India@75: History tells us India’s journey must dehyphenate from China too

In its 75 years of existence as an independent nation, India’s journey has often been hyphenated with its western neighbour, Pakistan. Due to ties of history, cultural affiliation and incessant political rivalry, and many wars, this linkage found expression in different ways — sometimes via bonhomie but at other times, through hostility and acrimony. For years, Pakistan’s presence — and its state support to terrorism — ensured few failed to miss that India was in a rough neighbourhood but many didn’t notice the other neighbour with whom India shared an equally cantankerous and complex relationship, but held a more ominous portent — China.

India’s history with Pakistan lay so deeply ingrained in the partition of 1947 that it took many years for Indians to look outside of it. Though cultural links between the two countries are inseparable, India’s economic liberalisation in the 1990s and the inclusion of China in the global ecosystem began a journey of political decoupling and strategic de-hyphenation, which stands more demarcated a few decades on. With a burgeoning Indian economy, a new hyphenation began to blossom. India-China.

In these 75 years, India and China have continued to coexist — through competition and conflict. It is predictable to point out wars and diplomatic exchanges as turning points in their strategic relationship. The one ill-fated event of history that dominates collective recall is the 1962 border conflict between India and China. However, it would be interesting to pick out those turning points that have usually been papered over or forgotten entirely. I have picked four such moments — and all of them point to mind games: one of the two sides either failed to read the situation or the other seized the moment. The history in these incidents also point to China’s seven-decade desire to psychologically dominate and contain India.

Flawed Beginnings and Failure to Recognise Tibet

The journeys began around the same time: India became independent in 1947 while a new China took shape in 1949. Though the two countries have had paths running alongside each other, their ambitions and experiences couldn’t have been more different. Mao Zedong and his government viewed India with suspicion; an heir of the imperial empire who was now a rival in the American camp that was bent on supporting Tibetan rebels fighting the Chinese government. On the other hand, India’s view on China was divided between Nehru’s views about accepting China’s suzerainty over Tibet and Sardar Patel’s views on condemning Chinese expansionism.

Nehru’s desire to become the leader of the new, emerging world of young nations resulted in the overruling of Patel’s damning view on Chinese intent. The first independent government of India believed that Tibet would be a buffer between India and China – much like a continuation of the policy of the British government in India before independence. But China claimed Tibet as an inalienable part of its past Manchu empire. In fact, Tibet had driven away Chinese forces and become free in 1912. It remained free until 1950, when the Chinese invaded Tibet. It is shocking though that Tibet remained a land without identity for three and half decades. For 38 years, Tibet wasn’t recognised as an independent nation. India too, after independence never considered recognising Tibet. Therefore, the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 went unchallenged at the UN.

By the time Nehru and the Indian government had realised their folly in the 1950s, the Chinese forces had not only occupied Tibet, they had begun to build roads in the Aksai Chin region of India. The writing was on the wall. China seized the moment and drove home the advantage by inflicting defeat on an unprepared, under-resourced, ill-equipped India in the 1962 conflict.

Sagat’s stand at Nathu La in 1965

The border conflict of 1962 had inflicted deep psychological scars on the psyche of Indian leadership. Therefore, when the India-Pakistan war broke out on the western front in 1965, China was planning to ensure a continuation of the psychological dominance over India and thus mounted pressure on India to withdraw its troops from Nathu La and Jelep La — border outposts on the watershed border.

Before the India-Pakistan war began, division commanders were summoned at 33 Corps headquarters in Siliguri, where it was agreed that if there was a buildup at the border and Chinese pressure, Indian forces would withdraw to about nine miles from the border and instead of a thin forward line, obtain a stronger depth to take on advancing Chinese troops. As the Chinese mounted pressure, troops at Jelep La (under 27 Mountain Division) were withdrawn. However, Maj Gen Sagat Singh, who commanded the 17 Mountain Division decided otherwise. He chose to defy both the Chinese and his senior leadership to continue occupation of Nathu La post (under 17 Mountain Division). Vacating Nathu La would have given China the advantage of occupying a dominant height and thus roll down to Gangtok. This tactical decision, singular and critical, resulted in protecting the Siliguri corridor during the 1971 war.

In the event of China occupying Sikkim, they could have broken through the Siliguri corridor – also known as the chicken’s neck because of its shape - and linked up with Pakistani troops in East Pakistan, thus severing India’s northeast from its mainland. It may have also derailed India’s war campaign in the east in 1971. Sagat Singh’s decision to dig in and hold ground in 1965 was an underrated but key tactical contribution in the strategic outcome in the 1971 war. More importantly, Sagat’s stand was the beginning of overturning the Chinese psychological stranglehold on India.

Sundarji’s Sumdorong Chu Send-off to PLA

Twenty years after the border battles in Sikkim, an incident brought back the rivalry of the bete noires. The Chinese edginess about India remained unchanged, despite Deng Xiaoping’s departure from Mao’s policies and a strong economic growth. In June 1986, when an Indian intelligence detachment returned to occupy its forward post they found the post in the Sumdorong Chu area, south of the Thag La-Bum La ridge and in Indian territory, occupied by forty Chinese soldiers who were erecting defence structures.

The Indian Army chief, General Sundarji, surprised the Chinese by mobilising a brigade, and Indian forces took up positions on the Hathung La ridge, across the Namka Chu river. Sundarji then chose vantage points to dominate: a helipad on a hilltop overlooked the Sumdorung Chu valley, heavy guns were brought in and emplaced, and long-range patrols dominated the area, unnerving the Chinese. The Chinese responded by mobilising forces and soon, the two sides were close to a conflict again. The difference was that while in 1962 the Chinese had held the first-mover advantage, in 1986-87 it was the Indians who had the upper hand by moving their troops quicker. General Sundarji had managed to put the Chinese on the defensive and led to the sacking of its Tibet military region chief in Chengdu.

The Sumdorong Chu pushback forced the Chinese to invite India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988 to defuse tensions. The initial strategy of softening the enemy’s stance through a limited military action helped pave the way for a political rapprochement.

Doklam and the Chinese strategy of pinning India across several points

After Xi Jinping became the premier in 2013, the number of standoffs between India and China increased. Xi’s ambitions of claiming Mao’s legacy overtook China’s plans of power expansion. In 2017, Indian and Chinese troops entered into a standoff in a territory that didn’t belong to either of the two countries. The Doklam plateau — where the standoff happened — is a trijunction in the Bhutanese territory. China’s objective was two-fold: one, occupy Doklam plateau and access Jampheri ridge that would help them dominate the Siliguri corridor — the narrow chicken’s neck in India’s north Bengal that is a lifeline to the northeast. India’s resolute military action resulted in a prolonged standoff and stopped the Chinese. After the ascent of Xi Jinping, this was the first time his juggernaut had faced a disruption. It was hailed as a psychological and diplomatic victory for India, but has been forgotten in the hullabaloo of the present — which includes the Ladakh standoff, the skirmish of 2020, the endless rounds of talks between the two sides and the diplomatic duels.

After Doklam, the PLA tried to open up several friction points along the border. On the Himalayan front, China has constructed 624 militarised border villages, and plans to construct additional military infrastructure. In the neighbourhood, China has been attempting to steer India’s neighbours into the conflict. Incidents in Ladakh and Naku La coincided with Nepal ratcheting up the Lipu Lekh dispute. Recently, China approached Bhutan about a barter deal with an eye on the Doklam plateau and lay claim on the Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in eastern Bhutan to possibly open up a friction point close to India’s Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, which China believes is disputed territory. In Sri Lanka, China recently lost its stranglehold after the dismantling of Rajapaksa, but has been attempting to dock its controversial Chinese ballistic missile and satellite tracking ship, ‘Yuan Wang 5’ in Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

In the last 75 years, India and China have travelled alongside each other and yet are grappling with the same problems of border disputes. Analysts believe that not having a demarcated border has been the crux of the problem. However, I believe the reason lies elsewhere.

What is the reason? What can India do?

In the 1960s, India aspired to be a leader amongst the developing world. China was intent on keeping India pinned in the subcontinent. Many years later, along various strife, wars, standoffs, China has continued with its objective of ensuring that India’s ambitions do not travel to the Indian Ocean region or to the South China Sea.

In Xi’s plans to build a China-centred international ecosystem, it helps to keep out its most visible rival — in a way it also cuts to size the role of Quad and the US in the region, if India is kept busy in the Himalayas. India is the only country in the Quad that has had an entire school of conflicts with China – wars, skirmishes, battles, standoffs, tussles for supremacy in the South Asia neighbourhood and yet there has long been a hesitation when it comes to playing a pivot for the Quad in the Indo-Pacific.

For long, India has kept itself restricted to the border issues and the subcontinent. However, India has begun to cautiously tread on controversial issues — which would mean leveraging its weight in international affairs. In recent times, India has begun to step up, though cautiously, given the repercussions of the Ukraine war on the Indo-Pacific.

On the issue of China’s adventurist military exercises around Taiwan after Nancy Pelosi’s visit, India cautioned China on avoiding unilateral actions that alter the status quo in the region. Sana Hashmi, a Taiwan-based analyst, writes: “Since 2010, India has stopped mentioning the One China policy and has urged China to uphold the One India policy”. India has voiced its discomfort to Sri Lanka on Chinese actions in Hambantota. In Maldives, India has outmanoeuvred China in recent times. However, much more is to be done.

In its 75th independent year, as India increasingly asserts itself and redefines its external role in the larger continent, the world beckons. The Indian Ocean — the only ocean named after a country and also one where China’s Achilles’ heel exists — beckons. It has taken decades to de-hyphenate from Pakistan; it would be in India’s interests to de-hyphenate China from a Himalayan focus and establish a more influential role in the region and the continent.

The writer is the author of ‘Watershed 1967: India’s Forgotten Victory over China’, writes on military history, strategic issues, international affairs and policy-business challenges. Views expressed are personal. Tweets @iProbal

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