Many worlds: Multipolarity in the new world order

If someone had asked me to speak or write before 7 October, my assessment would have been rather succinct. I would have characterised the world as relatively peaceful, except for the concerning situation in Ukraine. However, 7 October marked a significant turning point, shattering this sense of confidence. The acts of terrorism carried out by Hamas inflicted wounds on the world’s moral compass and raised global concerns. The targeting of women and children in what was considered one of the most secure countries served as a stark reminder that such events can occur anywhere. Israel’s subsequent response followed a predictable trajectory, marked by extreme violence fuelled by a desire for retribution. However, extreme violence can be a volatile force, with the potential for unexpected consequences. In rare instances, a new world order can emerge from the aftermath. While pondering over the theme, ‘Many worlds: Multipolarity in the new world order’, a multitude of questions spontaneously surface in my mind. One of my initial musings centres around the necessity of codifying every new order with written rules. Historically, cataclysmic changes often followed major wars, yet these transformations often occurred organically, without the need for formalized doctrines. Moreover, it’s worth noting that global orders can undergo significant or subtle shifts in a non-violent manner, as exemplified by the post-collapse reconfiguration of the Soviet Empire. Alongside these considerations, a myriad of other inquiries arises. • Is the world really between orders where the old pliantly cedes space to the new? • Will there be a sudden and total transformation? Or will it be gradual, step by step change? • Perhaps the world will simply drift. the old order resisting change, while the new restlessly pushes for one. If you look at the statements coming out of the US and China, all three processes seem to be at work. China is impatient to fashion the world in its image, while the US is anxious to guard its turf. Before we delve into making future predictions, let’s take a moment to step back and reflect on how recent history has shaped our world. If we begin with the aftermath of World War II, a clear pattern emerges. The transformative changes that followed this global conflict were undeniably born out of extreme violence, with Europe bearing the deep wounds of war. The ruins and devastation of Europe served as a poignant reminder to world leaders, leading them to make a solemn commitment: ‘Never again’. It was in this context that the foundations of a rules-based world order were set in motion, ushering in a relatively stable international financial system through institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This emerging world order was distinctive for its unprecedented global scope and an ambitious mission, seeking to foster global peace and prosperity. However, it also introduced elements of tension, exemplified by the Cold War standoff between two ideological blocs and the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Except for these two blips, and some regional wars, the world remained calm and this state of reasonable bliss lasted till 1991. Thereafter the Cold War phase was over and East became a geographical expression. Moreover, despite the claims of some, the US did not ‘win’ the Cold War; rather, the Soviet Union ‘lost’ it. Unable to compete with America in a competition for global dominance, its shaky and dysfunctional political/social/economic system imploded. Ironically, at this stage, there was nostalgia for the balance of power that the cold war had ensured. The new dilemma for the world was how, and with what, to fill that vacuum? And how to introduce again some balance in the affairs of world? It was also the hope that this vacuum should not lead to the authoritarian dominance of the world by the US. Another, less remarked change was the fact that the world was no longer in an ideological contestation because communism had folded up its tent. Other changes followed, but unlike after WWII the shift post-cold war was largely peaceful. Still, three major developments took place in this period. The first was that US became the sole global power. The second was the rise of China as the centre of global industrial growth. The third was the re-emergence of Europe as a large, integrated economic power. Another effect was at a social level: if the oil boom of 1970s had given speed to fundamentalism in sections of the Islamic world, the defeat of communism and spread of globalization had set off the trend that enabled religion to resume a place in global politics. This opened the way for a new focus on ‘culture’. After all, ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ feed on each other, because what primarily differentiates cultures from each other is religion. This marked the onset of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ between two cultural entities: the ‘Christian West’ and the ‘Islamic world’. The question that was increasingly being asked in the West was whether it is possible in a divided and economically vulnerable world for an individual to be simultaneously a Muslim, a Western citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as someone who respects difference and human rights. On their part, Muslims in Western Europe maintain they are subject to systemic inequalities of opportunity in economic, political and social spheres. This phase of post-Cold War adjustment lasted till 11 September 2001. There is no doubt that 9/11 shook the US and shocked the world. The post-World War II assumption, that the US is safe, was shattered. It was still the dominant political and military power, but it was no longer a formidable fortress; it was now vulnerable. If Al Qaeda could challenge it, then so could others. Its later defeat in Afghanistan was one such case. There was another reason for its reduction. The US was less significant than before because economics became the new global focus. And China was the world’s factory. There were no announcements; no one held placards to say the world had changed profoundly. There was simply a general acknowledgement that there were now three Great Powers – the United States, China and Russia. In the years since then, the world has changed in other ways as well. Europe is reeling economically, it is divided politically and challenged internally by immigrants. The Chinese economic miracle is drawing to a close and Beijing is beginning to examine its military options. The United States is reconsidering the relationship between global pre-eminence and global omnipotence. Nothing is as it was in 1991. Currently, we are witnessing a fourth change since World War II. But let their frequency not surprise us because these corrections are neither extraordinary nor unprecedented. The Great Roman Empire did not last forever, nor could the conquests of Alexander and Genghis Khan change the world for all time. Closer home how many of us recall what the Mughal and British Empires were like. These examples from the global past teach us that change is the way of the world. There is no system or no empire that lasts forever. Periods of prosperity alternate with periods of austerity, periods of rise of nations alternate with the times of their decline. That fact has now caught up with Europe and China. Europe is confronting the political realities of its unwillingness to make the fundamental and difficult decisions on what the European Union really meant. As for China, its economic climax has left it with the question of whether the regime can survive in an uncontrolled economy and what its power would look like if it weren’t prosperous. Meanwhile the US has emerged from the post 9/11 period with one big lesson: however attractive military intervention is, it always looks easier at the beginning than at the end. As the greatest military power in the world, it has the ability to defeat armies. But it is far more difficult to reshape societies in America’s image — Iraq and Afghanistan are prime examples of America’s failures. Let’s now look at the issue from a practical point of view. The last coherent response by the international system to a global challenge came at the London summit of the G20 in April 2009. There, following the 2008 financial crash, leaders took steps to avert another Great Depression and stabilise the global banking system. Another effect of that G20 action was an unstated acknowledgement by the G7 that the world had become too complex for it to handle its problems by itself. The energy muscle of the OPEC, the rising economic power of the global south was necessary to face that financial challenge. This joint action by the expanded leadership was undoubtedly successful. But was this success followed up? Did the world order or at least the world economic order change significantly? Was the G20 effectively given its due place in the world? Sadly, the answer is no. As evidence that there has been virtually no change in the global order, let us look at some of the crisis the world has faced since then. To cite two recent cases, the withdrawal by the US from Afghanistan was an ugly example of ‘me first’. US’s sole and only concern was the evacuation of its citizens. The images of Afghan youth clinging to the departing US aircrafts still haunt us. As for others, every country had to fend for itself. The response to Covid-19 was a second case of a fractured world. Even the WHO — an organisation that was set up to provide leadership in such a medical crisis — was stricken numb. It seemed too paralysed by China’s frown to take any action at all. Here India was the first to step forward and take the lead by providing vaccine doses to nearly a hundred countries. The subsequent international response to climate change and the debt crisis in developing countries can only be described as unfortunate. That failure stems from the fact that fewer and fewer countries including the ones that built the previous international order seem reluctant to extend largesse. Up until now, our discussions have primarily focused on the global developments since 1991. However, it’s crucial to recognise that the world had systems in place for centuries before our time. Therefore, let’s briefly examine the historical precedents that have shaped the world, including liberal internationalism, the nation-state concept stemming from the Westphalian system and the concept of civilisational states. • Liberal internationalism is a broad framework built upon principles of the rule of law, the protection of individual rights as enshrined in constitutions, parliamentary democracy and market economies. These are often regarded as universal ideals. • The nation-state, which gained prominence in the Western world under the Westphalian system, is commonly touted as the foundational political unit. However, this assertion is open to debate, as civilisational states existed within distinct boundaries for centuries long before the concept of Westphalia emerged. • Civilisational states are viewed with some scepticism by proponents of liberal internationalism as these states are perceived to be inherently resistant to the diffusion of the values championed by liberal internationalism. Major civilisational states include Russia, China, India, Turkey, Iran and several others. Today, we find ourselves at a juncture where these three elements coexist and interact in complex ways, their value systems displaying neither a linear nor rigidly fixed trajectory. Following the conclusion of the ideological contest between communism and capitalism in 1991, the world has transitioned into a more transactional and pragmatic state. Self-interest often takes precedence over lofty moral ideals such as human rights and societal equity. So far, we have addressed the political and economic facets that exert influence on the global landscape. Now, let’s delve into the technological dimensions. The seminal technological advancement that reshaped modern history was the invention of the printing press in the 15th century. This innovation enabled the pursuit of empirical knowledge to supplant ritualistic doctrines ushering in the Age of Reason as a successor to the Age of Religion. These developments set the stage for the contemporary world order we know today. However, the advent of the Internet and artificial intelligence (AI) has disrupted this equilibrium. Their primary aim is to validate knowledge through the continuous accumulation and manipulation of ever-expanding data. Individuals transform into data points, and data itself becomes the driving force. Undoubtedly, AI promises extraordinary advancements in fields such as medical science, clean energy, environmental conservation, and numerous other domains. Yet, it also poses the potential to become a double-edged sword capable of challenging its very creators. If the Age of Enlightenment marked the inception of philosophical insights, our current era of artificial intelligence is seemingly proceeding in an inverse direction. It has ushered in a potentially dominant technology in search of a guiding philosophy. Faced with this immensely potent technology, human society finds itself ill-prepared for the ascendance of artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, regardless of our readiness or preferences, the forces of politics, economics, technology, culture and religion exhibit impatience in reshaping the world to suit their convenience. However, one might question the incessant call for change. Have we not witnessed enough transformation already with four major shifts occurring in the span of just seven decades? Nonetheless, for the sake of argument, let us contemplate whether the current world order has reached its expiration date. Is there a predetermined lifespan for every great nation and once that period concludes, must it acquiesce to ordinariness? To gain insight into this matter, let us once again turn to history and consider the duration of dominance experienced by previous empires. Historically, the great empires have, on average, endured for approximately 250 years. With the conclusion of four centuries of Western dominance, the world order it presided over is long overdue for a recalibration. From a chronological standpoint, the world and its prevailing order are poised for transformation. While a comprehensive overhaul may prove challenging, there is a palpable expectation in the global South for a revision of the rules. In this context, an adjustment of some nature is presently in progress. Europe appears to be reverting to its customary condition of hosting multiple competitive nation-states. Russia is experiencing a resurgence, with its bolstered military capabilities instilling renewed global confidence. As for the United States, it has certainly made its share of mistakes, but its economic and military might position it as the world’s foremost superpower for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, China grapples with the management of its new economic realities. The raison d’être of the Chinese Communist Party remains rooted in prosperity. Without this prosperity, its offering seems limited to an even more authoritarian state. Is it conceivable that one among these nations could ascend to the status of a great power? If such a possibility exists, what criteria must a country meet to undergo this transformation and gain recognition as a great power in the eyes of the international community? Some fundamental prerequisites for such a transition could include: • A great power must possess a substantial manufacturing base, as this forms the bedrock of industrial capacity and job creation. • Great powers in history have invariably exhibited an outward-looking national vision, reinforced by capable leadership and efficient bureaucratic systems. This vision, coupled with a sense of national destiny, distinguishes great powers from the rest. Consider India in this context: despite its considerable population, economic clout and military might, it has not yet attained the status of a great power. Several factors contribute to this, including: • Persistent social challenges such as poverty and inequality. • An underdeveloped defence ecosystem. Given the current landscape, scarcely any countries from the global South can successfully meet these criteria, implying that great power status is likely to remain confined to the United States, China, and Russia in the immediate future. In the face of these shortcomings, the idea of a world divided into seven or eight ’lesser powers’ is no longer implausible. We might be heading into an era where three major powers, each with its own set of allies, dominate the stage. Alongside them will be regional powers, some aligning with one of the superpowers, while others maintain a significant degree of autonomy in shaping regional dynamics. This could give rise to a semblance of regional multipolarity, albeit with limited global reach. However, a profound transformation of the global order necessitates a significant global upheaval, and even then, the outcome remains uncertain. History reminds us of the aftermath of World War I, where both the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty proved to be failures. Conversely, the post-World War II rules-based world order has been effective due to its deliberate design emphasizing fairness. Historical precedent underscores the difficulty of introducing new world orders. Are we prepared to endure the sacrifices of a major war to fundamentally alter the world order and will the resulting new order outperform the existing one, which has served the world reasonably well? Moreover, history reveals that diverse worldviews have always coexisted and will continue to do so. This doesn’t necessarily imply a universal clash of cultures or economies, but it does imply potential localized conflicts. In the west, some nations have already proclaimed the demise of multiculturalism and this combined with the diminishing influence of globalisation could propel us towards the diverse world scenarios we discuss today. In conclusion, the world of tomorrow might exhibit multipolarity, particularly at the regional level, but the core major players, the ‘big three’, are likely to persist unchanged. While some adjustments to the global order may happen, a complete overhaul seems unrealistic. Ultimately, it’s the fault lines in globalisation that could usher in the ‘many worlds’ we aspire to see, though perhaps not in the manner we had wished. [The article is an extract from Rajiv Dogra’s speech in Hindu College, University of Delhi, on 1 November 2023.] The writer is a former diplomat. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Read all the  Latest News ,  Trending News ,  Cricket News ,  Bollywood News , India News  and  Entertainment News  here. Follow us on  Facebook,  Twitter and  Instagram.