‘Lull’ at the LAC: Implications for India and why New Delhi must continue to equip military, build border infra

Historians as well as defence analysts may be able to put a date between the souring relationship between India-Pakistan as well as India - China. This notwithstanding, China has been fighting an undeclared war with India even beyond the 1962 war. Its misadventure in 1967 in Sikkim failed but it continued its efforts towards its adversarial approach against India. This was demonstrated again in 1987 when it moved south of Samdurong Chu and established Wangdung Camp. Despite large-scale mobilisation by India, its further expansion was prevented but Wangdung still continues as a mark of Chinese conflict agenda with India to date. There was apparently a ’lull’ between 1987 and 2017 till China did ‘Doklam’ in 2017. This period of close to three decades was used as a  large ‘lull’ by China to trap India to use it as a market for its own development and economic growth. It has enmeshed India in a complex supply chain matrix that India continues to remain embroiled in this mesh till date wherein there is a huge trade deficit for India. The situation has not reversed despite a deliberate effort by India to address this issue and it is likely to take a considerable time for a favourable tilt in favour of India. The ’lull’ of three decades was disturbed in 2017 during the Doklam crisis which apparently ended in Indian advantage but China also realised that longer ‘lulls’ in the future could be detrimental to its interest and therefore it started its aggressive behaviour. In the year 2017, it renamed certain locations in Arunachal Pradesh. It was obvious that it was preparing for LAC transgressions in Eastern Ladakh for a considerable time as it is unimaginable that such large-scale transgressions at multiple locations will happen overnight in April-May 2020. When India raised objections and mobilised its troops for its defensive need, matching deployment including deployment of long-range weapons was also observed on the Chinese side indicating its advanced preparation towards defending this transgression and escalating it if it was needed. Despite all our political, diplomatic and military efforts, the status quo has not been restored as existing in April-May 2020. Progress on Depsang plains and Demchok is alluding us altogether and wherever there has been some progress based on mutual discussions, the status of April-May 2020 has not been really reached in the majority of the cases. The new approach of creating buffers even along LAC is something which needs further analysis. The concept of buffers may be more pragmatic along the borders if they are not fenced. It therefore clearly emerges that China has been at war with India since 1954 onwards in some form or the other. The intervening period has been taken by China as ’lull’ to prepare for the next stage of conflict which needs to be embedded in our psyche as well to see these periods as ‘lull’ in the continued conflict spectrum to address our national interests. The bilateral agreements meant ‘peace and tranquillity’ for India but these were used as ’lull periods’ by China to prepare for the next stage of conflict at all stages of our mutual relationship. India felt militarily satisfied by holding forward locations in certain areas as tactical-level preparations for a later date. As against this, China focussed on strategic and operational level issues initially pending the tactical level preparations for a later date. It has created axials as well as laterals connectivity infrastructure in border and disputed areas in abundance and continues to develop these further till date with impunity. The border infrastructure is not only limited to road and rail connectivity but in terms of airfields, logistics bases and all other infrastructure required for warfighting. This infrastructure surge is now leaning more closer to LAC as against being limited only to depth areas. In addition, it has also advanced its capabilities for military hardware be it for army, air force or navy. India has also been taking multiple steps to address its capacity deficit. It’s true that it will take time more so when we are late starters.  The earlier adage of ‘one may lose battles but the war must be won’ is no more valid. We need to be victorious at every stage of manifested conflict. This will be only possible when we are not lured by ‘Chinese lulls’ as signs of peace and tranquillity. Really speaking, time is almost running out. It is the responsibility of all stakeholders to get involved in the ‘mission mode’ for capability creation in their respective domains. When this ’lull’ gets vaporised cannot be predicted with certainty and therefore continued preparations are needed. Some of the recommended actions are as under:.

• Evolution of National Security Remaining ambiguous has also certain advantages but it helps to state the intent more clearly bringing out its advantages
• Modifying the ‘No first Use’ nuclear policy to remain “No first Use’ only against non-nuclear nations
• Restructure defence forces without any further delay to adopt Theaterisation. Inter services issues have to be disregarded to do what is best for the nation
• Executing multiple other force restructuring issues pending so far
• Creation of Rocket - Missile force in larger numbers to be operated by Gunners
• Creation of layered air defence, an umbrella which needs to be kept under concerned Theatre commanders
• While there will be an urgent need to indigenise our defence forces, it will still take considerable time given our manufacturing ability in defence domain combined with ‘process’ focus as against the ‘product’ focus. In the meantime, India must keep its existing defence equipment inventory mission reliable. ‘Equipment’ is likely to be a key constituent in winning the battles as has emerged in the year-long Russia-Ukraine conflict. For doing this, Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) support needs to be made more vibrant even if it needs review of Shekatkar committee recommendations. The creation of Forward Sustainment Bases (FSBs) at the Command level is such a pressing necessity whose time has come
• There has been substantial progress in automation and networking. Business process review of all our actions combined with process simplification are essential to do away with large No of our organisations which are now not contributing to our war waging effort. This will release the manpower for critical areas needed for future wars.
• Co-option of ESM in releasing combatants needs to be institutionalised in a substantial manner.The combatants so released can be gainfully employed in other critical areas.

The above are some of the measures but there are many more which must be in the knowledge of all stakeholders. All these will happen when the period of non-active combat is taken as a ‘lull period’ between two conflicts and waiting for the next conflict to happen. Given the adversity of the force matrix with China, we have fewer options and therefore it puts more responsibility on us to be better prepared for the active stage of a conflict while keeping appropriately responding to ‘lull’ duration of the Chinese activities.

The writer is a retired army veteran. Views expressed are personal. Read all the  Latest News ,  Trending News ,  Cricket News ,  Bollywood News , India News  and  Entertainment News  here. Follow us on  Facebook,  Twitter and  Instagram.