China-brokered Saudi-Iran détente is much more than a diplomatic breakthrough; it challenges US-led international order

James Bond likes his martini shaken, not stirred. It isn’t known whether Xi Jinping prefers martini, but the Chinese president’s move to broker a peace deal between archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran has both stirred and shaken up the Middle East (West Asia). The ripples will be felt further still. The development projects China as a responsible major power catches the United States — the resident power broker and security guarantor in West Asia — between a rock and a hard place and puts forward Beijing’s statement of intent as a legitimate stakeholder in the region whose interests go much beyond energy and trade into the political and security domains. The details of the rapprochement between Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia and Shia-majority Iran – one of the oldest rivalries in West Asia fed by ancient sectarian conflicts, jousting for power and one that in turn has led to numerous proxy fights in the region — are still sketchy. What we do know so far is that keeping aside a seven-year diplomatic hiatus and decades of hostility, both nations have pledged to resume diplomatic relations and reopen their embassies and missions in each other’s territory within the next two months. Their foreign ministers will soon carry forward details of the détente, according to a joint statement issued in Beijing by the three nations. It is also understood that the deal may even bring to a close the civil war in Yemen — a bruising proxy conflict since 2014 where Iran and Saudi Arabia are at opposing ends — as Iran will apparently no longer back the Houthi rebels who control the northern part of the country, against the Saudi-led military coalition that supports the Yemeni government. The UN-negotiated ceasefire expired in October 2022 though a precarious peace has held. Similar conflicts in Syria and Lebanon, where Tehran and Riyadh are at loggerheads through their factions, may also see a resolution. Media reports indicate that some assurances have been made to these effects. The three parties, however, have not revealed any details. It is not known what security guarantees the Saudis have been able to secure. Iran has the weaker hand, but it won’t have relented without some form of economic sops from China. Wall Street Journal quoted Iran’s news agency to report that “before Friday’s announcement, China allowed Iran to tap parts of funds in Chinese banks—which total $20 billion—that were frozen when the US left the nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions in 2018.” While there are still questions over the fine print and sustainability of the deal — driven also perhaps by disbelief in certain sections that China has been able to pull off what the United States has been unable to — there are no questions over the fact that this is a seismic development that promises far-reaching consequences. The fact that the deal was mediated by China makes it even more interesting. Xi reportedly made his move during the state visit to the Kingdom in December last year when the idea of a formal rapprochement was floated, but the breakthrough was reached after a discreet four-day, closed-door session in Beijing last week where top officials from Tehran and Riyadh were present. Xi’s imprimatur on the deal was carefully calibrated. Beijing has timed it to perfection. Xi has just been formally ratified by China’s rubber-stamp Parliament to continue as president for five more years (and decades more to come) and has filled the CCP state council with loyalists and cronies. Now, it appears, that he is on a mission to expand China’s role as a guarantor of peace and security in one of the world’s most conflict-torn regions. It is stepping up in its role as a peer competitor of the US led by ‘helmsman’ Xi. As the development unfolds, a few observations regarding the deal, its significance and its ramifications are in order. America’s shifting priorities Washington has bristled at suggestions that China’s brokerage of the deal means Beijing is undercutting America’s security and diplomatic heft in a part of the globe that oversees the lion’s share of energy outflows. White House came out swinging against the notion, claiming that it is “far from stepping back in the Middle East”. Yet its discomfiture at the development is apparent. John Kirby, the White House spokesperson, had to acknowledge the importance of the deal — “support any effort to deescalate tensions there in the region”, asserted that the Saudis had kept Washington apprised of the talks, claimed partial credit for the détente (“it’s something that we worked on through our own effective combination of deterrence and diplomacy”), sounded sceptical on Iran, tried to play down Beijing’s role, and finally, couldn’t help but sound bitter. “We certainly continue to watch China as they try to gain influence and footholds elsewhere around the world in their own selfish interests.” Yet, beyond Washington’s insecurities, a few truths are evident. America’s distraction in Russia which now looks increasingly like a US-led war by the West against Kremlin with Ukraine as its proxy, overarching focus on the Indo-Pacific and identification of China as the “pacing challenge”, the “only country with both the intent to reshape the international order” — has created a sense of vacuum in West Asia. Key actors in the region interpret America’s Asia pivot through a lens of abandonment. US presence in West Asia is still well entrenched. It still has hundreds of thousands of troops and contractors in the region. Yet, though its security presence in the region hasn’t reduced, its bandwidth for intense engagement, proactive diplomacy and issuing of security guarantees for allies certainly has. Churns in West Asia It may be argued that China’s facilitation of the diplomatic rapprochement is more cosmetic than is apparent because the war-torn, conflict-ridden region has been of late showing signs of settling down. Stemming from Donald Trump administration-authored Abraham Accords, several Islamic nations have either deepened or normalised their relationship with Israel. The I2U2 framework, which some have called a West Asian ‘Quad’ involving Israel, India, the UAE and the US built on the success of the Abraham Accords. But away from this framework, parallel efforts have also emerged. The Houthi rebels and Saudis have been talking for months about the renewal of the ceasefire as the fragile peace has held. Tehran and Riyadh have been talking about reconciliation. The growing political validity and acceptance of the idea of Israel, the general fatigue of war, and Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman’s push towards bringing wide-ranging social and economic change to the Kingdom have resulted in an atmosphere conducive to a shift in paradigm. Difference in China’s approach China may not possess the alliance networks of the US, but as the biggest importer of fossil fuel, it enjoys incredible leverage over the key actors. It is the biggest importer of Iranian oil, Saudis make up one-fifth of China’s import bill of oil and natural gas, and as Tuvia Gering, an expert in Chinese politics and foreign policy points out in Atlantic Council, “China has been fortifying its strategic ties and expanding its cooperation by heavily investing in local Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects” in the MENA (Middle East and North African) region”. It has been building numerous infrastructure projects from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea and has “formed a web of ‘Silk Roads’ spanning multiple fields: the digital and data domains with smart-city grids, submarine fiber-optic cables, 4G and 5G communications, artificial intelligence (AI)… helping wean the region off its reliance on fossil fuels by harnessing solar, hydro, wind, and nuclear technologies.” To this increasing leverage, China brings a culture of ‘non-interference’ to the table that has greater appeal in a region where democracy, by and large, isn’t the preferred political system. While the US-led collective West tries to evangelize its ‘values’ and democratic political system in foreign policy, issues frequent lectures on domestic policy and human rights, China’s negotiating strategy is based strictly on mutual interests. Therefore, while tying foreign policy to the apron strings of ideology may have constrained America’s hand, it presented an opportunity for China in a region where the major players have either been put off by sermonizing or been at the receiving end of western economic sanctions. Evidently, Xi capitalized on the opening. The joint trilateral statement signed in Beijing pointedly refers to the fact that “the agreement includes their affirmation of the respect for the sovereignty of states and the non-interference in internal affairs of states.” When it comes to Iran, China’s focus on economic sops to manage Tehran’s outlook seems to have worked better than America’s economic sanctions and military threats. On the other hand, if Iran has been forced to come to the negotiating table to get a breather from tough economic sanctions and end its international isolation, it would be ironic if America’s strong-arm tactics create space for China to exploit. An alternative framework It was interesting to note, as Wall Street Journal reports, that all parties in the trilateral joint statement “agreed not to use English in the negotiations, with speeches and documents conducted in Arabic, Farsi or Mandarin.” The emphasis on not using English is a conscious shift away from Anglicized framework, American soft power, and ultimately, American hegemony. Seen from this prism, it makes sense why the deal made the US sound irritable and worried. Not only is China offering a security alternative based on ‘Chinese wisdom and solutions’, the Beijing-backed diplomatic mediation projects the message that the Chinese system can offer an alternative framework to the US-led rules-based order. Related to this message is the subtext that where American diplomacy has failed China, America’s peer competitor, has succeeded. The deal, therefore, becomes much bigger than a diplomatic détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia and, as Yun Sun of Stimson Center tells New York Times, transforms into a “battle of narratives for the future of the international order.” In this battle, China must set the rules and build the order, and brokering a difficult deal between two difficult rivals is an opportune step towards creating a post-Western order where interest-based negotiations displace values-based ones, and Chinese interests are firmly ensconced. Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook , Twitter and Instagram .