How China’s expanding nuclear arsenal may fuel arms race in Indo-Pacific 

During China’s September 03, 2025 parade to celebrate the 80th anniversary of its victory against Japan, it showcased the considerably expanding and modernising nuclear arsenal. For the past five years, China has been engaging in its largest nuclear build-up ever, more than doubling the size of its arsenal from about 300 weapons in 2020 to an estimated 600 nuclear weapons in 2025.

The Victory Day parade was the first time China had publicly acknowledged and displayed a full nuclear triad. The country is estimated to possess approximately 600 nuclear warheads, with more in production, to arm land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers.

The country is constructing 320 new silos for its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including the liquid-fuelled DF-5B equipped with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology.

Additionally, China is refitting its Type 094 ballistic missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The country’s fissile material production is also increasing with the completion of its first civilian “demonstration” reprocessing plant of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) at Gansu Nuclear Technology Industrial Park, giving it the ability to produce more nuclear warheads in the future.

China now has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal among the nine nuclear-armed states and is the only party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is significantly increasing its nuclear arsenal.

China’s nuclear doctrine and its “no-first-use” policy have remained relatively consistent since its first nuclear test in 1964. China’s nuclear expansion has triggered speculation about its nuclear intentions, with some US officials suggesting that China seeks to match or surpass the US nuclear arsenal. The Pentagon has projected that China’s nuclear arsenal could surpass 1,000 warheads by 2030 and field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by 2035. China calls these “sensationalised” or “exaggerated” claims.

The country has not conducted nuclear tests since 1996, but recent construction at the Lop Nur test site has raised concerns about its intentions. The US has expressed concerns about China’s adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Chinese warheads are not thought to be operationally deployed on missiles or placed at bomber bases like the US and Russia; nearly all Chinese warheads are believed to be stored separately from launchers. Yet China’s growing nuclear programme has significant implications for global security and the balance of power.

Fissile Materials Production

China’s nuclear stockpile growth depends directly upon its inventories of plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and tritium. The International Panel on Fissile Materials assessed in 2023 that China had a stockpile of approximately 14 tonnes of HEU and approximately 2.9 tonnes of separated plutonium. Such inventories could support an increase to approximately 1,000 warheads by 2030. China stopped producing weapon-grade plutonium a few decades ago, but it is believed China sources significant plutonium from civilian reactors.

Russia’s state-controlled nuclear energy company, Rosatom, delivered initial fuel for China’s CFR-600, a sodium-cooled pool-type fast-neutron reactor under construction in Xiapu County, Fujian province. The second reactor is scheduled to come online by 2026; construction of a third plant is expected to be completed in the early 2030s. If the fast-breeder reactors operate as planned, they could potentially produce large amounts of plutonium, including weapon-grade material.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon assesses China is expanding and diversifying its capability to produce tritium at two large new centrifuge enrichment plants at Emeishan and Lanzhou. China’s production and reprocessing of fissile materials are thus largely consistent with its nuclear power and weapons plans. Currently very secretive, China may become more transparent about its nuclear forces if it more readily participates in arms control consultations.

Nuclear Testing

China’s nuclear stockpile also depends on the size and design of its warheads. China’s testing programme in the 1990s enabled development of the warheads currently arming the DF-31-class ICBMs. The same warhead design may also have been used to equip the liquid-fuelled DF-5B ICBM with MIRV technology. The large DF-41 and the JL-3 missiles could also use the same smaller warhead. China reportedly also seeks a lower-yield warhead for the DF-26.

Developing significantly different warhead designs would perhaps require additional nuclear test explosions. To avoid physical tests, China could use advanced computer simulations or very low-yield underground explosive tests. Open-source satellite imagery shows significant construction at the Lop Nur site with nearly a dozen concrete buildings and underground facilities. Should China conduct even a low-yield nuclear test, it would violate the CTBT, which it has signed but not ratified.

Land-based Ballistic Missile Launchers and Brigades

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) currently operates approximately 712 launchers for land-based missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads. Of those launchers, about 462 can be loaded with ICBMs capable of targeting around the globe. Many of China’s ballistic missile launchers are for short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles intended for regional, non-nuclear strike missions. China is estimated to have roughly 100 nuclear warheads assigned to regional missiles; many of these could be for targets in India and Japan.

The PLARF controls nine dedicated bases, including six for missile operations distributed across China. Each missile operating base controls six to eight missile brigades, totalling around 45 brigades. The number of launchers and missiles assigned to each brigade depends on the missile type. Nearly 30 of those brigades are meant to operate ballistic missile launchers with nuclear capability.

The 320 new silos for solid-fuel missiles and the construction of 30 new silos for liquid-fuel missiles in three mountainous areas of central-eastern China are significant developments. The silos are positioned roughly three kilometres apart and are deeper inside China than any other known ICBM base, beyond the reach of the United States’ conventional and nuclear cruise missiles. It is estimated that around 10 silos in each missile field may have been loaded.

Among the new silo fields, the Yumen field in Gansu province covers approximately 1,110 square kilometres and has 120 individual silos. The Hami field in Eastern Xinjiang spans about 1,028 square kilometres and has 110 missile silos. The Yulin field near Hanggin Banner measures 832 square kilometres and has 90 missile silos. The 350 new Chinese silos under construction exceed the number of silo-based ICBMs operated by Russia and constitute about three-quarters the size of the entire US ICBM force. Each field has secure storage and significant air defences. Satellite imagery analysis shows the three fields may still be some years away from full operational capability.

China’s ICBM Force Developments

China has around 400 ICBMs in its inventory, indicating continued missile production for the new launchers. The DF-31 solid-fuel road-mobile ICBM has a range of 7,200 kilometres; range and manoeuvrability were extended in subsequent variants. The silos may be loaded with DF-31-class ICBMs or a mix of DF-31As (11,200 kilometres) and DF-41s (15,000 kilometres). The new DF-31AG eight-axle launcher is thought to carry the same missile as the DF-31A launcher but has improved off-road capabilities. The DF-41 could carry up to three MIRVs. Presently, each of China’s ICBM brigades is responsible for six to 12 launchers.

The DF-5A and the MIRVed DF-5B are already deployed; the DF-5B can carry up to five MIRVs. A third variant with a “multi-megaton yield” warhead, the DF-5C, is currently being fielded. In February 2023 China conducted a developmental flight test of a multirole hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) for the DF-27. An operational FOB/HGV system would pose challenges for missile tracking and missile-defence systems, as it could theoretically release a manoeuvrable payload with little detection time.

Medium- and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

The dual-capable DF-26 MRBM and IRBM launchers increased from 18 to 250, with about 500 missiles in 2024. With an approximate 4,000-kilometre range, the DF-26 can target Japan, South Korea, important US bases in Guam, as well as large parts of Russia and all of India. It seems unlikely that all DF-26s are assigned a nuclear mission; the DF-26’s anti-ship version is non-nuclear. Among other DF-26 versions, only a few may be used for a nuclear mission. The DF-26’s capability of rapidly swapping warheads, even after the missile has been loaded, creates command-and-control risks and potential for misunderstandings in a crisis.

China is one of several countries (including India and Pakistan) that mix nuclear and conventional capabilities on MRBMs and IRBMs. The DF-17 is a Chinese road-mobile MRBM designed to carry the DF-ZF HGV; it’s a key part of China’s hypersonic weapon arsenal and is considered a significant technological advancement.

Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

China currently fields a submarine force of six Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), based at the Yalong naval base on Hainan Island. The new Type-094A variants are meant to be less noisy and equipped with 12 launch tubes each. The JL-2 SLBM has a range of about 7,200 kilometres, sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Russia, and India from waters near China. The longer-range JL-3 SLBMs have a range of about 10,000 kilometres and can target the continental United States if sailed deep into the Pacific; the JL-3 reportedly can deliver multiple warheads per missile.

The new Type 096 was scheduled to begin construction in the early 2020s but has experienced delays. These submarines would be larger, heavier, and quieter and would represent a significant technological leap; some speculate the Type 096 will carry 24 missiles. The service life of these types is expected to be 30–40 years, and they would operate together. China may settle for a fleet of eight to 10 SSBNs.

China reportedly began near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six SSBNs in 2021, implying that at least one boat is deployed intermittently. A “deterrence patrol” implies the submarine at sea has nuclear weapons on board. Giving custody of nuclear warheads to deployed submarines during peacetime would constitute a significant departure for China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), which has traditionally been reluctant to hand out nuclear warheads to the services. China is presumably improving its command-and-control system to ensure reliable communication with SSBNs and to prevent crews from launching without authorisation. Western allies are trying to constantly track Chinese submarines.

Bombers

China developed several aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs and test-dropped at least 12 that detonated between 1965 and 1979. Later, however, the PLAAF nuclear mission became dormant as the rocket force improved. In 2017–18 China reportedly reassigned ballistic missile missions to the H-6N “Badger” bomber. The H-6N can carry six air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) and has an in-flight refuelling probe, increasing range. Initially expected for conventional strike, by late 2024 there were indications that the CH-AS-X-13 nuclear ALBM had been deployed. Thus China re-established a viable nuclear triad.

Currently, only one PLAAF unit reportedly has a nuclear mission. Large tunnel entrances have been built into a nearby mountain wide enough to accommodate the H-6N bomber at an airbase in Henan province. Around 20 H-6N bombers have the nuclear role. China is developing a stealth H-20 bomber with longer range (20,000 km), aerial refuelling, and improved capabilities; some Chinese cruise missiles might have nuclear capability and may equip the H-20.

Are Chinese Nuclear Numbers Really Catching Up With the United States?

While the West continues to speculate about Chinese warhead numbers, the Chinese government keeps ambiguity by neither denying nor accepting the expansion. US officials argue China has moved away from its longstanding “minimum deterrence” posture and seeks quantitative and qualitative parity with the United States. China may want to be a nuclear “peer” or “near peer” in the future, but that seems far-fetched: even 1,500 warheads by 2035 would be less than half of the current US nuclear stockpile.

Chinese Nuclear Doctrine and Policy

China remains committed to “no first use” of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states unconditionally. China’s nuclear strategy is defensive: deterring others from using or threatening nuclear weapons against it. It aims to keep capabilities at the minimum level required for national security and a “strategic counterbalance”, though the definition of “minimum” is not explicit.

The current extraordinary expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal includes building nuclear counterattack capability and conventional strike capability. China is practising “nuclear attack survival exercises” to ensure troops could still launch counterattacks if China were attacked. It is also improving early-warning systems and stealth capabilities. China’s strategy may now include consideration of a nuclear response to non-nuclear attacks that threaten the viability of its nuclear forces or command-and-control. Officially, China states it will not attack unless attacked, but it will counterattack if attacked.

Nuclear Forces Readiness

The PLA keeps most of its warheads at regional storage facilities or its central hardened storage facility in the Qinling mountain range. Some units are on heightened readiness; PLARF brigades conduct “combat readiness duty” drills. Corruption within the PLA has eroded confidence in some capabilities; poorly constructed silos tied to corrupt officials have since been repaired. Lack of trust in top defence officials might deter President Xi Jinping from ordering missiles to be armed with warheads in peacetime.

Any nuclear attack is likely to follow increased tension and possibly conventional warfare, giving time to mate warheads to missiles. With launchers secured and dispersed, including in tunnels, it is likely some missiles would remain intact for a retaliatory strike. The Central Military Commission (CMC) will decide nuclear alert status.

The many new silos for quick-launch solid-fuel missiles and road-mobile ICBMs, and the development of a space-based early-warning system, indicate China’s intent to move to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, or “early warning counterstrike”, allowing China to launch missiles before they would be destroyed. China plans to have at least three early-warning satellites in orbit. PLARF is already practising “launch-on-warning” scenarios. Both the United States and Russia operate large numbers of solid-fuel silo-based missiles and early-warning systems to enable launch-before-destruction postures.

Conclusion

China is fielding an indigenous HQ-19 anti-ballistic missile system and developing an “ultra-long-range” missile-defence system as well as hit-to-kill mid-course technology that could engage IRBMs and possibly ICBMs. China maintains several ground-based large phased-array radars that contribute to its nascent early-warning capabilities. The modernisation of nuclear forces could gradually offer the Chinese leadership more efficient ways of deploying, responding, and coercing with nuclear or dual-capable forces.

Could China leverage nuclear weapons in a “counter-intervention” strategy that aims to limit US presence in the East and South China Seas and achieve reunification with Taiwan? Yet it is clear China’s no-first-use policy probably has a high threshold. Beijing might consider nuclear first use if a conventional defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened the Chinese Communist Party regime’s survival.

China’s increased nuclear readiness and strike capability will force improvements in the Russian, Indian, and US arsenals. India currently has nearly 180 nuclear warheads; some analysts believe this should rise to 400. India needs a robust command-and-control system and credible second-strike capability. Most importantly, India must have a credible conventional capability, as nuclear wars are unlikely.

(The writer is former Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)