Israel-Hamas conflict: Why obliterating the Palestinian terror group militarily is easier said than done

The asymmetric, irregular, dirty war triggered by the brutal terror attack by Hamas on Israel on 7 October, 2023, targetting innocent civilians and children calls for global condemnation. A violent response by Israel using all its military might is on, which was an expected reaction, with the death toll rising on an hourly/daily basis predominantly of innocent civilians and children. While the provocation was grave for Israel, the voices to distinguish between Hamas and innocent Palestinians and the consequences of disproportionate response, along with the hostage crisis has to be a subject of concern for the Emergency Unity Government of Israel. The crisis has the potential to expand into a regional conflict. Contributing factors to the current crisis While Israel and Palestinians both have legitimate rights to live, have a homeland, and govern and defend themselves, but lack of accommodation of these rights within the boundaries of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been problematic leading to bloodshed for decades. While every peace propagator talks of a two-state solution no such solution succeeded due to the competing claims to Jerusalem, which is crucial to Christians, Jews and Palestinians. The problem, therefore, remains how to divide that landmass into two states, as both sides want Jerusalem because Palestinians can’t compromise on al-Aqsa Mosque (the third holiest shrine for Islam) and Jews can’t compromise on Temple Mount or Western Wall (the holiest site in Judaism). With the complexities of entanglement of 167 Palestinian enclaves embedded in 203 Israeli settlements in the West Bank, it’s not really practical for any of them to leave their enclaves, which complicates the situation further. In the recent past a chain of events like the Abraham Accords, formulation of I2U2 and a potential deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, indicated increasing acceptance of Israel in the Arab World, which Palestinians in general, and Hamas and its backers in particular, saw as a threat, shrinking of their influence, dilution of Palestinian cause and loss of relevance for Hamas, as a potent organisation. Over decades Israel has emerged as the most powerful military power in West Asia controlling most of the claimed area including Palestinian settlements in the West Bank directly, and the Gaza Strip indirectly through six crossings with full control over the coastline and airspace. With the recent re-election of hardliner Netanyahu, the fear of tighter control on their settlements was growing, more so in the aftermath of fierce confrontations in the area of al-Aqsa Mosque in 2021, wherein Israeli muscle power demonstrated its might. The fact that today Israel has a state of its own which it fully controls, is not true for Palestinians, which will continue to be perceived as injustice by them. This unresolved issue is a recipe for future conflicts as well, even if the current crisis sees some awkward settlement. Netanyahu’s attempt at judicial overhaul was viewed as a power grab and the internal opposition to it divided Israel’s establishment. The redeployment of Israeli forces to control internal dissent with an additional focus on the West Bank in the last two years was seen as an opportunity by Hamas, coupled with a sense of complacency in Southern Israel opposing the Gaza Strip.  The formidable, technologically enabled fencing was assumed to be impregnable; hence found to be inadequately manned violating the important military principle that any obstacle, if not covered by troops and fire can be breached. Strategy of Hamas Hamas is designated as a terrorist group US, Canada, EU, Japan and Israel, but controls Gaza (post-Israeli disengagement in 2004) and has a military wing. In 2006, Hamas won the last-held Palestinian legislative election and started administering Gaza. In the absence of further elections, Hamas claims to represent the Palestinian cause, but its barbaric actions on 7 October have brought greater miseries to the people of Gaza. It doesn’t recognise Israel as a legitimate state, Oslo Accord 1993 and the Palestinian Authority (PA) over it. Decoding from the Hamas point of view, it knew that Israeli forces have an asymmetric advantage in combat power and military capabilities; hence a surprise terror attack was chosen to strike a blow on Israel to disrupt Arab-Israel engagement. The choice of Saturday (Jewish holiday) to launch the offensive Operation al-Aqsa Flood was to achieve surprise and its attack from land, air and sea indicates exhaustive planning and preparations for the offensive to take on Israeli forces with speed and surprise. The scale and magnitude indicate that it was beyond the capacity of Hamas alone; hence the possibility of external help can’t be ruled out. The aim of Hamas was to weaponise utmost brutality so that Israel is provoked beyond limits to respond disproportionately causing heavy casualties to innocent Palestinians in Gaza, which would invite favourable reaction in their support from Arab countries and most radical Islamic countries and organisations. Hamas expects to put the Palestinian issue from the backburner to the forefront once again and invite global criticism of Israel for disproportionate response and human rights violations. The operational objective of Hamas was to get maximum hostages from Israel, who could be used as bargaining chips or human shields to negotiate with a much more powerful adversary. While Hamas has no concern for human lives, Israel on previous occasions has conceded to releasing many Palestinians in exchange for a few Israeli hostages; however, it may not remain so liberal now and may take calculated risks with hostages in an attempt to obliterate Hamas. With an extensive tunnel network below civil habitation, Hamas will conserve its fighters, continue sporadic rocket attacks, conserve ammunition for a prolonged fight to draw Israeli forces into fighting in built-up areas, using ground knowledge of the thick built-up area to its advantage to overcome the asymmetry in the military arsenal. Strategy of Israel Having suffered heavy casualties due to serious intelligence failure or underplaying battle indicators and underestimating Hamas due to the superiority complex of its military power, Israel’s first priority was to evict Hamas militants from its territory, which it claims to have achieved. It is continuing standoff attacks in the Gaza Strip to soften up Hamas positions and shaping the battlefield for a ground offensive. Israel understands the gravity of the hostage crisis; hence it is trying backdoor negotiations for their release through various mediators like Qatar, Turkey, Egypt and even the US. It has launched exhaustive information and psychological war for early consolidation of Hamas and to mitigate criticism for its disproportionate response, but it knows the magnitude of the collateral damage of its offensive named Operation Swords of Iron. While Israeli rhetoric of obliterating Hamas is a political domestic compulsion for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the fact that Hamas has its leaders and cadres outside its striking distance and it involves heavy fighting in the most densely populated area, this rhetoric may be ambitious. If the US couldn’t obliterate Al Qaeda in two decades, obliterating Hamas may not be as easy, as it is being announced. The idea of shifting the civil population from North Gaza to South to clear the strip in segments is marred by the possibility of Hamas also merging and shifting itself along with hostages with the civil population. Possibility of expansion With increasing civilian casualties in Gaza, the global human rights concern will increase and the anger of some neighbours and Islamic radical organisations will provoke some to join in, although US, the strongest ally of Israel is trying its best to prevent it. It has postured its strongest aircraft carrier groups (USS Gerald R Ford carrier group being joined by USS Dwight D Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group) in the Mediterranean Sea as a deterrent and its secretary of state is visiting every possible stakeholder to prevent expansion. Hezbollah despite US warnings may increase its scale of engagement, which is a much more potent force than Hamas. Although evidence of direct involvement of Iran in the Hamas attack of 7 October hasn’t emerged, the alleged ongoing financial, moral and material support to Hamas and Hezbollah can’t be ruled out. The fact that Iran seems to be the beneficiary of break up in Israel-Saudi Arabia normalisation and is warning Israel to stop strikes in Gaza puts the needle of suspicion on it. Some actions from the Syrian front, with Iranian help, can’t be ruled out. Presently US is also playing down the Iran angle, as it is in no mood to open another front to keep the crisis localised. Way ahead With more than 2,450 Palestinians killed and thousands wounded in eight days by Israeli strikes in Gaza, their casualty figures including innocent women and children have increased to almost double of total casualties of Israelis in the brutal terror attack on 7 October attack as beyond (1,300 were killed and 3,400 wounded). It is giving rise to voices of criticism for going beyond self-defence, disproportionate response and collective punishment. Considering the excessive initial pain by Hamas to Israel, the West has been tight-lipped about Israel’s blockage of humanitarian requirements like food, water, shelter and electricity so far, but criticism can’t be avoided for too long. The United Nations (UNRWA) call for a humanitarian corridor not conceded by Israel, insisting on impractical total evacuation may soon drift global opinion away from the narrative of Netanyahu. Israel is determined for a ground offensive, with the rhetoric of obliteration of Hamas and seems ready to accept criticism for collateral damages. While its military might may prevail to destroy Gaza with harsh punishment to all its occupants, the complete destruction of Hamas ideology is next to impossible, if US and the collective West couldn’t obliterate Al Qaeda, ISIS completely even after years of war. Israeli strategy ignores the fact that in counterinsurgency/terrorist operations (COIN) people are the centre of gravity and excessive civilian casualties can give an adequate reason for developing the next generation of Hamas terrorists, even if the current one is defeated. For Palestinians, the poor leadership of Abbas, whose term expired 12 years ago lacked a popular mandate and radicalised Hamas the promise of peace and its legitimate rights looks bleak, notwithstanding the genuineness of their cause. The author is an international strategic and military analyst, well versed in the area of conflict, having served in the UN Peacekeeping Force. The author tweets @asthana_shashi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Read all the Latest News, Trending News, Cricket News, Bollywood News, India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.