Assam is facing clear and present Islamist terror: Here’s how India can counter it

The author had concluded his bestselling 2004 book, Terror Sans Frontiers: Islamist Militancy in North East India, by stating that Islamists in the North East — primarily Assam — continue to be silent, “not by the absence of activity but by the presence of non-activity”. Indeed, the Islamists — in this part of the world — have been eschewing confrontation with the state in order to avoid the attention that such an engagement would create. It was surmised (as has been stated by the author even earlier in these columns) that consequent to such a strategy the ideation is to construct a “doorway” from a realm where radical Islamism thrives — the demographic jungles of Lower Assam — to an area where visible terror can be perpetrated. After all, the places that would attract global attention are in the Indian heartland, in places such as Mumbai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Jaipur and Nagpur. To that end, Bongaigaon, Barpeta and Dhubri — districts of Lower Assam that strategically abut Bangladesh — are mere waypoints in the geo-terror rainforest that a decisive demographic invasion from Bangladesh has created. But of late — especially after the “success” of Op Inherent Resolve which ousted all the radicals from Syria and Iraq when the radicals of the world could have been decisively impounded to one expanse as also the Talibanisation of Afghanistan — radical elements are coming out of the woodworks and into their own. This has been borne out by the fact the recent arrests of several cadres of the Al Qaeda affiliated Ansarullah Bangla Team from different places in Assam. Indeed, a modus operandi which is distinct from the earlier manner of operation has also been unearthed. As a local paper headlined on 31 August, the Islamists are “eyeing street-smart recruits”. Indeed, it has come as no surprise to the author that the Islamists are attempting — and succeeding in some measure — to outwit the authorities by going “high-tech”. An analysis of this observable fact shows that (a) educated Muslim youths with clear motivation are being attracted to radical overtures (b) the epicentre of the global Salafi movement has moved “eastward” and is centred in Bangladesh and Lower Assam (c) radicalisation efforts are becoming sophisticated and have incorporated social media aspects whose reach and range the state has not been able to intercept and (d) there is a clear threat that there is a movement in the Islamist agenda from motivation to action. There is also an interesting development that has come to the fore — perhaps one that has always been part of the Islamist repertoire (as the author has been holding forth for a number of years) but one which has eluded the Indian state because of its inability to comprehend the “erudition” with which a faith had moulded itself since antiquity. While the successes achieved by the Special Branch of the Assam Police is laudable, especially as it has been able to zero onto the stealth Islamists without embarking on a racial profiling exercise, the fact of the matter is that the present “transformative moment” that radical Islam is passing through is fraught with grave danger for India’s security. It is, therefore, important to understand the manner in which Islamists are cloaking themselves. A retracing exercise of the Islamist agenda in the region informs that Assam was first mentioned in the 3 September 2014 televised statement Ayman al-Zawahiri worldwide when the Emir of al-Qaeda proclaimed the creation of Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent. The mention of Assam in the statement — at least to the author — was a clear allusion to the fact that al-Qaeda’s sights were on the state. Indeed, it was feared that half the battle was won the moment the mention of Assam (a puny province in al-Qaeda’s global scheme of things) was made. It was also clear that there was a clear convergence in both motivation and operational manoeuvre between Al Qaeda and ISIS. The exhibited dissonance between the two was only a ruse. In reality, there has always been a strategic convergence of objectives. To that end, whereas al-Qaeda concentrated on the far-enemy, the immediate goal of Daesh, a veritable metrics driven military command and control machinery, was that of holding and expanding territory, which indeed it is doing in Iraq and Syria. The deception was so well-grounded that a former United States Army general and CIA director, David Petraeus, even advised that “less extreme” al-Qaeda affiliates such as ones in Jabhat al-Nusra should be utilised to fight ISIS in Syria. In any event, continual counsel to the effect by the author did not prevail, and the counter-terrorism establishment “lost the plot”, and in the bargain, face, ability to think out-of-the box. Incidentally, according to the Sharia, in certain situations, deception — also known as taqiyya, based on Quranic expression — is reportedly not only permitted but sometimes obligatory. Tawriya, yet another form that allows Muslims to lie to non-believers, is the intentional creation of a false impression. The apprehensions that have been made of late are that all cadres of the Bangladesh-based Ansarullah Bangla Team, whose loyalty is being attributed to al-Qaeda. However, it is once again being underscored that one aspect that must not be disregarded is the unity of purpose in the Islamist agenda. For instance, when the SIMI was banned, its top leadership having being detained, the organisation simply took on a new name that of the Indian Mujahideen which was “disseminated” in the nation’s security firmament with the intention to provide it both novelty and contribute to the degree of confusion. In reality, SIMI was Indian Mujahedeen, and the change of names was but a way to herald not only a change in tactics: SIMI-affiliated militants sought to garner more support from the Muslim community in India than from guest-militants, but also because interchange-ability was a time tested Islamist ploy. Indeed, the compartmentalisation of agenda and action will continue until the state is able to discern this simple act of deception. A careful study would unearth the modus operandi of the Islamists and the fact that it has not only advanced the progression of a united Salafi agenda into Assam, but has succeeded in propagating puzzlement in the security establishment. Therefore, although laudable, the establishment must not tom-tom its fleeting attainments. A calibrated, wide-ranging and integrated drive against one distinct threat should be the aim. After all, the earlier forecast that the Islamist agenda would await until around 2024 and the demise of ethnic militancies in the region before taking up the trenches have been belied. Recent developments have indicated that the course of action of setting up Nizam-e-Mustafa in the region has been expedited. The sights of the state must now be to discover and destroy. The establishment must not allow itself to be dissipated by an assortment of disarray as a result of non-comprehension of the minimalism of a simple case by which a far enemy has endeavoured to navigate the distance from the Middle East to South Asia. The scenario-building should be well-designed, simple and without unnecessary clutter. German Field Marshal Paul Von Hindenburg probably had plainness of analyses in mind when he sought to wed the words “simple” and “war” when he said: In war only what is simple can succeed. The author is a conflict analyst. Views expressed are personal. Read all the Latest News , Trending News ,  Cricket News , Bollywood News , India News and Entertainment News here. Follow us on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.