Geopolitical ballgame: US-China rivalry, India’s response and global quest for balance

As enduring rivalries bequeaths systemic instability, such volatile tendencies turn regions into competitive hotbeds of strategic competition. The US-China meltdown shows no signs of abetting, albeit diplomatic overtures, and continues to feed optimism about signs of possible rapprochement. Tensions simmering from economic decoupling, maritime contestations and varied interpretations of world order have trapped these states into cycles of mistrust and suspicion. As systemic rivalries roll on, the regional sphere has received its brunt in Beijing’s neighbourhood. Beijing has a volatile neighbourhood, with maritime tensions in East Asia, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the case of Taiwan’s future. Global systemic rivalry manifests in more assertive policies and manning regional spheres. As Beijing’s power saturates, it also is slowly erasing the prospects of Beijing’s dream to bestow its values upon the current international order. To avert such an outcome, Beijing will push to maintain and secure existing power balances that define the regional power configuration in its favour. Beijing’s drive for alternatives in world order showcases failed US attempts to integrate China into the liberal international order. A revisionist rising power will resist the unflinching desire of the global hegemon to impose standards of values and military balances that dovetail with its strategic objective to maintain disproportionate levels of power. Washington would also be unwilling to roll back and share the power, prestige and status that a revisionist China feels it rightly deserves. Consequentially, such an approach forces Beijing to jostle to sustain and maintain its resistance against the current liberal order. Carving out a niche defence perimetre that roughly resonates with the idea of a sphere of influence to protect its political and strategic interest is a manifestation of such reverence for alternatives. However, Beijing’s efforts rarely reverberate with other members of the international community. Political push-backs and issue-specific alignments are common means to challenge Beijing’s cast on world politics. In the recently concluded BRICS Summit, President Xi Jinping resisted the efforts of Indo-Pacific states by criticizing the formation of “small circles” and “exclusive blocs”. Apprehensions exist about China-Russia bonhomie and their mutual membership in BRICS that may herald a post-liberal world order. Although BRICS states cashed in to dish out Western sanctions that threatened economies of the Global South in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, the hue and cry for germination of an alternative post-Cold War order is a mere speculative and far-fetched idea. Western structural dependencies are so inextricably linked that smaller states entangled in institutional and governance frameworks would find it difficult to divert their preferred trade links. More so, other member states like India and Brazil were doubtful and resisted buying the Chinese offers. Making amends to the Chinese “anti-Western” proposition, these states vouched for “non-Western” approach that better serve as a repertoire to address issues concerning the Global South. Further capitalising on assuming leadership for the Global South, New Delhi desires to use the “framework” of G20 to “mainstreaming the marginalised aspirations of developing countries”. President Xi absence at the recently concluded G20 Summit lowers the barriers for contending leadership claims to voice Global South concerns. And this was more apparent with Modi extending G20 membership to the African Union. Dispelling Chinese revisionism from institutional governance models also translated into regional pushbacks. Regions have been the experimental field for Beijing to introduce prototypes featuring alternative modes of governance that decry conditionalities and privileges extending monetary assistance to curry favour for political leverage. India and US were critical in their strategic pushback against Beijing in South Asia. To maintain the vitality of its economic growth and project power in IOR, Beijing made substantial economic handouts to South Asian states to influence their political choices to serve Beijing’s defence needs. Basing facilities, dual-use infrastructural modules and selling arms to key South Asia countries are the ways in which Beijing maintained the plausibility to secure a defence arc that could curtail India’s hegemony and challenge the balance of power in the region. Akin to Beijing’s tactics, both New Delhi and Washington made inroads in South Asia to engage smaller states in their strategic template. Nepal’s MCC and Dhaka’s recent tilt towards Washington paved the way for a much more sustainable and long-term relationship. Colombo’s subdued economic growth and Beijing’s reluctance to offer financial help propelled Washington via IMF to intervene by deploying monetary assistance. While Kabul and Islamabad featured less on Washington’s strategic vision, the long-term goal to wean off small state’s dependencies away from Beijing impelled US to engineer non-traditional security options to foster interactions and manage collaborations. Recently, Chinese assertiveness, besides South Asia has been on exponential rise in the South China Sea. More so, when it continues to launch “ cartographic aggression ” by proclaiming territorial dispute over Arunachal Pradesh and 9 dash line claims in the South China Sea as part of its official territory. Since the early years of this decade, China’s artificial activity to lay claims to maritime features illegally has been ratcheting. To man these territorial waters, China is involved in ensuring regular patrols and enforcing sovereignty through the Chinese militia and its navy. Recently in early August, Beijing used “water canon” against a Philippines supply ship. It was also been involved in maritime skirmishes with other states over claims to EEZ in the region. China also discarded the ruling of Hague in 2016 over the arbitration issue on the Philippines’ Scarborough Shoal which Beijing occupied illegally. China’s attempt to revise and discard major institutions that govern the international order showcases its active revisionism to overthrow the extant order. However, efforts to resist and counter Beijing’s moves have also rekindled proportionately. Most states suffering from Beijing’s assertiveness preferred to exchange vows in favour of “rules-based international order”. Recently US, Australia, Japan held a military drill off the coast of the Philippines to secure countervailing support for “rule of law and peace” in the region. Further, states in the region have also signalled foreign armaments sales like India’s potential Brahmos missile sale to Vietnam to correct the imbalance of power and induce fear of denial in Chinese military planners. Countries like US and Australia with other rising powers like India and Japan are now using a concerted strategy to forfeit Beijing’s adventurism. Infrastructural aids and developmental assistance coupled with new economic governance mechanisms like IPEF aim to create alternatives and decouple small states from Beijing’s lure. Military means to frustrate China through AUKUS and a renewed focus on Indo-Pacific along with QUAD are footsteps to checkmate Beijing’s transgression that eventually exacerbates problems in the already fragile international order. China’s regional posture has become more aggressive as global US outreach against Beijing’s intentions has gained traction. Unable to match US power at the global level, Beijing is concentrating its power by localising it in its periphery. While regional order is vacillating by push and pulls of the contending great powers, the regional players have preferred to support US-led efforts to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing’s failure to shape an alternative global order through major groupings and muscle power has largely been futile. However, as the space for its activity is shrinking, the collapse of trust and regional pushback could herald geopolitical development impelling Beijing to fall back on wars as a political instrument to “shape and shove” the global balances. The author is a PhD candidate at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and is associated with the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views. Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.