As compared to the Naga and Mizo insurgencies, the insurgency in Manipur intensified only in the 1970s and 1980s as the grievances of the various tribes and ethnic groups morphed into organised violence. Historically, the Meiteis, who comprise over 50 per cent of the population, occupy only 10 per cent of the land, mainly in the Imphal Valley or Bowl comprising the towns of Imphal, Bishenpur and Thoubal. The Meities are a prosperous community and own much of the fertile land in the region. The erstwhile Maharaja of Manipur was a Meitei. The other 50 per cent of the population of Manipur comprises approximately 29 tribes, broadly made up of Naga, Kuki and Zomi (Paite) tribes. While the Tangkhul Nagas are spread across Southern Nagaland and the contiguous hilly areas of Ukhrul, Tamanglang, Senapati and Chandel in Manipur, the Kukis and Zomis who have a greater connect with the Chins of Myanmar, largely inhabit the hilly areas contiguous with Myanmar with some migration into Meitei and Naga dominated areas. As the Government of India introduced its various policies of positive discrimination, such as Reservations for tribes, the Nagas, Kukis and other hill tribes became landowners in the hills around the Imphal Bowl and stopped depending on the Meiteis for their livelihood and started pushing back on class distinction. As the two distinct communities drifted apart, the battle lines were drawn. This article seeks to offer a historical perspective to the conflict in Manipur through the prescient lens of Lt Gen Rostum Kaikhushru Nanavatty, an accomplished Indian Army Commander. Ironically, Nanavatty took over the Dimapur-based 3 Corps in August 1997 soon after the ceasefire in Nagaland and the concurrent violent clashes in Churachandpur in South Manipur where Kuki insurgents executed nine Paite villagers Fault lines Following the historic Naga Accord of August 1997 between the GOI and the NSCN (IM), the nascent Naga demands for a Greater Nagaland or Nagalim with parts of Manipur included in the proposed new geographical construct, seriously impeded the return of peace to Nagaland and exacerbated ethnic fault lines in Manipur. Reflecting on the Manipur insurgency in a paper written in 2004, a year after he retired from the Indian Army, Nanavatty zoomed in on the Meiteis and their deep sense of insecurity as the principal driver of the conflict. As the dominant ethno-religious sub-national group in Manipur, and despite their sophistication and eminence, Nanavatty attributed Meitei insecurity to four main reasons. First, a perceived sense of injustice because of the various historical developments in the region post-Independence. Second is a sense of physical isolation — surrounded by hill tribes and exacerbated by tenuous and vulnerable surface communication. Third, a feeling of discrimination, having been denied various socio-economic concessions and privileges admissible to the hill tribes in the state like the Kukis and the Tangkhul Nagas. Fourth, a deep-rooted fear that the Central government may seek a resolution of the conflict in Nagaland at the expense of the territorial integrity of the state of Manipur by hiving-off a large portion of the hill districts that were contiguous to the state of Nagaland and inhabited by Naga tribes. “Imphal and its surrounding hill areas are among the most beautiful parts of India, teeming with sporting and cultural activity like nowhere I have seen. Culture is preserved in Manipur and rituals such as funeral processions are spectacular with immaculately dressed mourners with sandalwood paste markings and graceful dance. It makes me sad to see the state torn by strife and vicious violence,” observed Nanavatty in one of his diary entries. Pushback The pushback from the Meiteis over the years has been violent and gradually led to the formation of armed groups such as the United Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Liberation Army-East (PLA) and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), termed by the Indian Army as Valley-based Insurgent Groups (VBIG). Inspired by the Naga groups, they have been a handful for the security forces even though the VBIG soon abandoned revolutionary ideologies and settled for profit-driven organised crime such as extortion, kidnappings for ransom and murder. On this count, there was much similarity between what was happening in Nagaland and Manipur as youth were exposed to a culture of drugs and guns and faced with the grim prospects of unemployment. Crime and terrorism has now represented a conscious lifestyle choice as the VBIG and armed Naga and Kuki gangs have emerged as well-organised and highly militarised groups of criminals masquerading as revolutionaries. Little progress Attributing the Churachandpur massacres of 1997-98 to the abject apathy of the state administration, Nanavatty wrote a firm letter to Chief Minister Rishad Keishing, a Tangkhul Naga, highlighting that militant groups were getting out of control of the moderate leadership of the communities. Recommending a three-pronged approach that was partly doable and practical and somewhat aspirational and idealistic, the strategy aimed to: • Suppress and neutralise the VBIG and the other Naga and tribal groups to include the vast Over Ground Worker (OGW) network • Empower and uplift the Meitei population • Fulfil the genuine aspirations of the other minority sub-national groups in the state — Naga, Kuki and Paite — without prejudice to safeguarding Meitei interests. The problem then as now revolves around a heady cocktail of ethnic and tribal strife; a constant shift of power centres that has been dominated by political opportunism and expediency; and most importantly, the absence of a tall regional leader who could foster a shared vision of economic prosperity amongst the people of Nagaland and Manipur. The author is a retired Air Vice Marshal from the IAF and a military historian. He is currently writing the biography of Lt Gen Rostum Kaikhushru Nanavatty. 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The insurgency in Manipur intensified only in the 1970s and 1980s as the grievances of the various tribes and ethnic groups morphed into organised violence
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