it comes to India and China’s border issues. Kwatra’s statement was followed by a Chinese foreign ministry readout that acknowledged the meeting between Modi and Xi, and added two more points. One, that the meeting took place on Wednesday, and it happened at “the latter’s (India’s) request”. The readout stated that “the two leaders had a candid and in-depth exchange of views on current China-India relations and other questions of shared interest. “President Xi stressed that improving China-India relations serves the common interests of the two countries and peoples, and is also conducive to peace, stability and development of the world and the region. The two sides should bear in mind the overall interests of their bilateral relations and handle properly the border issue so as to jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the border region.” Juxtaposing India’s and China’s statements, two points are worth noting. There is no mention of ‘LAC’, or “unresolved issues” at the border, nor is there any acknowledgement that Modi and Xi agreed on “expeditious disengagement and de-escalation” of troops, as stated by India. Moreover, China once again sought to delink border issues from overall bilateral ties — a position that is in direct contradiction to India’s and at variance with China’s own policy when it come to bilateral ties with the US, where Beijing has consistently linked stability in relationship to Washington reversal of policies that contain and constrain its rise. Finally, through the words “candid and in-depth exchange of views on current China-India relations”, a sense was conveyed that the Modi-Xi meeting carried a modicum of formality and structured approach. The Indian reaction to this statement was made off the record through ‘sources’, and New Delhi let it be known that there was “a pending request from the Chinese side for a bilateral meeting with the Indian side. PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, however, had an informal conversation in the Leaders’ Lounge during the BRICS Summit in South Africa”. Things start to get more interesting at this point. The fact that it was an “informal conversation” at “leaders’ lounge” refutes the air of formality and structure that China sought to give to the exchange, and Indian Express reports that “no interpreters or note-takers were around when the two leaders spoke to each other.” That would, again, be unusual if it was a “formal meeting”. Finally, India didn’t deny that this interaction was initiated by New Delhi, but chose to add that there was a “pending request for talks” from Chinese side. The turn of events makes it clear how deep the divergences are on the border issue where even the perception of the problem is at conflict. China is not even ready to accept the fact that Demchok and Depsang Plains impasse is related to the current standoff that began in April 2020, claiming that these are ‘legacy issues’. In a subsequent statement, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin on Friday added that, “I would like to reiterate that China’s position on the China-India boundary question is consistent and clear. The boundary question is a historical issue and does not represent the entirety of China-India relations. We should place it appropriately in our bilateral relations and seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement through peaceful and friendly consultations. “Before the boundary question is settled, the two sides need to jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the border areas. We hope to work with India to act on the important common understandings between the two leaders, increase strategic mutual trust, focus on our consensus and cooperation, remove disturbances and obstacles and advance the bilateral relations along a sound and stable track.” In other words, China is mirroring India’s position, but backwards. Whereas India says that peace and tranquility in the border areas, resolution of the current standoff and respecting the agreements, mechanisms and protocols that have been put in place over the years are imperative for normalcy in ties, China is suggesting that these issues may only be addressed if the boundary issue is delinked from the larger ties, mutual trust is restored, and “disturbances and obstacles” are removed — suggesting reversal of trade, geopolitical, geoeconomic and policies related to national security. India, for instance, has banned several Chinese apps, put severe restrictions on Chinese businesses operating in India, tweaked rules aimed at restricting Chinese investment and has gone after Chinese mobile phone manufacturers such as Oppo, Vivo and Xiaomi for ‘tax evasion’ and ‘unlawful remittances’, initiating legal action. New Delhi has also kept Chinese telecommunication companies from participating in 5G trials and is actively trying to reduce the trade deficit with and economic dependence on Beijing. China is signalling as clearly as it possibly can that it is disinterested in resolving the border issue in this paradigm and if India wants any forward movement on disengagement of troops and de-escalation of tension, then it must do so on “mutually acceptable” terms. Those terms, in light of the current status of the standoff, look very much skewed in favour of China. It is trying to freeze the incremental gains that it has managed to eke out along the LAC by creating buffer zones on India’s side of the LAC, while simultaneously squeezing the space for negotiation. If India allows China to nomalise such grey zone tactics, China is sure to become bolder and attempt another set of incremental land grabs in the future. In this scenario, if India seeks to dial down tension through some tactical moves, such as agreeing to strengthening CBMs, consenting to freezing troop induction along the LAC just to facilitate Xi’s arrival in India for the G20 summit even as the core issues remain unsolved, that would be a mistake. As former Indian envoy to China Ashok Kantha writes in Hindustan Times, “We cannot be in a hurry to de-induct additional troops as we are at a disadvantage when it comes to the re-induction of troops, given the asymmetry in border infrastructure and the nature of the terrain. However, a situation of enhanced deployment of troops of both countries in close proximity is also not desirable as it can lead to accidents. We have to, therefore, keep exploring means of achieving de-escalation and de-induction of troops through patient negotiations.” The G20 summit cannot become a ‘prestige issue’ for India to the extent that its core interests fall prey to the pressing need for an interim settlement. Ensuring its success is important, but far more important is winning the battle of attrition against China. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost_’s views._ Read all the  Latest News,  Trending News,  Cricket News,  Bollywood News, India News and  Entertainment News here. Follow us on  Facebook,  Twitter and  Instagram.