Chhattisgarh attack: Why more troops is not a clever strategy

In a land that already has 30,000 paramilitary personnel deployed for anti-naxal operations, the Centre on Chhattisgarh chief minister Raman Singh’s request has rushed in another 2,000 to the area. Clearly shaken by the killing of 27 people, many of them senior Congress leaders in the state, the government wants to show its iron fist to the Maoists. [caption id=“attachment_819807” align=“alignleft” width=“380”] Tactical retreat is a term used by the Maoists. The police will need to embrace it and make it part of its vocabulary. AFP[/caption] A clever strategy? Not really. By pumping in extra numbers the political establishment — both in New Delhi and in Raipur — has shown that it has learnt no lessons from the IPKF misadventure against the LTTE in Sri Lanka. If the Indian state is to effectively deal with the challenge thrown at it by the Maoists, it needs to get its strategies right. And for that it is necessary to know its enemy. Here is why : 1. I recall a session that Andhra Pradesh cadre IPS officer Nalin Prabhat, now posted as IG (Operations) in the Valley, conducted with his jawans in Sukma in Chhattisgarh when he was posted there. “Fighting the Maoists is a battle of wits, it is not rocket science. You have to out-think the Maoist, not outgun him. You need to know the food, the land, the terrain, the vegetation with each changing season. Because the Maoist knows it as well, if not better than you,’’ he said. These 2,000 extra boots on the ground will be mere tourists in Chhattisgarh, at least in the initial months, and will do nothing much to alter the security architecture beyond adding to the numbers. Asking for more forces also flies in the face of Raman Singh’s written assertion that over 800 security personnel had been deployed both as road opening parties (412 jawans between Sukma and Jagdalpur) and for general security (416 jawans in Sukma and Bastar districts). What the chief minister needs to answer is why on that fateful stretch at Darbha Ghat, there was not a single jawan present. 2. It is also to be investigated whether the Congress leaders did not inform the district police properly about their movements. It has been found in the past that politicians do not like the police to know who they are meeting and where, especially when state intelligence sleuths are trying to snoop on opposition leaders in a bid to collect political intelligence. And more so during election time. 3. While security in Bastar, a district in the heart of the Red Corridor, should be on high alert 24x7, it is acutely embarrassing how the movement of such a large militia platoon went unnoticed by those meant to gather intelligence on the ground. The buck stops at the table of the State Intelligence Bureau and the IB. Local intelligence gathering is where the security forces in Chhattisgarh have faltered the most. They need to learn from what their counterparts in Andhra Pradesh did so effectively by planting moles in the Maoist outfit, killing them from the inside. Fighting the Maoists isn’t like the climax scene of a Sunny Deol film where the hero can pump in bullets and everyone lives happily ever after. 4. Strategies employed at the moment in fighting the Naxals will need to be revisited. A story about Chandragupta Maurya will be pertinent here. The tale goes that for some reason, Chandragupta’s initial strategy of invading enemy kingdoms did not yield results. One night, when travelling in disguise, Chandragupta stopped at a wayside eatery, where a grandmother was berating her grandson for nibbling at the roti the way Chandragupta Maurya was fighting his battles. “Eat the outer sides first and then move to the centre of the roti. Not like Chandragupta Maurya who straightaway attacks the centre.” The king, who overheard the conversation, learnt his lesson. So ideally the strategy should be to retreat a bit, give them space and a false sense of one-upmanship and then try encircling from all sides. This is where inter-state cooperation would be critical. The CRPF should have its bases on the Chhattisgarh-Andhra Pradesh border inside Khammam district of Andhra Pradesh and launch surgical strikes from there. Attack and retreat. Tactical retreat is a term used by the Maoists. The police will need to embrace it and make it part of its vocabulary. 5. For years, the Maoists have used guerilla warfare against the state’s troops that are invariably large in number. The big lesson that the massacre of 76 CRPF jawans in April 2010 taught the paramilitary force was that since big formations are getting hit, it needs to move around in small groups and behave like a guerilla unit themselves. But the latest request to get in more jawans only shows that the state believes might is right. 6. Naxals do not forgive their enemies. They have permanent action teams always on the prowl to target key politicians and policemen, who they treat as their enemies. Despite Mahendra Karma figuring high on that list and surviving assassination attempts before, the state police and CRPF did not treat his tours in Bastar with the seriousness it deserved. 7. Though both will not admit it officially, there are huge coordination issues between the CRPF and the Chhattisgarh police. The paramilitary unit depends on the district police for logistical support and many a times, one-upmanship spoils what should ideally be a well-coordinated effort. It is time the state police takes the lead instead of expecting the CRPF to fight its battles. 8. Activate the development machinery full throttle. South Chhattisgarh has, for all practical purposes, fallen off the development map. A successful PDS scheme cannot be the sole success story in this part of India. The government needs to put in place officers with a solid development track record, provide them with the security to do all it takes to woo the Adivasis in this belt, away from their Maoist benefactors. 9. The situation on the ground should be in Raipur’s control, not Delhi. If law and order is a state subject, Raman Singh or whoever becomes CM at the end of the year has to take full responsibility. Ego issues between CRPF and Chhattisgarh police, between Congress and BJP, between Delhi and Raipur, is what the naxals are taking advantage of. 10. Go for the top. This was a strategy that worked well in Andhra Pradesh. Many of the top leaders of the CPI (Maoist) take refuge in Dandakaranya and a serious attempt has to be made to get the big guns of the organisation to deflate the morale of the force. Easier said than done, but if the neighbour could do it, why can’t Chhattisgarh.