E-voting to become reality soon? Here’s what Election Commission should do before going for blockchain polls

India has been exploring the possibilities of implementing a remote voting system through technologies such as blockchain since the past few years. The Election Commission  has taken up  this idea with enthusiasm, and has been working towards initiatives that could bring a blockchain-based remote voting system to reality. In this light, it would be interesting to explore a case for conducting elections over a blockchain system—whose theoretical underpinnings ensure a transparent and accountable record of data. However, as we explore the various implications that arise out of adopting such a technology, it would be imperative to understand its underpinnings (technical and theoretical) in order to assess its viability for the greater good of the electoral system in India. Remote voting through the blockchain system would include  similar  practices that are followed in cryptocurrency transactions, with the only difference being that instead of a virtual currency, there is a virtual token representing a ‘vote’. This would entail a peer-to-peer technology that would utilise encryption and a write-once model (a model in which information, once written, cannot be modified. This assures that the data cannot be tampered with once it is written). The electronic ledger will allow private and secured registration information and ballots to be transmitted over the Internet. However, the ballot rolls and the counting of the votes would be displayed in the public domain, in order to ensure transparency and prevent fraudulent practices. International perspective Countries such as the United States, Argentina, Russia, Estonia, Thailand and South Korea in the past have utilised the blockchain methods for conducting voting processes for their citizens, with a fair share of positives and negatives deriving consequentially. In the United States, third-party applications such as Votem and Voatz have assisted in conducting such polling processes, alongside local county governments of  West Virginia ,  Denver  and  Utah .  Votem  worked on a model where the voters check that their individual votes were counted, whereas  Voatz  supplemented the blockchain framework with biometric identity verification, using smartphones and tablets’ built-in fingerprint readers and facial recognition to authenticate voters. In  Argentina , a local party start-up called Democracy Earth had conducted a blockchain voting system prototype on the basis of an open-sourced model.  Russia  had its government authorities conduct runs of blockchain-based elections in 2019 and 2020, respectively. In  Thailand , members of the Democrat Party utilised blockchain systems for conducting internal elections for their party leaders. South Korea  is planning to explore blockchain in online voting, by approving a pilot of a blockchain-based voting system through the National Election Commission that can be used by more than 10 million people. This is likely to be one of the largest-scale blockchain online voting drives around the globe. On the basis of the outcome produced by the pilot scheme, the Korean government shall take a call on nationwide implementation of the same in the future. India’s position India too has had a positive response towards exploring the implementation of blockchain networks across several sectors, including election systems. The foremost example is that of the  Telangana  government, which aims at implementing an experimental run towards an e-voting idea. It has raised a point towards building the voter’s trust towards such remote voting systems by aiming at holistic user inclusion. In May 2019, the state government published a ‘ Blockchain Policy Report ’ (BPR), which discussed the relevancy of blockchain in a wide variety of domains, including tax filings, voting, land registry setups, utilisation of healthcare facilities, creation of tamper-proof voting records, registration of vehicle and licences, fraud-proof welfare scheme disbursements, and digital identities for individuals such as refugees, who lack government-issued identity documents. BPR also  advocated  the use of biometric facial recognition technologies (FRT) for voter identity authentication, as well as connecting the voter’s phone number and International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) to voter ID for verification in rural voting systems. In 2020, the Election Commission conducted several  discussions  and  demonstrations  with various state government, policy think tanks, and private industry stakeholders to explore the idea of a nationwide remote blockchain election system. In February 2020, it had  collaborated  with the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras (IIT-M) to develop a new technology that will allow electors to vote from far away cities without going to the designated polling station of their respective constituencies via a blockchain system. The model followed by them was that of a ‘two-way’ blockchain remote voting process that would entail voter identification and authorisation on the Electoral Registration Officer Network (ERO Net) using biometric data and web cameras for authentication, followed by a blockchain based e-ballot generation, which would convert into a vote once the hash code would be generated on its execution. The encrypted remote votes cast would once again be validated at the pre-counting stage to ensure that they have neither been decrypted, nor tampered with or replaced. Election Commissioner Sunil Arora proposed to link voter IDs with the Aadhaar Card if India adopts a blockchain voting model as a solution for the long run. At this point, there is minimal clarity on the actual process that shall be adopted in order to implement the election process, i.e., whether the election would take place on remote devices, or voting centres shall host devices that are capable of recording the votes on the day of elections. However, a brief mention of this issue had taken place at a  conference  by former senior deputy election commissioner Sandeep Saxena, where he stated that if blockchain elections are implemented, voters would be required to physically report at the allocated voting, and users would have to provide biometric authentications in order to be eligible to cast their vote. In March 2021, then chief election commissioner Sunil Arora stated that e-voting through blockchain systems via app-based technologies are being properly  explored  for the 2024 general elections. Evaluating upsides and detriments Addressing technical issues As we look at the lessons that can be inferred from blockchain election systems, let us first delve into the  positive  side of the spectrum. Blockchain voting has shown to: a) reduce geographical barriers and increase turnout in voting numbers; b) promoting security towards recording of votes as opposed to physical tampering; c) an enhanced efficiency in counting votes; and, d) minimising errors and easing the overall process for the voter by utilising basic features such as FRTs and biometric identification protocols. As a whole, the use of blockchain brings a lot of potential advantages for voting systems: i) transparency, ii) immutability, iii) high availability, iv) reliability, v) auditability, and vi) voter confidence. For example, the county voting in the US counties helped increase the remote voters’ turnout from  3% to 5% . As a whole, to counter the difficulties and citizen’s growing anxiety towards traditional offline ballot elections, the shift towards an online system on the blockchain has shown promise. On the other hand, the  negatives  which this framework presents easily convince us to take a step back and look at the actual effectiveness of this idea. A primary point to note is that the adequacy and efficacy of blockchain technology are often not evaluated on the basis of sound theoretical and practical claims, but rather on the intuition of trust, transparency, accountability, decentralisation, and the guarantee of political equality in a democratic setup. However, it can be stated that blockchain technology in elections is a double-edged sword and one needs to ponder upon whether there are additional complications that arise out of the same. If the information on a blockchain—either of an individual or the entire dataset—comes into the eyes of the public or a hacker, the entire security element of the blockchain is breached. As governments centralise the digital identities of their individuals for voting processes, their data becomes vulnerable to the authorities and the third-party body that is facilitating such a transaction. In course of this, issues that arise are cybersecurity vulnerabilities and malware attacks by third parties, which can be obtained by either attacking the voter’s personal device(s), or device(s) installed at a voting center. Stealing biometric information at the pre-voting phase, or infecting the blockchain during the counting phase, both stand as equally dangerous issues in a democratic setup. Network attacks could also reveal where a given user was voting and potentially suppress votes in the process. In such a case, if the blockchain displays all the votes to be in public domain, a simple hack into the system puts thousands of people’s data at risk. As a whole, the fundamental issues that arise through blockchain election are as follows: i) cybersecurity vulnerabilities, ii) malware attacks by third parties. Further, the application of this system can involve iii) vulnerable collective choice mechanisms, iv) dubious technical safeguards, and v) geographical hurdles. Analysing substantive issues Since developing a consensus mechanism is essential to the core of a blockchain system, if there is an involvement of corruption in the election process (either at the hands of the third-party vendor, or politically inclined attack on the blockchain ballot), the entire idea behind the democratic and decentralised blockchain turns counterproductive in nature. Further, the issue of individual privacy and data protection in the course of collation, authentication of personal data for blockchain elections require significant deliberation. While the blockchain process functions towards ensuring that a vote recorded onto the system shall be public (and not tampered with), the process of authentication of a voter (which includes elements of biometric and personal data) can be of concern. Therefore, in order to ensure an effective blockchain election system, two points stand pertinent: i) the cryptography involved blockchain election system should ensure a tamper-free record, display, and calculation of data involved in the election; and, ii) policymakers should pay attention towards the aspect data protection and privacy in the course of authenticating a valid voter via biometric systems. The way forward for India As we grapple with understanding the effectiveness and scope of implementing blockchain elections in a country like India, we need to address more fundamental issues alongside the ones that have already been mentioned above. The country has a dearth of computer and Internet access around the nation, alongside the illiteracy and ignorance of citizens towards the adoption of such advanced technologies. According to the 2011 Census, roughly  51 million  individuals belong to the category of migrant and seasonal workers, who have issues in accessing basic voting facilities during elections. Although the blockchain election system comes with promise to develop and ease hassles by promoting remote voting, looking at the technical issues faced vis-à-vis precedents around the globe, coupled with problems unique to our country, the future of complete reliance on this technology does seem to be a distant one. In comparison to the EVMs, although a cryptographically sound blockchain election system does provide promise, there needs to be technological robustness and resource abundance in the country in order to implement the same. At this point, it is suggested that India takes an observatory stance while building its technological infrastructure. There are two fundamental elements that ensure electoral success in a democracy (among other nuanced points): i) voter awareness, and ii) infrastructural stability. As India struggles at both of these fronts at this point, it would be prudent for us to take methodical steps in improving our position in these aspects. As an instant measure to counter geographical hurdles, ideas such as ‘proxy voting’ and ‘by-post voting’ can be taken up, which can ensure a larger voting turnout in upcoming election cycles. In terms of improving electoral technology, India can work towards making the EVM safer and more secure at this point, while picking up lessons from foreign countries on their blockchain election experiences and implementing the same when we are much better equipped as a whole. India requires revisions in its privacy laws, election policies, technical resources, and governance methods, in order to ensure that it is future-ready in the advent of emerging technologies—especially with regards to elections on a blockchain system. Only then would the government be successful in implementing the same. The author is a fourth-year student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Views expressed are personal.