How to rebuild the CBI

THIS, there is no doubt about: India’s premier anti-corruption investigation agency faces the most serious crisis since its inception. The ugly fight between its two top officials, who levelled corruption allegations against each other, is just a part of the larger problem. Three previous Directors and a Special Director are being investigated for corruption; there are a welter of similar allegations among its own investigators; acquittals and even discharges of cases are rising. Now, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chief Justice of India Rajan Gogoi and Opposition leader Mallikarjun Kharge are trying to find an officer who can resuscitate the comatose organisation. [caption id=“attachment_4731151” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] Representational image. PTI.[/caption] Irrespective of who they find, the solution will only be skin deep because the real problem in Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) runs far deeper than most understand. The problem is not new. In its 1997 Vineet Narain judgment, the Supreme Court (SC) gave the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC) functional control of the CBI, in a bid to contain government interference, and called for the setting up of a selection panel to choose its director. Later modified through CVC Act, and subsequently by the Lokpal & Lokayukta Act, the system has clearly failed to ensure integrity and competence in the organisation. It was believed that the Director who was given a two-year fixed tenure in the new system, and could be removed only on the recommendation of committee which proposed his induction, would ensure the CBI’s autonomy. This has patently failed. Why? Earlier, the selection of officers up to the rank of Deputy Inspector-General was made on recommendation of a junior board, and other senior officers on recommendation of a senior board. These boards consisted of the CBI Director and other senior officers of the Ministry of Personnel and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The recommendations of the senior board were, in turn, approved by the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet. IPS officers working in the states were cherry-picked based on their integrity, competence and aptitude for investigation, which was followed by detailed verification by the field unit and intelligence wing. For senior officers, a CBI stint held the key. The system didn’t always work—but sending undeserving officers back to their cadre was a relatively simple process, which was often used. But the new system of selection involved consultation only between the Director and the selection committee. The result is there for all of us to see. Officers of questionable competence and integrity made the grade in the CBI. Few had experience of working in the CBI; many proved poor leaders. The internal vigilance system, which kept a close watch on officers to ensure that the corrupt were identified and action initiated against them, was allowed to become slack. In certain cases, no exemplary action was taken against some known rogue officers. Moreover, induction from state police forces has trickled down to a minimum, which has resulted in exponentially high number of officers being taken on deputation from Central Armed Police Forces with no previous experience of investigation. This dilution of time tested internal checks and balances has led to the current sorry state of affairs. I believe that the credibility of an investigation organisation is built and sustained on the competence of its human resource, and the quality of its leadership. Falling standards of human resource and poor leadership have led to the decline in the credibility and professionalism of the CBI—and fixing it will need major structural reforms. At present, the members of the committees to select Director and other senior officers largely depend on the annual performance appraisal reports and the vigilance clearance given to the respective cadre controlling authorities. In a meeting of an hour or so, the PM, the CJI and the Leader of the Opposition have no time to sift between many apparently-qualified personnel. The net result being poor supervision at senior level, a steady decline in investigation standards and slowing down its pace. The only way forward is to revamp the induction process. An empowered selection committee, assisted by independent experts, should be tasked with screening eligible officers, making elaborate background checks regarding their integrity and professional competence and if required make enquiries with officers who have known them. Following its investigation, the committee could shortlist four or five officers ranking them on merit and provide the names to the Selection Committee. The committee may choose even to call such shortlisted officers for personal interaction. Similarly, the CVC-led committee meant for selecting supervisory officers should be assisted by a body of independent professionals. The expert panel may also take into account the inputs of the CBI’s internal vigilance unit. The selected senior officers must meet clearly-defined standards of professional acumen. In particular, policy of inducting senior officers who have no past record of working must be reversed. Officers who have distinguished themselves in previous tenure must be preferred over others. Investigation officers of experience and proven integrity, from the different state police forces must be drawn to the organisation, as they were earlier. These officers could revert to the states, like IPS officers on deputation, after an interval of five or six years, carrying with them valuable investigation experience. Finally, I believe it is important to add a note of caution. Parliamentary committees, and others, have suggested that the direct recruitment to the CBI at different ranks needs to be increased, thereby slowly reducing induction on deputation. In my opinion, that would be a perfect recipe for disaster. Not only directly-recruited officers lack the experience of investigators from the state police forces, it is extremely difficult to remove those suspected of corruption or inefficiency. Tinkering with the system isn’t going to solve the problem. We have to get down to the task of rethinking it, bottom-up. The writer, an IPS officer, retired as Director General of Bureau of Police Research & Development having served in senior positions at the National Investigations Agency and Central Bureau of Investigation.