 "Beijing did not know the location of Barahoti but claimed that it was Chinese. In June 1958, the negotiations between India and China led nowhere.")
The Himalayas are changing very fast, for the good and the less good.
The attitude of the government is also changing; Delhi is slowly reasserting its border with Tibet. This should eventually enable Delhi to better deal with China, which occupied the Tibetan plateau in 1950.
A recent visit to Uttarakhand made me aware of the great changes which are taking place in the area.
First, of course, the improved road network (though this had been severely battered after a particularly heavy monsoon); the communication network with towers now installed in each border village; but also the schools and medical facilities providing a better life to the local populations who are vital for the defence of the borders.
Another change is that the state governments and the different agencies are now allowing domestic visitors to visit some of the border villages, as is done in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh or Sikkim.
Joshimath Sector
An area which is of particular interest to me is north of Joshimath in Chamoli district, which, in 1954, witnessed the first ‘dispute’ with China, when the Chinese troops crossed the customary boundary at a place called Barahoti, north of Niti village, one of India’s ‘First Villages’.
One striking feature is that the Indian and the Tibetan sides of the boundary are extremely dissimilar. The difference in terrain between the Tibetan plateau, where it is easy to build roads, and the difficult approach on the Indian side. This has, of course, tremendous strategic implications for the defence forces, especially when the region suffers heavy rains like this year.
Another difference is the population; here India has an advantage.
As per the last Chinese census, Zanda (or Tsamda) County of Ngari Prefecture (also known as Western Tibet) has a population of 8,454 for an area of 18,083 km². The area north of the international border is sparsely populated, with Tholing Town (an administrative unit below the county) and Daba Township (called Daba Dzong by the locals in India).
Impact Shorts
More ShortsLocated south of the Great Himalayan Range, the Garhwal region has two districts bordering Tibet: Uttarkashi with a population of 330,086, while Chamoli has 391,605 people. One can immediately see the vast difference. One of the positive changes is that India has started to take better care of its border villages by providing them all modern amenities.
On its side, China has built 18 Xiaogang villages opposite Garhwal. These so-called ‘moderately well-off settlements’ are supposed to support the Chinese border defence forces manning the border in this sector. We were told that they remained practically empty despite the heavy Chinese investment.
A clear line of peaks marks the customary border with Tibet; it comprises 13 passes (four in the Harsil sector, then Niti and Mana, and finally seven in the Sumna/Lapthal sectors in the east), which undoubtedly delineate the boundary.
Another particularity of the Garhwal sector is that it was the first area ‘negotiated’ between Delhi and Beijing in 1958.
The First Intrusion
Strangely, it was Beijing who first wrote to India about the intrusion of the Chinese troops, typically a tactic to confuse and put the blame on India.
It all started on July 17, 1954, with a note given by the Chinese Counsellor in Delhi to the Ministry of External Affairs; it complained that “over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti pass on 29 June 1954 and intruded into Wu-Je of the Ali [Ngari] Area of the Tibet Region of China.”
The note specified that ‘Wu Je’ was about one day’s journey from the Niti Pass, adding: “The above happening is not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India and the spirit of the Joint Communiqué issued recently by the Prime Ministers of China and India.”
This exchange was absurd from several points of view; first, it happened just two months after the signature of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement, or ‘Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region and India’ (paradoxically remembered as the Panchsheel Agreement).
A month earlier in the Parliament, the Indian Prime Minister had stated that this agreement was the best thing that he had ever done, while Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, had assured the Indian negotiators that all matters ‘ripe for settlement’ had been resolved.
Beijing had decided to test India by treacherously opening a new front (on a tiny area) in the high Himalaya.
The ‘absurdity’ continued: nobody had ever heard of ‘Wu Je’, which was a new name invented by China, while Beijing did not even know that this place was located south of the Tunjun-la (pass) and therefore in India.
A Historical Background
In a note in July 1952, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) described the topography of the area (today’s Chamoli district of Uttarakhand): “The Garhwal-Tibet border can only be crossed through the Mana and Niti Valleys where there are open places and habitation, while the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers,” adding, “These passes marked the watershed line; north was Tibet (China after 1951), and south was India.”
The intelligence note admitted that once in the 19th century, there was a short boundary dispute about Hoti Plain: “The Tibetan official (called a Sarji, an emissary of the Tibetan Dzongpon or District Commissioner of Daba) usually crossed the border at Tunjun-la pass to announce the beginning of the trading season.”
Though the access to the place was difficult, making it hard to keep a tab on the area, the British were quick to understand the plot and stop the Tibetan official from crossing the pass.
In 1952, the Information Bureau recommended to the Government of India that it was essential that Delhi “should make it clear to the Government of Tibet and its Dzongpon that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory and the Tibetans have no right to establish any customs post there; nor can they exercise any authority in the area.” Unfortunately, the Tibetan government was fast losing its independence, and the new rulers wanted to grab territory.
In June 1958, Subimal Dutt, the Indian Foreign Secretary, wrote to the Prime Minister: “Our case is that Barahoti is an area of about one and a half square miles. We have given the exact position of this area with reference to its latitude and longitude. The Chinese have not defined which area they mean by Wu Je. After a good deal of arguments, all that they have vouchsafed is that it is an area south of Tunjun La, about 15 km north to south and 10 km east to west. This does not define the exact location of the area. If the Chinese claim were conceded, the international boundary would lie south in what is undoubtedly Indian territory.”
Beijing did not know the location of Barahoti (or Wu Je for them) but claimed that it was Chinese.
In June 1958, the negotiations between India and China led nowhere.
In April 1962, the first permanent post was established at Rimkim. Cap (later Lt Gen) Balbir Singh wrote: “On 24 April, the Sherpas and I guided the second batch of 30 STF soldiers to Rimkim. Accompanying this batch were also 15 constables of the UP Armed Constabulary who on 26 April set up a Revenue Collection Post (RCP) for monitoring the graziers’ pasturing in the BGG [the Barahoti Grazing Ground].”
The BGG “is a gigantic amphitheatre of 13,500 ft ASL mean elevation. On its NW and SW rims are ridges one to three thousand feet higher than the BGG plateau floor. But its NE rim, which forms the international boundary with Tibet (China), is barely 500 ft higher than the surroundings, a gateway to BGG over the Tun Jun La (14,500 ft ASL) for the PLA.”
Why India accepted to negotiate is incomprehensible, as there was no dispute; even ethnically, the Rong-pa tribe of Niti or Mana is totally different from the Tibetans; their language is different, and their religious faith is different. India probably wanted to be the good guy and ‘discuss’ the issue with the Chinese bhai.
The Situation Today
More than 70 years later, the Chinese are still visiting the ‘bowl’ three or four times every season, with banners saying that it is Chinese territory, though as far as the Line of Actual Control is concerned, the Chinese claims are today restricted to Barahoti.
Today, there is no reason for India to not allow visitors or trekkers in the area (with an Inner Line Permit if necessary).
The state government should also showcase the old ties with Tibet, in particular the trade with Tholing and Daba, and open a museum (for example, in Mana village) showing the old linkages that this area had with Tibet. It would go a long way to remind China that Tibet was Garhwal’s northern neighbour.
Retrospectively, it is absurd that such a small ‘bowl’ has mobilised so many resources and defence manpower simply due to Chinese hegemonistic tendencies.
The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (Delhi). Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.