Is Central Asia still 'central' in Eurasian geopolitics?

Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 and the subsequent chaos in Eurasian geopolitics (post-Soviet space), an important question that often arises is how Central Asia will define its identity in both global and regional geopolitics. This question is assuming importance in recent years because there will be a new kind of geopolitical “chessboard” in Eurasia in which Central Asian countries will give greater teething to their respective multi-vectorial foreign policy. At the same time, though Russia is still the pre-eminent power in Central Asia, its economic weaknesses will allow it to maintain its dominant position for a longer period. However, a question that arises here is whether the United States is taking a lesser interest in Central Asia. This is more so after Washington’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. On the other hand, European Union is confronting a geopolitical quagmire largely because of the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war and the subsequent energy and economic crisis, thus putting their earlier democratic promotion project in this part of the world on a backfoot. In this context, European countries are looking towards Central Asia as an alternative to Russian energy. Though China is trying to extend its leverage in Central Asia, however, the historical distrust of the Central Asian countries towards China, along with the recent unequal energy bargaining as well as asymmetric trade, is raising doubt about the nature of relations. Similarly, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman legacy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan towards Central Asia generated a sense of apprehension. So also, Iran is emerging as a major geopolitical player in Central Asian geopolitics. This is putting the Central Asian countries in a lurch of searching for a reliable geopolitical actor with whom they can develop a strong partnership. In this context, the Central Asian countries are looking towards India as a primary balancer in Central Asian geopolitics. Trajectories of Central Asian Geopolitics Some of the above-mentioned geopolitical trajectories need to be discussed at length to examine the contours of Central Asian geopolitics in the broader context of Eurasian geopolitics. Along with these factors, there is a need to relook at the geopolitical realignment within Central Asia that gives a clearer picture of Central Asian geopolitics. In this regard, one particular factor that needs to be highlighted here is that both countries are mending their fence under the new leadership of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. This can herald a new sort of cooperative geopolitical development in Central Asia and can enhance Central Asia’s security situation to some extent, as it is a fact that both Astana and Tashkent are competing with each other to expand their sphere of influence in Central Asia. This is in contrast to the growing rift between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, there is an ever-increasing intra- Central Asian trade. This can be evident from the fact that the total trade among the Central Asia countries grew from “6.4 per cent in 2014 to 10.06 per cent in 2022”, as per two economists Evgeny Vinokurov and Anton Malakhov of the Eurasian Development Bank in their report titled Tackling Central Asia’s Remaining Development Challenges.  This is a positive move as far as stabilising the Central Asian economy is concerned. Similarly, the World Investment Report 2022, published by UNCTAD, highlights that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) “Flows to Central Asia rose by 12 per cent to $7 billion”. Though the report highlights that “FDI flows to Kazakhstan fell by 14 per cent to $3.2 billion, with declines in extractive industries and transportation”. On the other hand, FDI “Flows rose 18 per cent to $2 billion in Uzbekistan and 24 per cent to $1.5 billion in Turkmenistan” (p.14). The pattern of FDI in Central Asia is an indicator of the fact that there is an upward tendency in the Central Asian economic structure. Some of the above strategic elements provide a context to study the geopolitical importance of Central Asia in the tumultuous geopolitics of Eurasia. Three important prisms that define the interaction between Central Asian geopolitics in the framework of broader Eurasian geopolitics are: a) the nature of geopolitical interaction between Russia and Central Asia, especially in the context of the present war between Russia and Ukraine b) the significance of Central Asia in the realms of Eurasian geopolitics c) geo-economic engagement of Central Asia in the context of Eurasian geopolitics. As discussed above, these three prisms will shape Central Asia’s geopolitical dynamics. Russia, the traditional player in Central Asian Geopolitics As discussed above, the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war has forced the Central Asian countries to relook at their relations with Russia. This is a fact, but at the same time, it is also true that over the years, there has been a marked engagement between Russian and Central Asian leadership. This can be evident from the fact that Central Asian countries consistently supported Russia at the United Nations regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. Similarly, Russia renewed its pledge to provide full-scale assistance to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation(CSTO) when Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu visited Tajikistan in December 2022. So also, in the field of energy cooperation, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are strengthening their gas cooperation, as evidenced by the disclosure made by the Russian Foreign Minister during his visit to Uzbekistan in April 2023. With Kyrgyzstan, Russia is strategically moving to beef up the Joint Anti-Air Defence System. This can undoubtedly give Russia a tactical edge in air power manoeuvrability in this region. Similarly, with Turkmenistan, Russia remains the major trading partner in terms of energy despite China slowly emerging as a major energy customer of Ashgabat. It is also a fact that all five countries of Central Asia have yet to recognise Russia’s annexation of the breakaway regions of Ukraine. It is an assertive move on the part of the leadership of Central Asia vis-a-vis Russia. Similarly, in Kazakhstan, though Russia intervened (under the aegis of the Collective Security Treaty Organization(CSTO) to quell the situation in January 2022, as news reports suggest, it obstructed the flow of Kazakh oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Thus, from the above strategic moves of Central Asian countries, one can infer that they are adopting a calculative move to engage with Russia. The relationship between Russia and Central Asia is rooted in historical continuity as well as geopolitical compulsions of both. This is also a fact that Central Asia is emerging as a major supplier of manpower to Russia in its war against Ukraine, as reported. Thus, the present move on the part of the Russian Administration was more or less similar to the 19th-century strategic development. The occurrence of the Crimean War and the subsequent need for space propelled Russia under Tsar to move towards Turkestan(Central Asia), as Indian Historian Surendra Gopal writes in the article “Driving the Wedge: The Russian Occupation of Tashkent 1865” (Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 1974, Vol. 35, pp. 394-402). Gopal highlights in the same article that “The Tsarist control also ensured safe bases for future Russian penetration and eliminated the need for taking measures for securing long and struggling lines of communication in the rear” (p. 396). As mentioned above, the Tsarist strategic postulates can be recontextualised in the present context as Russia is strengthening its military bases in Central Asia to ward off the threat from China and minimising United States’ influence in Central Asia. This is a fact that Russia still sees Central Asia as its “strategic backyard” as it used to perceive it in the 19th century. In this regard, it can be underlined that though there is a great deal of engagement between Russia and China, especially to counter the United States in the energy field, both appear to have not seen eye to eye in Central Asia in recent years. The strategic apprehensions between Moscow and Beijing are rooted in history. In this context, though the Eurasian Economic Cooperation Project of Russia is in a lull following the Russia- Ukraine war outbreak, Moscow is keen to expand its geoeconomic sphere of influence in Central Asia. United States, the distant geopolitical player in Central Asia Though the United States left Afghanistan, Central Asia as a geopolitical “Pivot” still holds importance for US foreign policy. The same can be seen in US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Kazakhstan in March 2023. In Astana, Bilken attended the meeting of C5+1 Foreign Ministers meeting. The visit of Bilken to Central Asia assumes significance when Russia is engaging in war with Ukraine. This may be a well-calculated strategic move on the part of Washington to bring Central Asia into its strategic fold while at the same time isolating Russia from this geopolitical space. The US Administration is quite apprehensive of Russia’s move into the “Pivot of Eurasia”, especially after the outbreak of the War between the two Slavic brotherly countries. In this context, Washington is keen to encircle Russia through Central Asia. In this context, the priority Central Asian country is Kazakhstan, with whom Russia shares a long border. In this background, the US administration is keen to take advantage of the recent fissure in the relationship between the two countries. This makes Kazakhstan an ideal base for the US to encircle Russia. Similarly, the US is also keen to engage with Turkmenistan, which occupies a strategic vantage point bordering Afghanistan, Iran, and the Caspian Sea. The recent meeting between Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Merdov with US Secretary of State Bilken in April 2023 at Washington in a testimony to this. It is also a fact that the Western World, particularly the European countries, are eying the energy resources of the two Central Asian energy-rich countries, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This is more so as these European countries face energy shortages due to sanctions on Russia, and Central Asia constitutes an important energy alternative for European countries in terms of accessing energy in this geopolitical space. Turkey and Iran, the regional geopolitical actors Some of this strategic development proves that Central Asia still occupies a central place in the geopolitical calculus of post-Soviet Eurasia. Turkey is also interested in navigating the geopolitics of Central Asia using its age-old geo-cultural relations and in the framework of the Turkic world. However, it has not succeeded much except in the rhetorical statements of “Turkic World” by the Central Asian and Turkic leadership. One major factor which impedes Turkey’s influence in Central Asia is its negative image of patronising radicalist and terrorist forces in this geopolitical space under the leadership of Erdogan. On the other hand, despite past hostility, the Central Asian countries are interested in mending their fences with Iran. Though Iran is under a spell of sanctions imposed by the US, Central Asian countries are eager to engage with Iran to end their geographical isolation regarding accessing the Sea routes. At the same time, Iran is also trying to strengthen relations with the Central Asian countries to counter Turkey and Pakistan, considered the two major arch-rivals of Teheran. The joining of Iran in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a member proves its intention to play an important role in the regional geopolitics of Central Asia and Eurasia in a broader sense. China, the imperial geopolitical player It is true that over the years, China has made an inroad into Central Asia and trade turnover with Central Asia stood at “$32.1 Billion in 2022”, as per the data provided by Serik Zhumangarin, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Integration at the China and Central Asian Summit and as reported in Astana Times. However, the trade is primarily asymmetric and dominated by the export of oil and gas from this region to China. This asymmetric trade fosters a “Patron-Client relationship” between China and Central Asia. In addition, China, through its OBOR Project, is hegemonising the geopolitics of Central Asia. One noteworthy aspect that needs attention is the growing apprehension about China’s strategic move in Central Asia. It may be recalled here that the mutual suspicion between China and Central Asia is rooted in the annals of history. Need for reform of SCO Though the emergence of SCO as a regional bloc is giving a new dimension to the geopolitics of Eurasia, there is a need to reform this regional body to be more effective and relevant. The membership of Pakistan (a patron of international terrorism) in SCO is a major cause of concern. So also, China’s support to Pakistan raises many questions regarding Beijing’s true intention to fight against terrorism. Along with these concerns, there is a need to change the name of this organisation from Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to Eurasian Cooperation Organisation. This is because this regional organisation is no more confined to addressing the border disputes among China, three Central Asian countries- Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and, Kazakhstan and Russia. Not only the membership of this grouping has broadened in recent years, but SCO as a regional body is delving into new areas of cooperation like food security, climate change, greater economic cooperation etc. India as a rising power in Central Asia  Being a major global power and a leading voice of the Global South how India looks at the strategic developments of Central Asia. In this context, three major structural factors determine India’s relations with Central Asia. These are: a) age-old historical ties rooted in a common geo-culture space b) present complex geopolitical realities c) the need to strengthen and institutionalise India and Central Asia cooperation. All these elements provide the necessary impetus to strengthen India and Central Asia’s bilateral relations. India has been emphasising a stronger geo-cultural relationship with Central Asia. This provides the foundation for building a strong relationship between India and Central Asia. The formation of the India-Central Summit at an institutional level is a major milestone in strengthening India-Central Asia relations. The Central Asian countries are looking towards India to enhance cooperation in the field of trade as well as in the domain of technology, particularly in the field of information technology. Similarly, in the energy sector and the development of hydroelectricity, the Central Asian countries are also seeking India’s assistance. At the same time to end their geopolitical isolation, these countries of Central Asia are keen to join India’s Chabahar Port located in Iran. It is a well-known fact that India’s initiative to boost connectivity with Central Asia through Chabahar can undoubtedly be considered a game-changing approach. This port provides an opportunity for Central Asian countries to access the Indian Ocean with minimal hindrances. However, the emergence of the Taliban in the power structure of Afghanistan is undoubtedly hindering the Central Asian countries’ accessibility to the Chahbahar port. But things will be normalised as India started exporting food grains to Afghanistan as per UN mandate using Chabahar Port. So also, the International North-South Transport Corridor promoted by India along with Iran and Russia is providing an opportunity for the Central Asian countries to boost their trade. Similarly, there is a move to link India with Central Asian countries through the Turkmenbashi Port located in Turkmenistan. Over the years, India’s assistance to the Central Asian countries varies from aid in the health sector, capacity building, harnessing human potential, capacity building projects, etc. As India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, in his address at the 3rd India-Central Dialogue in December 2021, stated, “Our ties must now focus on 4Cs – Commerce, Capacity enhancement, Connectivity and Connectivity and Contacts.” The Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-Central Asia Summit held in January 2022 highlighted the multi-faceted nature of Inda-Central Asia relations. In this context, it can be underlined here that the Summit highlighted the need for cooperation in the field of “ medicine, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, education, technology, business process outsourcing (BPO), infrastructure, agriculture and processing of agricultural products, energy, space industry, textiles, leather and footwear industry, gems & jewellery, etc.”. One moot question the Delhi Declaration emphasised was cooperation in the Solar Energy and hydrogen field. In this regard, it can be stated that India can provide substantial technical and financial assistance to Central Asian countries in harnessing solar energy and hydrogen. This can undoubtedly help Central Asian countries in ensuring a smooth renewable energy transition. Emphasising the significance of Central Asia in India’s foreign policy calculous Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi, in the above-mentioned India-Central Asia Summit, highlighted three cardinal points, namely: “Central Asia is central to India’s vision of an integrated and stable extended neighbourhood. The second objective is to give an effective structure to our cooperation. This will establish a framework of regular interactions at different levels and among various stakeholders. And, the third objective is to create an ambitious roadmap for our cooperation”. The above speech of Prime Minister Modi aptly projects a cooperative geopolitical relationship between India and Central Asia. In this regard, three major geopolitical factors put India as the leading player in the moving geopolitics of Central Asia. These are: a) Central Asia as a coherent “ geopolitical Pivot” is looking towards India for sustainable cooperation to ensure stable peace in the context of tumultuous geopolitical crisis in the region. 2) Though Russia and China are preponderant external actors in Central Asia at present, the countries of Central Asia look more towards India for cooperation in the field of technology, food and agriculture and sustainable development. C) Kazakhstan, a leading Central Asian power, is, of late, more interested in joining the maritime trade through Indo-Pacific and needs India’s cooperation. In light of strategic developments, India is emerging as a key strategic actor in Central Asia. Conclusion Because of its location and as a “geopolitical pivot”, Central Asia occupies a prominent position in the geopolitics of Eurasia. Because of its location, any geopolitical developments, whether in the form of the Russia-Ukraine War, strategic development in the Indo-Pacific, or any form of strategic manoeuvring in Afghanistan, are bound to impact Central Asia. In this context, the notion of “Centrality” in the context of the geopolitics of Eurasia, as articulated by Ander Gunder Frank in his seminal article “Centrality of Central Asia”, remains relevant in the complex Eurasian geopolitics. At the same time, India is emerging as a major geopolitical actor in Central Asian geopolitics. The author teaches at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal. Read all the Latest News, Trending News, Cricket News, Bollywood News, India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.