Military, diplomacy and India’s Neighbourhood First Policy

When Narendra Modi first took oath of office as prime minister, he unveiled an intrepid foreign policy doctrine, India’s Neighbourhood-First Policy, which by all accounts is a first of its kind. The policy was a clear break from the past. Most observers were of the opinion that the grouse which India’s smaller neighbours were harbouring against its colossal “big brother” would be a thing of the past. The presence of the heads of states from all the neighbouring countries during Modi’s swearing-in ceremony had all the makings of a magnanimous elder that would not only put its overbearing attitude towards its smaller neighbours on the back burner but would actually step up new vistas that would permit India’s giantism to treat its neighbours as equals. But the last nine years have not quite translated the ambitious project into reality. It is unfortunate, but for one reason or the other, alienation with most of India’s neighbours only grew. Nepal and Bangladesh were being ambivalent and even Bhutan (presumably with New Delhi’s nod) entered into a “Three-Step Roadmap” with China. The Chinese had already made robust inroads into Sri Lanka and less said the better about the People’s Republic’s all-weather relationship with Pakistan and even Afghanistan after the latter’s second Talibanisation. It is for the mandarins of South Block, primarily the members of the Indian Foreign Service to put their heads together and embark on a course correction exercise and boldly anvil Modi’s “Neighbourhood First Policy”. This column will, however, devote itself to the much-needed military to military contact between India and some of its important neighbours. A beginning was made by instituting joint military exercises with some of India’s neighbours. But such exercises remained confined to Op Sampriti between India-Bangladesh and Op Hand-in-Hand with China. India already has a military presence in Bhutan by way of the IMTRAT and in the past senior personages from Indian officialdom had served as the National Security Adviser of the Maldives. But apart from undertaking sundry joint operations against Indian insurgent groups in Myanmar, joint military exercises of the sort that were witnessed with primarily Bangladesh have not seen the light of day with countries such as Myanmar or Sri Lanka. Indeed, Operation Sampriti (when the Indian army and the Bangladesh army went through the paces in tandem) was an unqualified success. But it is wondered as to why more such exercises are no longer taking place. A backgrounder is in order at this juncture. When Sheikh Hasina’s government in Dhaka reciprocated in almost full measure to Indian overtures by apprehending and repatriating important Indian insurgent leaders billeting in her country, the doors opened not only for improved bilateral cooperation, but also for a basis that could present itself as a substratum for proximate military ties. Indeed, India had already set it as an agenda during the caretaker regime period when the Bangladesh army virtually governed the country, and the visit of the then Bangladesh army chief, Gen Moeen U Ahmed, to India during the time was more than an occasion when his Indian counterpart presented six thoroughbreds to the neighbouring country’s army. The military-to-military exchange was fine-tuned thereafter, and subsequent army chiefs of both India and Bangladesh visited each other’s country. The visit of the then Indian army chief, Gen VK Singh, who took part in the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war, deepened military ties between the two neighbours, as did the one by his counterpart Gen Md. Abdul Mubeen. Gen Singh must be singled out for the special efforts he had made to further military-to-military ties with Bangladesh even during his tenure as the general officer commanding-in-chief of the Kolkata based Eastern Command of the Indian Army. Earlier, the former Bangladesh army chief, Gen. Moeen had agreed to finally honour the Indian army soldiers who had lost their lives during the Liberation war. Indeed, such had been the animosity between the two countries since 1975 — when Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman was assassinated — that not only was mention of any Indian support to the Bangladeshi freedom fighters expunged from the pages of Bangladesh’s history, but the country’s armed forces used and termed India as “Wolf-Land,” a prototype of the enemy during their military exercises. The second phase of Op Sampriti that was launched in north-eastern Sylhet on 9 October 2011 was a happy departure from the time when ill-feeling marked both the countries and their armed forces. Designed as a 14-day joint exercise, Special Forces of India and Bangladesh simulated terrorism and insurgency scenarios and operationalised counter measures that tested each other’s expertise and possible cooperative skills. The first phase of Op Sampriti was undertaken on 1-4 November 2010 in Assam’s Jorhat, the regional hub of India’s elite 21 Para Battalion, the same force that took part in Op Sampriti II. Joint exercises between the two militaries had been on the anvil for quite some time. But these were called off at the eleventh hour; perhaps due to the hostility that stemmed from a section of Bangladesh’s security establishment’s close ties with Indian insurgent groups in the country, a relationship that events such as the unravelling of the conspiracy of 2 April 2004 Chittagong arms haul has now established. At the time, the possibility of joint CT/CI exercise seemed remote: indeed (as aforesaid), an influential section of the Bangladesh army was aiding anti-India forces even as the Indian security establishment was countering such forces. The two armies were occupied in cross-purpose engagements, and cooperation was not a word in Indo-Bangla lexicon. It would also be of pertinence to note that the Bangladesh army had been engaging in joint exercises with the Chinese army since long, but none had taken place with India, the country that had ably aided its liberation from Pakistan. Most of the Bangladesh army’s armaments, too, were acquired from China. The improved relation after Sheikh Hasina’s return saw an opening up with Bangladesh jettisoning the wastes of the past and cementing an enduring alliance with its eastern neighbour. India and Bangladesh share a common past. Correct policy and the will of the majority of Bangladesh’s populace have provided both the country with a unique opportunity. Bangladesh cannot ignore a country that abuts it on three sides. Strategically even its southern mouth faces a superior power in India’s navy. It is, therefore, only rational that geography and commonality of both countries’ dilemmas and agenda should bring them together. Bangladesh cannot wish away its most proximate neighbour. While its foreign policy would have to be constructed by its own concerns, the aspects that it would have to take into consideration is: a) sheer proximity with India; b) the identicalness of culture with a country that it was once a part of; c) the ease with which that can translate into unadulterated friendship; d) the midwife role that India played in its birth; and, e) the similarity of concerns, a la Islamist terrorism. India, on its part, must revisit its sub-continental “Neighbourhood First Policy” and recast the policy towards its neighbours in light of its strategic concerns. It must set an agenda that defeats what has been termed as the Chinese “string of pearls”. While the agendas of China and Pakistan would need a different set of counter measures, the ones for Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan, and particularly Bangladesh (a country that had experienced a “great turn-around” after the affability of 1971) would have to be calibrated with both charity and with an eye to India’s strategic concerns. An appropriate beginning has been made with Bangladesh ever since Hasina returned to power. Indeed, Op Sampriti — in its present theme — is perhaps more emblematic, a symbol that not only probes each other’s body language, but sends out signals to onlookers. It also has the ingredients that can break the barrier of us-and-them, and usher in a bonhomie that should characterise neighbours that are poised to play important buddy-roles in the region. But India should decisively engage the military of Myanmar, especially as they are presently in the seat of power in Naypyidaw. Indeed, India’s “Act East” policy will never “Go East” unless there is military-diplomacy between the two countries in place. The next Indian envoy to Naypyidaw can be a former Indian army commander with a knowledge of Myanmar. The present atmospherics in Myanmar necessitates unorthodox methods and it is important at this juncture to have not only military to military ties by way of joint exercises underway (and ones that would in togetherness wipe out the Indian insurgents billeted in Myanmar’s Sagaing Division), but usher in a comfort level by way of freshly cast military-diplomacy. The exercises should be initially directed towards demolition of the Indian insurgents in Sagaing Division and severance of the unholy alliance which certain Valley-Based Indian Insurgent Groups have gotten into with the Myanmar army. This should be followed up with joint exercises by both the countries air force and the navy, especially the latter, given that the Andaman Sea region and the abutting sea lanes would once again be experiencing non-traditional piracy of the Somalian variety as well as extra-regional maritime ingress. The joint exercises must translate into real time military cooperation not only against ethnic insurgents, but Islamist terror in each other’s borderlands. After all, the Rohingya problem criss-crosses and overlaps Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Indian and Bangladesh armies, for instance, can engage terror modules in the North East, especially in areas in Assam’s districts of Dhubri and Karimganj. The run-up to such collaborative affair must be preceded with Myanmar’s and Bangladesh army’s visitation and training alongside Indian counterparts in places such as Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram’s Vairengte where the armies of the two countries can witness and learn the art of rural and urban guerrilla warfare that the Indian army has been able to perfect. The time has come for the military to don the diplomat’s hat. The atmospherics of the present so demand. It would be, therefore, New Delhi’s while to test such an idiom. It could well turn out to be the preferred language of the “Neighbourhood-First Policy”. The author is a conflict theorist and bestselling author. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views. Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.