The Indo-Tibetan border has had multiple opportunities to get settled in the past, but there are many reasons as to why it could not be settled. Though this border extends from the geographic extent of erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir and continues along the states of Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, it also passes through the national boundaries of Nepal and Bhutan in its wide traverse. When this border issue came to the fore and direct conversations started between India and China, as Beijing had forcefully occupied Tibet in 1951 unopposed by India, Chinese proposal then and during subsequent negotiations appeared to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary in Arunachal Pradesh but it sought large concessions for retention of Aksai Chin while some minor adjustments could be carried out in the middle sector. As part of the resolution of the border issue, maps were exchanged between India and China initially for the middle sector as these were considered ‘low hanging fruits’ or ‘early harvests’. India was largely in agreement with this sectoral approach to the border settlement but it was China which had initially agreed to the methodology of pocket settlement and but now prefers the complete package settlement to include the entire length of the border. The issue of exchange of maps for the border settlement met negative reaction as China took this as a justification for the legitimate claim by India specially in the Western sector. Though the exact modalities with requisite clarity are not available in the open domain, this activity was reverted in the western sector. In any case it did not reach the stage of exchange of maps in the eastern sector. The border issue settlement between Bhutan and China is closely interlinked to the border settlement issue of India with China and has to be factored accordingly. It was realised by both sides that the border resolution issue is too complex to resolve simplistically and the same has been further compounded by Pakistan handing over Shaksgam valley to China and China using the Indian claimed areas of Aksai chin not only to link its Tibet and Xinjiang provinces but extending its reach to Central Asian Republic (CAR) in addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan now shaping in the form of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Both the countries therefore focused on delineation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) so that peace and tranquillity can be maintained by both sides whereas border issues could be resolved later. Even efforts to delineate LAC did not succeed as there were areas of differing perceptions in multiple areas. As against accepting a middle path for the areas of differing perceptions, both countries have been articulating the justification as to why their stance is correct and the stance of the other is incorrect. As a result of this, leaving aside the border issue, the LAC alignment also remains unresolved. This is creating a condition of “Advantaged China” where on one hand, it is already in the adverse possession of Indian claimed territory of Aksai Chin and on the other hand, it is putting undue pressure on India for its false claim on Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet. When all these issues of border and LAC were under deliberation, China transgressed at multiple locations on the LAC in eastern Ladakh. The resolved transgressions are also resulting in new normals wherein a buffer is being created on LAC and being accepted by India. China may replicate such attempts at other locations of LAC as well wherein it transgresses first, opposed by India later and then resolved by mutual discussion creating buffers all along. It will be closer to the Chinese thought process of creation of buffers along the LAC with a depth of close to 20 km, though these buffers now being accepted have much thinner dimensions. If China succeeds, it would create a buffered LAC all along, with due ratification by India, and a new norm of LAC alignment will emerge. China has built more than 600 villages. By settling the population close to LAC, it is exploiting the agreement signed between both the nations in 2003 wherein the interests of settled population are one of the considerations for border resolution. This ‘lawfare’ condition will be further exploited by China through its new land border law enacted on 23 October 2021 and implemented with effect from 1 January 2022. These combined activities of China will cement the so-called borders along the newly formed LAC. It is obvious that this will become a de-facto border between India and China as the new buffered LAC alignment will have our acceptance as well. Combined with this is our inability to take Aksai Chin by military force now given the current and future extrapolated asymmetries especially when China remains on own side of the buffered LAC. China will be retaining this advantageous position and will continue exerting pressure in the support of its claim on Arunachal Pradesh. Combined with this is the border settlement with Bhutan which will be strategically disadvantageous to India due to proximity of Chumbi valley with narrow Siliguri Corridor. It is highly likely that once China succeeds in the creation of a buffered LAC, it will stall discussion on the border settlement for times to come. It may best agree to accept this buffered LAC as the border between the two countries. It appears that we might have missed out this facet in our negotiations. While it is correct to demand and accept the reversion of China to pre-April-May 2020 locations, it is hoped that China is not playing a big game by this buffered LAC approach as highlighted. It is still time to come out from this arrangement of buffer creation while resolving Depsang and Demchok transgressions wherein earlier ones can also be modified to reach pre-April-May 2020 locations with no buffers anywhere all along the LAC. The writer is a retired army veteran. Views expressed are personal. Read all the Latest News , Trending News , Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.
If Beijing succeeds, it would create a buffered LAC all along, and a new norm of alignment will emerge
Advertisement
End of Article