When a neighbour implodes: Mapping the Hasina verdict in India’s calculus

The conviction of former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, delivered in absentia by the International Crimes Tribunal—a domestic tribunal—and culminating in a death sentence, has thrust South Asia into one of its most sensitive political flashpoints in decades. For Dhaka, the verdict is not merely a legal pronouncement; it marks the dramatic unravelling of a political dynasty that has influenced Bangladesh since its birth.

Hasina is not only a four-term prime minister but also the daughter of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the architect of Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation and a figure whose struggle was intimately intertwined with India’s own regional and humanitarian commitments during the war. Her family’s historic relationship with India—forged in exile, sanctuary, and shared sacrifice—has long underpinned the unusually close strategic, security, and developmental partnership between New Delhi and Dhaka.

It is against this heavy historical backdrop that Bangladesh has now formally asked India to extradite Hasina following the tribunal’s ruling, which centres on the security forces’ lethal crackdown on the mass student protests of July–August 2024. The decision has sharpened political rhetoric within Bangladesh and triggered a flurry of urgent, discreet consultations in New Delhi.

For India, the request presents not just a legal quandary but a profound diplomatic dilemma: should New Delhi comply with an extradition demand involving a leader whose political lineage is inseparable from the very foundations of India–Bangladesh friendship? Or should it refuse, thereby risking a serious rupture with an increasingly fragile neighbour at a moment when both countries critically depend on stable cooperation in trade, energy, connectivity, and border management?

The Verdict and Its Regional Stakes

The tribunal’s decision on November 17, 2025, found Sheikh Hasina guilty on multiple counts related to the deadly suppression of student-led demonstrations in 2024; the court handed down capital sentences to Hasina and several senior officials in absentia. The convictions are the culmination of a year-long, fraught process—often accused of being politically motivated—that began after mass protests, which toppled the government, and Hasina fled to India in August 2024.

The verdict has been hailed in Dhaka as a ‘milestone of accountability’; critics—inside Bangladesh and abroad—have warned that trials in absentia and the speed of political retribution risk exacerbating national polarisation and eroding due process.

For New Delhi, the calculus is complicated by three overlapping realities. First, India and Bangladesh share an extradition treaty framework and long-standing legal contacts; Dhaka is therefore asserting a formal right to demand Hasina’s return. Second, Hasina has been resident on Indian soil since fleeing in 2024, making any decision non-hypothetical. Third, bilateral relations have already been strained since the overthrow of Hasina’s government, and Bangladesh continues to await an elected goverment.

New Delhi’s earlier comments on the conduct of Bangladesh’s interim administration and its push for inclusive elections were publicly rebuked in Dhaka, leaving a residue of mistrust. Together, these facts turn what might otherwise be a standard treaty case into a geopolitical test of India’s neighbour policy.

Legal Tools, Political Choices

On paper, India’s response could be framed within standard extradition law: an extradition treaty typically lists extraditable offences, prescribes procedures, and allows state discretion where the requested person faces the death penalty or risks of unfair trial or where the offence is political in character. In practice, however, the legal rubric is inseparable from political judgement. New Delhi can lawfully refuse extradition on grounds such as potential for political persecution or if mandatory safeguards—a fair hearing, appeals and non-application of the death penalty—are absent.

Several analysts point out that extradition is as much a diplomatic judgement as a legal one: accepting Dhaka’s demand would amount to active collaboration with a government that, even in pro-government narratives, is confronting sharp internal division; refusing it would be portrayed in Dhaka as sheltering an accused human-rights violator.

Beyond legal technicalities, New Delhi must weigh immediate national interests: supply chains (including electricity agreements and cross-border energy projects), porous border management, counterterrorism cooperation, and the stability of a strategically located neighbour.

Prior transactions, including energy imports and rail/port linkages, underscore that both economies are interdependent even as political trust frays. A precipitous rupture would not only disrupt commerce but also hand greater diplomatic space to other external actors eager to expand influence in Dhaka. Conversely, acceding without careful safeguards could damage India’s international standing on rule-of-law and human-rights grounds.

Risks of Escalation and Regional Spillovers

Domestic reaction in Bangladesh to the tribunal’s verdict has already been volatile: episodes of arson, explosions and clashes have been reported around Dhaka; the security establishment is on high alert. The prospect of large-scale unrest or retaliatory violence is real, and if unrest deepens, it will produce refugee flows, cross-border criminality and pressure on Indian border states.

There is also an electoral calendar to consider: Bangladesh’s interim administration has set national elections for the first half of April 2026. The verdict—and any ensuing diplomatic standoff—could reshape the pre-electoral environment, harden partisan narratives and influence who stands where in the campaign season. For India, the worst-case scenario is sustained instability that preempts orderly elections and creates a governance vacuum in which non-state actors and third-country rivals can entrench themselves.

India’s Strategic Choices

India’s policy toolkit in this particular case is narrow but not empty. A strictly legalistic refusal to extradite, supported by a carefully worded public statement emphasising legal safeguards and the extraordinary risks of capital punishment in trials held in absentia, would be defensible — but it should be paired with robust, visible diplomacy aimed at preventing escalation.

New Delhi can offer to host a mediated dialogue under neutral auspices, propose an independent review panel of legal experts, or encourage multilateral observation of any retrial in Dhaka that meets international fair-trial standards. Such moves would signal that India is not shielding individuals from accountability while also dissuading Dhaka from taking unilateral punitive steps that spill across borders.

A second pragmatic track is compartmentalisation: explicitly agreeing to preserve cooperation on immediate, mutual concerns (energy supply stability, border management, counter-terror cooperation, and trade facilitation) while suspending certain high-politics interactions pending legal and political de-escalation. This would protect the day-to-day functional ties that matter to millions on both sides, even if diplomatic warmth cools. It is, however, politically costly because it formalises a downgrade in bilateral trust—a price New Delhi must consider against the cost of doing nothing.

Norms, Leverage and Credibility

India’s longer-term response will hinge on whether it chooses to prioritise principled restraint or transactional gains. A principled posture grounded in human-rights consistency and legal norms would protect India’s international credibility, especially among middle-power democracies that watch South Asia closely. Yet such a posture must come with active diplomacy to avert immediate fallout. A transactional posture, one that treats the case as a bargaining chip to extract concessions on infrastructure, investment, or border cooperation, risks short-term gains at the expense of long-term trust and the moral high ground New Delhi claims in many forums.

There is no perfect choice. The smart policy is to blend principle with prudence: be transparent about legal constraints; offer conditional engagement on legal review and safeguards; and simultaneously mobilise regional and international interlocutors to lower temperatures. India’s objective must be to ensure that legal accountability, if pursued, follows procedures that preclude violent backlash and that any international criticism of Bangladesh’s process is channelled constructively rather than punitively.

Conclusion

The Hasina conviction and Dhaka’s demand place India in an unenviable position where law, politics and geopolitics collide. New Delhi’s response will reveal not only its posture towards a turbulent neighbour but also how it balances legal obligations with geopolitical prudence. The imperative is clear: avoid transactional reflexes, use legal mechanisms with care, and prioritise stabilising diplomacy. In a region where proximity is destiny, the best strategy is to be a steady, predictable partner—one that defends the rule of law while preventing a convulsion next door from becoming a wider regional crisis. The coming weeks will test New Delhi’s capacity to do precisely that.

(Amal Chandra is an author, political analyst, and columnist. He tweets @ens_socialis. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)