Anantnag encounter: How Pak proxy terror groups are waging a propaganda war to promote ‘Ambush Hypothesis’

The recent counter-terrorism operations in Anantnag have again brought to the forefront the nefarious design of Pakistan’s ISI to foment unrest in Jammu and Kashmir. One of the key tools created by ISI in this regard is The Resistance Force (TRF). Though it claims to be a local group of Jammu and Kashmir, the fact is that it is a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist group carrying out subversive activities in Jammu and Kashmir.

Origin of the TRF

On the global stage, Pakistan is viewed as a hub of terrorism. Because of its active support to various terrorist organisations in the South and West Asia region, Pakistan was placed for the first time on the grey list of the global money laundering and terror-financing watchdog, Financial Action Task Force in 2008. Since then, it has been on and off the grey list. Through greylisting, FATF had placed tremendous pressure on Pakistan to come clean on terror funding.

More from Opinion

77th Republic Day: How India is biding its time, carving a geo-strategic space in an uncertain world Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Abu Dhabi show progress, but final deal remains contentious

Pakistan received its first major jolt from FATF on 8 March 2019, when the former announced that Daesh, Al Qaeda, Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD), Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Haqqani Network and persons affiliated with the Taliban were high-risk entities. FATF gave the Pakistan government an ultimatum to take concrete actions against these terror outfits or continue to be on grey list. Being on the grey list for almost a decade had already taken a toll on Pakistan’s economy. So it decided to create a smokescreen by creating the TRF in the wake of the abrogation of Article 370 in India that earlier gave rise to fissiparous tendencies by giving special status to Jammu and Kashmir. With the active collaboration of the Pakistan Army and ISI, a number of terrorists from LeT and other groups were brought under the umbrella of TRF.

TRF has claimed that the terrorist attack in the forests of Kokernag in Anantnag was its retaliation against the killing of Muhammad Riyaz. It may be recalled that Muhammad Riyaz alias Abu Qasim Kashmiri was an LeT commander who was shot dead by unidentified gunmen a few days ago at Rawalkot in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK). This statement by the TRF itself proves its allegiance to LeT.

Quick Reads

View All

77th Republic Day: How India is biding its time, carving a geo-strategic space in an uncertain world

The Oscars don’t reward cinema, they ratify the narrative of the moment

Pakistan nurturing proxy terrorist groups against India

In 2019, apart from TRF another proxy terrorist group — People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) — also came into existence. This was a proxy of another Pakistan-based terror group JeM.

PAFF is the same terrorist group which had claimed responsibility for twin terror attacks on Indian Army in Poonch-Rajouri on 20 April and 5 May respectively. Apart from TRF and PAFF, there are some more such proxy terrorist organisations created through the collaboration of Pakistan’s Army and ISI. These proxy terror outfits are Kashmir Freedom Fighters (KFF) and J&K Gaznavi Force (JKGF). A careful analysis of these proxy groups reveals the following:

Motive: All these proxy groups were created with the aim to mask the funding and support to the terrorist groups against India and subsequently evade scrutiny of anti-terror funding organisations such as FATF. There has been a concerted effort to project terrorism as a political struggle by creating a façade of local resistance.

Naming conventions: These proxy terror groups have been given non-religious names to get greater acceptance from the Western world.

Use of social media: All these proxy terror groups have made their affiliated social media accounts which they use to spread their propaganda and lay claim to any terrorist incidents. These social media accounts are extensively used to propagate anti-India agenda and threaten non-locals/political workers/sympathisers of security forces. The propaganda disseminated through these proxies has institutionalised support from Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI. Last year more than 56 threats were recorded to have been released by proxy groups. Maximum No of threats were against the alleged demographic alteration of Kashmir valley and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits. These were followed by threats to civilians working for Security Forces, journalists covering government-related issues, police personnel and migrants/non-locals working in Jammu and Kashmir.

Claiming of terrorist actions: These proxy tanzeems have been prompt in claiming responsibility of terrorist incidents. Initially there used to be instances of multiple proxies claiming for an incident, now the process seems to have been streamlined where a terrorist action is exclusively claimed by a particular proxy group. These proxies have been using heavily edited graphics of the terror incidents along with multimedia special effects to promote their narrative on various social media and conventional media platforms.

Finance and support: The proxy tanzeems continue to draw its support and finances through their respective affiliated parent tanzeems. However, given the severe economic crisis in Pakistan and strong vigil along the borders by Indian armed forces, the funding of these terrorist groups has taken a significant hit in the past few years.

Psychological warfare by the proxies: These proxy terrorist groups are involved in conducting psychological operations at the behest of their Pakistani intelligence handlers. They use it to influence the youth of J&K to join their ranks. A classic example of the same was unveiled during the Kokernag incident.

Propaganda: TRF had laid a successful ambush in Kokernag.

Fact: Based on specific int input the operation was launched by IA & JKP on the night of 12/13 September. A cordon was established and a detailed search of the Garol village was conducted. Based on further leads, obtained during the search, it was ascertained that the terrorists were in a hideout in higher reaches above the village which was covered with dense foliage and undergrowth. Given the difficult terrain and lack of clear field of view, a search was temporarily halted at night and resumed next day in daylight. The multiple search columns at the higher reaches were being led from the front by Col Manpreet Singh, along with the company commander and Deputy SP Humayun Bhat. The columns had to move through rugged terrain with dense foliage and undergrowth. Such terrain provided natural cover to terrorists from ground and aerial observation also, they were hiding in pre-prepared hideouts. Being located in upper reaches had given the terrorists an additional advantage over the searching columns. On 13 September at approx. 1230 h the columns came under heavy fire. The search column retaliated but in the ensuing fire fight Col Singh, Major Ashish Dhonchak and DSP Humayun Bhat suffered gunshot wounds and later succumbed to the injury.

Careful analysis of the timelines of the operation reveals the following:

(a) The operations were started on the night of 12/13 September but, there was no claim from TRF/ LeT initially.

(b) As soon as the news of causalities suffered by the Indian Army and JKP during the operation came out in media around 1400 hrs on 13 September, the affiliated Social Media handles of TRF/LeT started claiming responsibility for the “Surprise Counter Attack”.

(c) Then at around 1500 hrs on 13 September as the reports of serious injury of the DySP, Commanding Officer Col Singh and Major Dhonchak started coming out, these handles started propagating the narrative of “Planned Ambush Attack” to avenge the killing of Mohammad Riyaz at Rawalkot.

(d) Soon the media channels and social media were buzzing with this “Ambush Hypothesis”.

(e) On 14 September, as soon as social media started buzzing with messages seeking answers from the government regarding the terrorist attack, the TRF handles started the next phase of their propaganda by targetting the Lt Governor and the Director General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir.

(f) By the morning of 15 September, the TRF handles started drawing parallels between the Kokernag incident and the Handwara Attack of 2020 in which significant causalities were suffered by the Indian Army and Jammu and Kashmir Police.

(g) By 15 September, Indian Army had already put in more resources for reconnaissance in the area and had identified the hideout locations of terrorists. These hideouts were targeted with high-calibre weapons and armed quadcopters. By 1500 hrs on 15 September, TRF handles started propagating false narratives that all the terrorists involved in the incidents including LeT Commander Uzair Khan had successfully exfiltrated from the site of encounter and reached at a safe point. However, as the Indian Army continued targetting these hideouts soon thereafter came another statement from TRF handles warning security forces from using armed quadcopters against their fighters.

(h) On 15 September in the evening ADGP Kashmir in his press brief and subsequently on its official social media handles called for retired police and army officers to avoid propagating the “Ambush Hypothesis”. He categorically specified that it was an input-based operation.

The “Ambush Hypothesis” is being propagated by Pakistan and its proxies as this gives undue hype to the terrorists of being able to carry out successful attacks on Indian security forces. While, in reality it was the difficult forest terrain because of which the Indian Security Forces suffered these causalities. What need to be understood that any live encounter in a densely forested terrain such as Kokernag carry very high probability of risks to lives of the security forces. Such a scenario often requires the commander to be located closer to the area of action to have better access and control of the operations. Also, it is within the finest tradition and training of the Indian Army to have commanders leading their troops NO matter how dire the circumstances might be.

Imagine yourself walking through dense foliage unable to see ahead. While this foliage significantly restricts your view it does not provide any protection from bullets. The first volley of fire from an entrenched and hidden enemy has the highest probability of killing. Modern-day surveillance equipment may not always be very successful in detecting hideouts in such terrain.

The writer is an author and columnist and has written several books. He tweets @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost_’s views._

Read all the  Latest News,  Trending News,  Cricket News,  Bollywood News,
India News and  Entertainment News here. Follow us on  Facebook,  Twitter and  Instagram.