In 1996, P. Satyanarayanamurthy, assistant director, commiserate of Technical Education, Hyderabad was caught with his pants down— with Rs 500 that he took from S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, owner of Rama Typewriting Institute, Kurnool for extension of license.
The bribe giver fortunately did not give it post 2013 as according to the new amendment, it makes the giver of the bribe including corporates, liable for punishment under the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988, that targets the public servants.
Be that as it may, had he been alive he would have had the mortification of seeing the corrupt official being acquitted by the Supreme Court on the ground that the prosecution did not adduce any evidence that he demanded the bribe.
The Supreme Court has set store by sections 7 and 13 of the Act according to which, it requires the prosecution to prove that bribe was demanded in the first place.
In other words, mere unearthing of the illegal money or assets is not sufficient to nail an official with an itchy palm– it has to be proved by the prosecution that the accused demanded the bribe. This renders presumption of mens rea by section 20 not so helpful. Under section 20, it is presumed that the public servant took illegal gratifications with a view to facilitating the bending or circumventing of the law unless the accused proves otherwise through cogent evidence.
This is a big relief for the prosecution but the new requirement read in by the Apex Court would pour cold water on its enthusiasm, nay the very sustainability of the charge of corruption because first it has to discharge a very onerous responsibility– finding the evidence for demand of bribes.
The Supreme Court, it is respectfully submitted, ought to have read down section 7 and 13 so as to make them subservient to the overarching objective of the Act– to shift the onus of proving innocence on the accused. Normally, the prosecution has to prove mens rea but the Parliament in its wisdom thought corruption the scourge of our politics and administration cannot be fought with normal laws and jurisprudence.
Scamsters and bureaucrats with itchy palms would laugh up their sleeves at this huge relief conferred by the Apex Court. They may be caught with their pants down. Disproportionate assets relative to their known sources of income may be found.
Yet they might smugly defy and escape conviction because they might have taken care not to leave any tell tale marks of demand of illegal gratifications.
Indeed no corrupt person offers his head on the chopping block by doing so. His demand for bribes is always through innuendos and complicity on the part of favor seekers. Yes, the speed money, hush money etc is negotiated but away from the public glare, in clandestine hideouts where the interlocutor is frisked to make sure he is not carrying a spycam.
The government must forthwith move the Supreme Court with a curative petition praying for harmonious interpretation of section 20 and sections 7 and 13 so that the objective of the law is furthered and taken forward instead of being frustrated which the reading in of an impossible condition—proof of demand—amounts to.
In fact the Act should give up its fixation about disproportionate assets relative to the accused person’s known sources of income. Why should the prevention of corruption law take it upon itself the onerous and impossible task of finding the ill-gotten assets given the fact that the institution of benami always frustrates such efforts?
Is it not enough if the dishonorable intent of the public servant is there for all to see? The Supreme Court, it is respectfully submitted, has muddied the waters further by stipulating a near impossible condition—proof of demand of bribe or illegal gratification.
If mens rea can be presumed, so can the demand be. The chastened tribe of public servants now fears tell-tale mediums like emails and cell phones. In the event, the Supreme Court should have been alive to the reality that no one signs his own death warrant.