Chhattisgarh attack: Were CRPF jawans lured into Elamgunda forest by Maoists?

New Delhi: Yet another Maoist attack on security forces in the Sukma district of Chhattisgarh on Monday underlines the glaring truth that security forces are waging a battle already lost in the Maoist heartland, where the latter repeatedly emphasize their supremacy by killing jawans in big numbers. In the latest ambush in the forest of Elamgunda in the Chintagufa area in Sukma district (South Bastar), more than 400 kms from the state capital Raipur, as many as 14 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, including two key officials - deputy commandant DC Verma and assistant commandant Rajeev Kapuria – have been killed. How many more jawans will have to die before the government realises that its efforts don’t measure up to the challenge posed by the Maoists? When he was sworn in as chief minister of Chhattisgarh for the third time in December 2013, Raman Singh vowed that his government would sternly deal with the Left-wing extremism and uproot it. But, no such thing has happened. On the contrary, the number of security personnel, policemen and civilians who have been killed since then has risen. In more than half a dozen attacks between February and March this year, the Maoists have already killed 22 security personnel and civilians. [caption id=“attachment_1830399” align=“alignleft” width=“380”]  Representational image: Reuters[/caption] The attack has come at a time when Chhattisgarh has been claiming record Naxal surrenders in the last six months. Two days back, the CM had said “the Maoists would be finished from Chhattisgarh soon”. The ambush on Monday morning has again raised questions about the modus operandi of the security forces in taking the Maoists head on, and the failure of the on-the-ground intelligence network. The question that is making rounds is whether the CRPF battalion was lured by the extremists or whether it was a flush out operation routinely undertaken by the force in the forests. Nothing is clear yet. According to security forces and local sources, eight teams comprising over 550 personnel from the 223rd battalion of the CRPF, the 206th battalion of the CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) – an elite fighting unit created to track, hunt and eliminate Naxalite groups and the state police got into an intense search and flush out operation by entering into the jungles of Elamgunda – 10 km from Chintagufa police camp on November 29. The paramilitary force is said to have undertaken the operation following information that the CPI (Maoist) cadre, including their senior leaders, would gather to observe People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) Week, scheduled to begin on 2 December. Every year between December 2 and 9 Maoist fighters gather to commemorate the foundation of their military wing. The PLGA is its frontal military wing that executes bloody attacks. With an estimated 15,000-20,000 highly trained guerillas, the PLGA is known to target security forces. Little did paramilitary forces realize that they had stepped into the most dangerous zone of the Maoists (liberated zone) – a part of the Red Corridor, which also is a safe haven for the Maoist cadre. Surrounded by hills and deep forest, Elamgunda is an ideal ground for guerrilla warfare. According to preliminary reports, while a squad of CRPF personnel where conducting combing operations, they were ambushed by the Maoists near Tondamarka village in Kasarpad at around 2 pm. “It’s a Maoist tradition to carry out strikes against security personnel during PLGA week to exhibit their strength and control in areas under their dominance. This time too, they did the same and the CRPF probably missed this point or couldn’t guess its severity,” a counter-insurgency expert told Firstpost. Both state police and local sources have said that the Maoists created a human shield by taking villagers as hostage, and took to heavy firing at the jawans, which left 14 CRPF men dead and 16 injured. Six Maoists were reportedly killed too. “Going by the preliminary news of the operation, the story doesn’t seem accurate and logical. There are serious lacunae in the methodology of the operation. First, the Maoists fired from behind the human shield, but as reported till now, not a single civilian has got wounded or killed in the cross-fire. Second, despite being specially trained, how the CRPF battalion got into the trap laid by the Maoists in their liberated zone is unclear,” pointed out defence analyst Maj Gen (retd) Dhruv C Katoch. “Lack of knowledge of the terrain like Bastar also leads to such disaster. The CRPF wasn’t initially designed to combat militants, and it’s involved in multi-tasking from safeguarding elections to peace-keeping during riots, and moreover they are constantly on move. The need is to deploy a highly trained specialized force dedicated to take on LWE and guerilla warfare in difficult forest terrains. In addition, a grass-root intelligence network has to be more efficient. It is the lack of it that causes such large-scale casualties in Maoists hotbeds,” added Katoch, who has led several counter-insurgence operations. “Our jawans are losing morale in Naxal-infested regions. The gruesome death of their colleagues is one of the reasons for it. There’s so much helplessness growing in them, and they pray that one shouldn’t get posted in these belts,” a CRPF official said on condition of anonymity. Ajit Jogi, former Chhattisgarh chief minister and Congress MP, said: “I feel there were shortcomings in the entire operation. I fail to understand how a CRPF battalion was sent to a place where the Maoists can’t even be touched. Innocent lives were lost because of this.” Former director general, CRPF, Pranay Sahay added, “It’s too early to comment on anything, but prima facie it seems there was a lapse of procedure in the operation that caused such a big casualty.” Counter-insurgency experts opined that senior police officials like the inspector general and deputy inspector general in-charge of Naxal operation should be posted in the jungles along with the police force to provide effective leadership and boost morale of the subordinate staff, instead of being stationed at district headquarters, Local sources in Sukma told Firstpost that intermittent firing continued till 8.30 pm. “As darkness prevailed, it wasn’t possible to recover the dead bodies of the jawans and reinforcements couldn’t be sent.” “The IAF has reportedly refused to get its rescue chopper over there, due to poor light and uncertain ground situation,” a source added. Earlier too, the Maoists had fired at a BSF’s chopper in Sukma in April 2013 and the other at an IAF chopper Mi-17 near Chintagufa on 21 November.